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FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT REVIEW
OFFICE

BUREAU FEDERAL

D'EXAMEN DES EVALUATIONS

ENVIRONNEMENTALES



Held at/Auditions tenues au:

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## BEFORE / DEVANT:

MR. BLAIR SEABORN

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DR. LOUIS LAPIERRE

DR. WILLIAM FYFE

MR. PIETER van VLIET

Chairman/Président

Member/Membre


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---La séance commence à 19h10.

LE PRÉSIDENT: Bonsoir mesdames, bonsoir messieurs, soyez les bienvenus à ces réunions de détermination de l'importance des problèmes tenues par la Commission d'Evaluation Environnementale, chargée de l'examen du concept de gestion et de stockage des déchets de combustibles nucléaires. Cette commission a été établie par le ministre de l'environnement le 4 octobre 1989.

La présente réunion sera tenue et en français et en anglais. Il y a un service de traduction si vous y tenez, qui vous permettra de suivre les discussions en l'une ou l'autre des deux (2) langues.

Et il va sans dire qu'on peut présenter les points de vue ou en anglais ou en français. Les écouteurs sont disponibles au fond de la salle.

Permettez-moi d'abord de vous présenter les membres de la Commission qui sont avec moi ce soir: A ma gauche, à l'extrême -- votre droite, de cette table, monsieur Pieter Van Vliet de Régina, il est ingénieur en mécanique, aussi membre du Sénat de l'Université de Régina.

A côté de monsieur Van Vliet, madame Lois Wilson de Toronto, présidente du Conseil Mondial des





Eglises et co-directrice du Forum Oecuménique du Canada.

A ma gauche immédiate ainsi, monsieur

Louis LaPierre de Moncton, professeur au département de

biologie de l'Université de Moncton et président du

Conseil de l'Environnement du Nouveau-Brunswick.

A ma droite, madame Louise Roy de

Montréal, consultante dans le domaine de

l'environnement et des affaires publiques. Madame Roy

a été vice-présidente du Bureau d'Audiences Publiques

de l'Environnement, elle est présentement membre du

Conseil Canadien de Recherches sur l'Evaluation

Environnementale.

Et à ma droite, à côté de madame Roy, monsieur William Fyfe, de Londres, Ontario, professeur de géologie à l'Université de Western Ontario où il est doyen de la faculté des sciences.

Mon nom est Blair Seaborn et je suis le président de la commission. J'habite Ottawa, je suis actuellement à la retraite mais précédemment, j'étais sous-ministre de l'environnement et président de la Commission Mixte Internationale.

Les membres aussi du secrétariat, je voudrais bien présenter, à la table à gauche ici, monsieur Bob Greyell, qui est secrétaire-exécutif de la





commission.

Et au fond de la salle, madame Suzan

Toller et madame Suzan Flanagan, toutes les deux qui

sont membres de notre secrétariat et qui sont là pour

vous aider si on en a besoin, au courant de la soirée.

Cet examen est effectué conformément aux Processus Fédéral d'Evaluation et d'Examen en matière d'Environnement.

Ce processus assure que les implications environnementales de propositions pour lesquelles le gouvernement fédéral qui est l'autorité décisionnelle, soient prises en considération le plus tôt possible, lors du processus de planification, avant que des décisions irrévocables soient prises.

J'espère que certains parmi vous auront eu l'occasion lors des jours d'accueil en mai et juin de cette année, de recevoir de l'information au sujet de ce processus d'examen et de la proposition d'Energie Atomique du Canada Limitée.

Une des demandes faites à la commission est d'examiner un concept de gestion et de stockage des déchets de combustible nucléaire, qui consiste à stocker de façon permanente le combustible irradié dans les couches profondes de la roche granitique du bouclier canadien.





Cette proposition, la proposition de l'AECL, les déchets de combustible nucléaire seraient scellés dans des containers résistant à la corrosion. Ces containers seraient ensuite placés dans des trous creusés dans le sol des chambres de stockage. Le réseau souterrain de galeries et de chambres de stockage ainsi semblable à une mine profonde, occuperait une superficie d'environ quatre (4) kilomètres carrés.

J'aimerais aussi vous dire quelques mots au sujet du mandat de la commission. La commission est entre autres, chargée d'examiner la sécurité et l'acceptabilité du concept proposé par l'AECL que je viens de décrire.

La commission est aussi chargée d'examiner un large éventail de questions relatives à la gestion des déchets de combustible nucléaire y compris leur gestion à long terme, leur transport et leurs impacts environnementaux et socio-économiques.

Elle étudiera également des diverses approches développées ailleurs dans le monde en matière de gestion et de stockage des déchets de combustibles nucléaires.

Etant donné qu'aucune sélection d'un emplacement de stockage ne sera faite avant que le





concept soit considéré comme sûr, la commission ne déterminera pas d'emplacement mais examinera seulement la carte générale d'emplacements éventuels ainsi que les méthodes requises pour définir les caractéristiques des tels emplacements.

Après avoir dit ce qui est inclus dans le mandat de la commission, il est nécessaire que je vous dise maintenant ce qui n'est pas inclus, ce qui est exclus et ne sera donc pas traité dans cet examen.

Ne sont pas couverts par le mandat, les politiques énergétiques du Canada et de ses provinces, le rôle de l'énergie nucléaire dans ces politiques y compris la construction, l'exploitation et la sécurité des centrales nucléaires tant existantes que futures.

Re-traitement du combustible en tant que politique énergétique et les applications militaires de la technologie nucléaire.

Je tiens cependant à dire très clairement que les membres de cette commission sont très conscients de plus vastes préoccupations concernant l'utilisation de matières nucléaires et de l'utilisation de l'énergie atomique pour la production d'électricité.

La commission a insisté vivement pour que l'on procède à un examen plus étendu des conséquences





environnementales comparées des diverses méthodes de production d'électricité.

Des dispositions ont maintenant été prises pour mettre en tel examen en branle. On est en train de consulter les provinces et les groupes intéressés sur le mandat de l'examen qui j'espère, pourrait commencer bientôt.

Revenons maintenant à nos réunions. Elles ont pour objet de permettre à ceux qui y participent d'aider la commission à déterminer l'importance des problèmes et des préoccupations qui doivent être étudiés dans l'Etude d'Impact Environnementale qui sera faite par l'AECL.

Il ne s'agit donc pas de discuter
maintenant du concept de stockage lui-même. Des
audiences publiques auront lieu plus tard pour discuter
de l'acceptabilité de la proposition faite par
l'AECL.

Après cette série de réunions actuelle, la commission rédigera une ébauche de directives pour la préparation de l'Etude d'Impact Environnemental.

Le public disposera d'au moins trente (30) jours pour faire ses commentaires. Ensuite, après avoir tenu compte de ces commentaires, la Commission rédigera la version finale des directives qu'elle





transmettra à l'AECL . Quand l'EACL aura complété son étude d'impact, un travail qui durera une (1) année, peut-être dix-huit (18) mois, même plus.

Elle la déposera auprès de la Commission et le document sera mis à la disposition du public pour examen pendant un minimum de quatre-vingt-dix (90) jours.

Pour l'aider dans l'évaluation des questions scientifiques et techniques, la Commission a établi un groupe d'examens scientifiques composé d'experts indépendants, éminents, qui examineront la sécurité et l'acceptabilité scientifique du concept de stockage proposé par l'AECL.

Ils présenteront à la commission un rapport de leurs conclusions et de leurs recommandations. Ce rapport sera lui aussi, mis à la disposition du public pour que celui-ci puisse l'examiner.

Lorsque la commission considérera que l'AECL a traité tous les sujets indiqués dans les directives d'une manière satisfaisante, elle tiendra des audiences publiques.

C'est à cette étape de l'examen, que le public sera invité à discuter en détail de l'acceptabilité du concept de stockage de l'AECL.





La commission prendra en considération, tous les commentaires qui lui seront présentés et préparera comme son acte final, son rapport au ministre de l'environnement et de l'Energie, Mines et Ressources.

Les procédures publiées le 24 août cette année s'appliquent aux réunions de détermination de l'importance. La commission apprécierait que les participants veuillent bien s'en tenir à la détermination des questions comprises dans son mandat.

Je prie ceux qui sont inscrits pour faire un exposé de s'efforcer de limiter la présentation à quinze (15) minutes à moins qu'ils n'aient demandé préalablement dix (10) minutes additionnelles.

La commission accordera la même attention aux exposés oraux qu'aux exposés écrits. Les participants inscrits seront invités à présenter leurs opinions à la Commission. Après chaque présentation, la Commission peut poser des questions de clarification, et demander des précisions.

Tous ceux qui souhaiteraient présenter leur point de vue mais ne sont pas encore inscrits au préalable, peuvent s'adresser au secrétariat de la Commission ou à monsieur Greyell, madame Toller ou madame Flanagan, maintenant ou plus tard dans la





soirée. Nous ferons tout notre possible pour satisfaire tous ceux qui veulent nous adresser mais tout dépendra bien sûr du temps dont nous disposerons à la fin de la séance.

Les sténographes enregistreront les débats de chaque séances et des procès-verbaux seront disponibles dans les bibliothèques indiquées. On pourra aussi obtenir au Bureau Fédéral d'Examen et d'Evaluation Environnementale à Ottawa, un recueil des mémoires écrits.

La Commission acceptera des mémoires écrits au sujet de la détermination de l'importance des problèmes jusqu'à la fin de ce mois, jusqu'au 30 novembre 1990.

Et avec cette introduction, je vais
passer la parole maintenant à notre premier participant
qui sera monsieur Gordon Edwards, Canadian Coalition
for Nuclear Responsibility, Regroupement pour la
Surveillance du Nucléaire. Monsieur Edwards, s'il vous
plaît.

## PRESENTATION BY GORDON EDWARDS:

Thank you Mr. Chairman. My name is Gordon Edwards, I'm a mathematician by training, Professor of mathematics and science at Vanier College and President of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility





which is in French Regroupement pour la Surveillance du Nucléaire.

It's a federally incorporated charitable organization. And I have given to the members of the panel a few documents which I think might be relevant.

Unfortunately, I didn't have sufficient copies of the full version of "Nuclear Waste, what me, worry?", but I've made available two (2) copies, that's the bound version.

The spiral bound version of "Nuclear Waste, what me, worry?" is incomplete in that it only contains the material which I prepared in 1978 for the House of Common's Committee on natural resources and public works, which at that time, was looking into the Hare Report.

It was having hearings on the management of Canada's nuclear waste, commonly known as the Hare Report, published by Energy, Mines and Resources in Ottawa. The fuller version has an update that was written in 1987 and presented by me to the House of Commons Standing Committee on forestry and environment.

These concerns are the concerns which the Board of Directors of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, feel are uppermost, in terms of dealing with nuclear waste.





I would like to begin by saying what I think is important to say, and that is that I and the Board of Directors of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, are rather distressed by the manner in which this important subject is being treated.

In particular, we found it really intolerable that the Government of Canada should be conducting environmental assessment hearings on the concept of geological disposal. Frankly, we're all grappling with the question of what is the environmental impact of a concept. It seems difficult for us, it certainly is difficult for us to understand how you can reform an environmental assessment of a concept in the absence of any site. It seems that the definition of environmental impact is that one should have an environment. And if one does not have an environment, then I don't see how you can do an Environmental Impact.

But that's one matter. Another matter is the fact that while these hearings are taking place, the Government of Canada is taking steps to expand the nuclear industry. Taking steps to authorize more nuclear reactors which will be producing more high level, radioactive waste. Now we recently had an





example with the Rafferty Dam situation where a panel of FEARO resigned because they felt themselves in a difficult position, conducting an Environmental Assessment of a project which was under construction at the same time that the Environmental Assessment was taking place.

other members of the board of directors of CCNR, we feel that we are in a similar situation in the nuclear of field. When the minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, who set in motion this process, simultaneously authorizes an extra billion dollars to develop a new nuclear reactor, the Candu 3, over the next seven (7) years and also, gives every indication that such a reactor will be constructed in New Brunswick, one is tempted to ask the question what does this do to the credibility of the FEARO process? Is this... are these hearings to be seen as window dressing or are they to be seen as having a predetermined conclusion.

Now there is a context to all of this and it's a context which I'm afraid is -- you'll bear with me, Mr. Chairman, I would like to just elaborate a little on this, because there is a historical context. And that historical context goes back to the document





which I mentioned to you at the beginning, that is the Hare Report.

The Hare Report was published in 1977 and hearings were begun at the House of Commons

Committee level and there were over three hundred (300) briefs submitted to that committee, most of them, as I understand it, quite critical of the conclusions of the Hare Report, one of them in fact from a vice-chairman of Ontario Hydro, Dean Hoffan, of Queens' University.

Another one from the Professional
Association of Geologists, one of the large
professional Association of Geologists in Canada, and
numerous other excellent briefs, which were critical of
the plan proposed in the Hare Report for geological
disposal of nuclear waste in the Canadian shield.

At the same time, there was a provincial inquiry under way, which was the Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning. That commission, commonly known as Porter Commission, was also having hearings on the subject of nuclear waste and high level nuclear waste, along with many other aspects, such as nuclear safety, etc, etc.

The Government of Canada without waiting for either one of these committees to finish their deliberations, signed an agreement with the Government





of Ontario, to initiate work on essentially implementing the Hare Report's recommendations and that was the 1978 agreement signed by the Energy Minister of Canada, and the Energy Minister of Ontario.

If you read the record, Mr. Chairman, and panellists, of the House of Commons Committee, that had been having hearings into that report, you can read of the frustration and anger of the committee members at being so preempted.

And in fact, that committee never filed a report because it seemed that the government had simply obliterated the purpose of those hearings with a single stroke.

Now, it's those kind of actions, Mr.

Chairman, from the past, which leave a bitter taste in terms of due process and in terms of seriously —

taking seriously, a deliberative process which was in itself, well conceived and was progressing well until it was superseded. There's a very wide spread fear in the environmental community in Canada, that these hearings may suffer a similar fate. And I would like to emphasize that these concerns in no way reflect upon any member of the panel, or the Chairman of this committee. On the contrary, nor does it reflect on the FEARO process. On the contrary, it is due to our





concern for having a good, well respected, highly credible FEARO process, that we raise these concerns.

We fell that it is not to the benefit of the FEARO process to be seen, to be perhaps participating in something which is, which is in fact not a genuine deliberation. And that's why I raise these concerns.

Let me just recapitulate. The fundamental problem I was trying to raise here, is the fact the Government is Canada is committing funds, money and resources and even seems to be on the verge of making decisions which would in fact lead to the construction of new facilities, producing more high level nuclear waste, before waiting for the conclusions of these hearings.

This would be contrary to, at least two

(2) important recommendations that have come out in

Canada, one at the provincial level and one at the

federal level, the Porter Commission, whom I mentioned

earlier, in 1978, recommended that it would be

justified to have a moratorium on nuclear reactors if

suitable progress is not made on this matter of high

level waste disposal.

And, by 1990 I might add, there is also more recently, an all-party House of Commons Committee,





the Committee on Forestry and Environment, which published their report, the Eleventh Hour, also recommending unanimously, Mr. Chairman, that a moratorium on the construction of new facilities producing high level nuclear waste, would be in order until the people of Canada have, the people of Canada, have in fact decided what is the best course of action to take with regard to these nuclear wastes.

Now all of this is based upon a very important consideration. And that is that we must not, I think make the mistake of assuming that every problem that humans bring about, is necessarily solvable.

Now as a mathematician, I can attest, that for many thousand of years, in mathematics, it was firmly believed that this was the case, that in fact, every problem which made mathematical sense, could be solved.

In the 19th century, it was discovered and proved beyond any doubt, that many classical problems dating back to the ancient Greeks, are in fact not only unsolved but unsolvable. They will never be solved.

And they have been proved that they are unsolvable. It has been proved mathematically, that they never will be solved because the very nature of the problem precluded the solution. This is a well known fact in the





mathematical community now, it was certainly not a well know fact in the 18th century.

Perhaps in the physical and engineering sciences, we are just beginning to come up against the limits of our own powers of prediction and control. Perhaps in the physics and engineering sciences and even in the biological sciences, perhaps we may encounter similar types of situations where we have problems which really are not solvable at least not in the terms in which they are posed. And what are the terms in which this particular problem of waste disposal is posed?

advisedly because I think it is very much a presumption, it is a fundamental underlying presumption, that we can continue to produce nuclear waste, high level nuclear waste indefinitely in to the future, without establishing any ceiling on the absolute amount of such waste. And that we will in fact, devise a method for safely storing this material, despite the fact that it is so toxic that all the fresh water in the world is not sufficient to delude it to safe levels as the US Geological Survey has commented in their famous 1978 circular on the subject. This may be folly. It is true that we have waste on hand





already and it is true that we're going to have to do something with it. It is not necessarily true that we can continue producing this stuff indefinitely into the future and expect that it will never come back to haunt us. It may be that the problem perhaps will be solvable if we limit it, but not solvable if we don't limit it. And for this reason, I must object in the strongest possible terms to the terms of reference given to this FEARO panel.

I think that it is not possible Mr.

Chairman, to give proper scope to an Environmental

Impact Statement or to an Environmental Impact Hearing,

if the terms of reference themselves are wrong.

And the terms of reference, as I read them, perhaps I'm reading them wrongly, but as I read them, the terms of reference preclude consideration of certain things which definitely should be considered. One of them for example being, a discrimination between historical waste which we cannot wish out of existence, and future waste which we can.

If we're not allowed to consider
historical waste as being in a different category from
future wastes, if the panel is not allowed to consider
the difference between these two types of nuclear
wastes, than I fear that a sensible approach may be





precluded.

It may be then the case that if the panel were to decide that an acceptable solution existed for waste on hand, that that in effect, gives a green light for the un... unbounded production of such wastes in the future. That is one very strong concern we have about the terms of reference, Mr. Chairman.

Another strong concern we have about the terms of reference is the very fragmentary and non-holistic look at radioactive waste.

The nuclear technology produces not only high level radioactive waste which is in the form of spent fuel or the derived reprocessed waste from that, but also produces very large quantities of highly dangerous uranium tailings as well as the decommissioning wastes resulting from radioactive dismantling of the structures of the nuclear reactors at the end of their lifetime.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I have read carefully the documentation and also speeches made by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited representatives, and it is clear to me, that one of their arguments, which they frequently make in public and which they will probably make to this board, to this panel, is that the high level waste, after a thousand years or so, is not





significantly more hazardous than radioactive ore bodies or the tailings derived from such ore bodies.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I believe this to be true. But I also believe it to be true, that the tailings derived from those ore bodies are a monumental problem. And I don't see how this Committee, how this panel, will be in a position to judge or weigh such arguments or such representations, if they are not allowed to in fact, investigate the toxicity of the uranium tailings, the mistakes which have been made with trying to deal with uranium tailings, the underestimates and false assumptions that have been documented in dealing with uranium tailings.

It seems to be that the panel will find itself unable to judge the validity of such comparisons. And for this reason, I would urge, Mr. Chairman, that the panel ask for better and more complete terms of reference because I think that without such terms of reference, it will not be possible to do a proper job.

I'd now like to turn to the particular -let's say the nitty gritty of the problem which is at
hand, and that is the question of assessing a concept
of geological disposal.

I have made available to the secretary two





(2) copies of this report, which is from the California Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission, dated January 11th, 1978. It's called "Status of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing, Spent Fuel Storage and High Level Waste Disposal".

Now, just briefly Mr. Chairman, may I tell you the context of this report. This report is simply a summary and overview of a very, very large undertaking by the California government.

The California legislature passed three

(3) laws which essentially made it illegal to license nuclear reactors in California until or unless, at least one (1) safe method for disposal of high level radioactive waste was available.

The body which was given the job of seeing whether such was the case, was the California Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission.

And in order to fulfil their mandate to advise the legislature as to whether or not there was such a method for handling high level radioactive waste, this body, which by the way is the body which, as I understand it, gave a state license for nuclear reactors and for other facilities in the States and is quite, quite a large and well funded body -- this body undertook to have extensive hearings with many





thousands of pages of testimony and hundreds of witnesses appearing before them, whom they summoned, to inquiry about the feasibility of geological disposal of high level radioactive wastes.

And I think that the results of the study would be of interest to the panel members. And in fact, the entire multi-volume documentation from this effort, would be of value to the panel members if they could acquire them.

What the upshot was, was that they concluded that there is in fact at present, no method for safely handling these wastes into the indefinite future.

And they raised the question as to whether in fact, there would be -- and if you read the wording of the document, you will see that they cite five (5) failures to date, that is at the date of writing, five (5) failed attempts in the United States, to actually implement a geological disposal option for high level nuclear waste, all of which failed not only because of political problems, but more importantly, because the fundamental technical and scientific problems, which came to light...

I could, I think it's very illustrative to take a look at some examples of those technical and





scientific problems because although they were looking at a different medium which is bedded salt as a disposal option, they were trying to put the waste into salt formations, Mr. Chairman, and these salt formations were considerable desirable because of their self-healing proprieties. The fact that they are a soft rock and that basically, if there are fractures, those fractures will heal and consequently limit the pathways to the environment.

There are also other considerations such as the thermo conductivity of salt. Salt is a good conductor of heat and consequently, since the wastes will be generating heath for a very long time, the salt would help to dissipate that heat rather quickly.

Both of these advantages I might add are not shared by granite, which is what we are looking at here in Canada. Granite is a very brittle substances easily fractured and in fact, unfractured granite is very difficult to find.

Sinking a shaft does cause fractures and once you have excavated chambers in granite, you can expect further fracturing in the years that follow and the decades and the centuries that follow, as a result of the permanent disturbance and the stress field that has been created by the excavation itself.





Moreover, granite is not a particularly good heat conductor and consequently, the local heat build up will be greater in granite than in salt.

Be that as it may, the choice of salt was also dictated by one very important consideration, and that was the absence they thought of water.

The fact that these salt formations had existed for such a long time argued that they had not been subject to water for an equally long time otherwise they would have dissolved.

Well, as the record shows, they discovered that they were wrong. In fact, in one case, they drilled into a salt formation and actually struck a pocket of pressurized brine which surprised them.

They now know, but they didn't know at the time, they now know that every salt formation does have pocket of brine and they have also learned that the very heat of the waste caused those brine pockets to migrate towards the waste.

The reason being that the pocket, the side of the brine pocket which is closest to the waste becomes slightly warmer than the side away from the waste and this causes a higher solubility and that causes a gradual migration. And et cetera.

Now, my point in making this comparison





Mr. Chairman, is simply to point out that we have not been looking at granite very long.

Granite is a commercially unattractive substance. As a result, our ignorance of granite surpasses our ignorance of most other rock formations.

And in fact, much of the interest of a geological and scientific nature which accrues to the work done at Whiteshell, Pinewa rather, excuse me, I mean Lac Dubonnet, which the underground research laboratory of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, is precisely because relatively little is known about granite and this is the first major opportunity to do fundamental scientific research in granite.

I am rather appalled that this panel and the Canadian public apparently, are being asked to judge a concept which has so little scientific research behind it to date.

It's surprising to me from everything that I've been able to determine, it seems to me that Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, could not have performed very many long term experiments because they haven't really had the laboratory for very long and I'm very surprised that in the absence of long term data, that they would even be asking the panel to consider the approval or disapproval of this concept.





There's a couple of things which I would like to touch on particularly. I don't know how my time is Mr. Chairman, but I think it's running out.

THE CHAIRMAN: You asked for an additional ten (10). You're close to that twenty-five (25) mister Edwards.

MR. GORDON EDWARDS: I'm close to the twenty-five (25).

THE CHAIRMAN: You're within a couple of minutes of it.

MR. GORDON EDWARDS: Alright, let me just point out a couple of major -- I haven't even begun to really get into the technical details but let me just point out a couple of major areas where I think that AECL should be required to provide a lot of detailed information.

First is reprocessing. And again, I think it's intolerable that the terms of reference preclude the committee from looking into the full environmental impact of reprocessing when the panel is going to be asked to judge the merits of burying reprocessed waste.

It seems to me that one has to look at the environmental impact of reprocessing per se.

Reprocessing, Mr. Chairman, is a very dirty operation involving the robotic chopping up of





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the fuel elements, dissolving them and boiling nitric acid, occasioning the release of gaseous radio nuclide emissions as well as very large volumes of highly acidic and caustic... excuse me, highly acidic high level radioactive liquid wastes, which also occasions contaminated bulky equipment that must be treated as high level radioactive waste.

And moreover, there are additional problems accruing not only to the toxicity of the plutonium, which would be separated from the spent fuel, from the products, but there are also concerns about possible theft of plutonium, possible terrorists attacks to obtain plutonium from a reprocessing plant all of which has a direct bearing on the ultimate safety, the ultimate environmental safety of such a plant.

Now, as I read the terms of reference, anything of a military nature, that presumably, that means anything having to do with bombs, is not within the terms of reference of the panel.

However, I don't see how you can talk realistically about the hazards associated with reprocessing, even the environmental hazards associated with reprocessing if you do not talk about the fact that plutonium is not only a potential fuel, but also a





potential element for bombs.

And consequently, a potential target for criminal activities, activities of criminal organizations, terrorists organizations, whatever, to try to acquire such plutonium. And that is, that is I think, a major concern.

I would hope that the panel would require of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, detailed information as to the toxicity of all of the emissions that would be occasioned by reprocessing, the effluent control and what kind of guarantees Atomic Energy of Canada Limited has that they will be able to actually contain these effluents and keep them out of the environment.

Because, certainly the tract record at other reprocessing plants in other parts of the world, is not sterling.

There is one other concern which I think should be raised and that is the following. In assessing the concept of geological disposal, one has to ask two (2) things: what is the criterion for doing this?

That is first of all, why do you want to do it? What are you hoping to achieve? And the second thing is how are you to judge its success?





Obviously, you can put waste underground.

But if it has been there for fifty (50) years, does
that mean it's going to be there safely for five
hundred thousand (500 000) years?

If it has been there even safety for a century, does that mean it's going to be there safely for a thousand (1 000) years.

What possible scientific criterion can you use to judge whether or not your disposal scheme has been successful?

In fact, that was one of the principal points which lead the California Energy Resources

Commission, to decide that no method exists and no method may exist if this problem of finding the proper criteria and verifying those criteria cannot be solved.

The other aspect of this is why do we want to put it underground? Why should we put it underground rather than for example, leaving it above ground in monitored storage as it is at present?

The argument that Atomic Energy of Canada

Limited has given in public in the past, is that we

want to put it underground in order to basically lift

the burden from future generations so that they will

not have the burden of having to look after our wastes.

Again the California Energy Commission





decides that in the absence of criteria, putting it underground does nothing to alleviate that burden because, if we cannot prove within a finite time horizon, that it is safe for the indefinite future, then the necessity of perpetual surveillance remains.

Moreover, if you have a growing atomic energy -- a growing use of nuclear power, suppose the growth of nuclear power grows at any percentage point you wish, suppose you have a growth of 3% even in nuclear power per year.

We know that the wastes have to wait ten

(10) years before they are put underground at a

minimum. That's because of the heat generation.

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited admits that there has
to be a waiting time of a decade or so before you even

consider putting them underground.

Because of that time lag Mr. Chairman, if you are expanding the use of nuclear power by any percentage, then, there will be a constantly accelerating gap between the wastes which are being produced and the wastes which are being put underground. Even if you're putting them underground as fast as possible.

So that in fact, you will never have less nuclear wastes on the surface of the earth than you





have today. Each year you will have more.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Edwards, I'm sorry to have to interrupt you but you really are to thirty (30) minutes now and...

MR. GORDON EDWARDS: Okay, fine.

THE CHAIRMAN: ...consideration for the others and there are several who want to address us this evening.

MR. GORDON EDWARDS: Okay.

THE CHAIRMAN: I think, I must ask you if you would...

MR. GORDON EDWARDS: May I ask a procedural question. Is it possible to submit in writing, some questions which should be put to Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, with regard to the Environmental Impact Statement?

THE CHAIRMAN: It is not only possible, we would strongly encourage it.

MR. GORDON EDWARDS: Okay.

THE CHAIRMAN: We would be very grateful if you could -- we would like to have that by the end of the month if you could put something down and get it to us.

MR. GORDON EDWARDS: Okay.

THE CHAIRMAN: Now, those are the written





submissions I referred to in my opening comments, we'd be very pleased to receive them from you.

MR. GORDON EDWARDS: Right and again, without meaning any discourtesy to the panel or to yourself Mr. Chairman, I would like to repeat once more that if the terms of reference are not somehow expanded, or if the apparent conflict between expanding the industry and having these hearings is not resolve, then, I'm afraid that many groups in Canada are going to come to the conclusion that these hearings are without any intention on the part of the panel, perhaps a sham. Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Could you wait a moment please, Mr. Edwards...

MR. GORDON EDWARDS: Oh, sorry.

THE CHAIRMAN: ...in case there are any points of clarification or...

MR. GORDON EDWARDS: Certainly.

THE CHAIRMAN: ...precision which members of the panel would like to put to you. Any panel members wish.... yes, Dr. Wilson?

DR. LOIS WILSON: You mentioned that you thought it was a very short time frame that AECL had been doing research into granite.

MR. GORDON EDWARDS: Yes.





<u>DR. LOIS WILSON:</u> It may be an answered question but do you have any suggestions as to what time frame would be more adequate and any basis for suggesting that time frame?

MR. GORDON EDWARDS: Well, I'm guided partly by the US Geological Survey Circular because I am not a geologist. But I was very impressed by both the... not this report but there are much thicker reports available from the California Energy Commission, which really identify literally dozens if not hundreds of unanswered questions of basic science.

Now the US Geological Survey circular which I referred to, I believe it's circular 779, on the geological aspects of high level waste disposal also identify many fundamentally unanswered questions of a scientific nature which would have to be resolved, in order to determine whether or not geological disposal in granite or other media, would be safe for the long term.

I'm really astonished that just ten (10) years later or twelve years later, that Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, comes to the Government of Canada, apparently with the idea that it has resolved all these difficulties and is ready to undergo an Environmental Assessment.





I just find it astounding that so many fundamental scientific questions could be answered in so short a time.

I do not know how long it would take, but one question I ask it, what's the rush, particularly when the most damaging wastes in Canada at the present time, are not the high level wastes, which are not getting into the environment, even though they're potentially dangerous, but they are the uranium tailings.

The uranium tailings are getting into the environment, they're getting into our watershed, they're getting into our food chain and seems to me, that anybody with an ounce of common sense would say that that should be the priority in terms of nuclear wastes.

So I find it strange that there is this urgency to solve a problem which is not immediately a problem.

## DR. LOIS WILSON: Thanks.

THE CHAIRMAN: Any other members of the panel have any questions to put to Mr. Edwards? We thank you for your, not only for your presentation, oral presentation, but thank you also presumably for your written material which we will have a chance to





look at in the next few weeks, certainly as we get down to the next stage of our work.

And we will certainly look forward to receiving from you some of the written questions which you think ought to be addressed...

MR. GORDON EDWARDS: Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: It's precisely that sort of thing which we need for - at this stage of the at this stage of our work to make sure that we have identified all the questions to which answers ought to be provided.

MR. GORDON EDWARDS: Right, may I beg your indulgence for just one final statement. It has to do with one of the hand outs you have. It's really a reprint of an article from the Globe and Mail about a serious accident at the Bruce Nuclear Generating Station due to a computer error.

I just wanted to mention that my reason for including that Mr. Chairman, is that ultimately, the only proof as I understand it that Atomic Energy of Canada Limited could offer to support their claims of safety for geological disposal, are essentially mathematical.

That they're going to be using mathematical models for this. And as a mathematician,





I would like to underscore the message of that article which is computer models are pesky and they're particularly pesky if you dare to believe them. One has to remember that although computers are very powerful and succeed at many things, and although science is very powerful and succeeds at many things, in terms of waste disposal, it's not the success that's important, it's the failure.

And we have to then put on our caps and think about -- in other fields when we have failures, we just forget about them and say well look at the successes but in the field of waste disposal, we can't afford to overlook those failures. And I'm afraid that at the present time, we have no mathematical or scientific basis for knowing that a computer program is correct. Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you Mr. Edwards.

THE CHAIRMAN: Could I call next on Mr.

Andrew Orkin who will be speaking on behalf of the

Lawyers for Social Responsibility.

## PRESENTATION BY MR. ANDREW ORKIN:

Good evening members of the panel and Mr.

Chairman. My name is Andrew Orkin. I'm National

Vice-President of Lawyers for Social Responsibility





Canada, a not for profit organization of members of the legal profession and also Director of it's Quebec Chapter, Juristes pour la Paix et la Sécurité. I thank the panel for this opportunity to participate in this evening's proceedings.

Our organization was founded in 1983 in response to the threats posed by nuclear weapons to the survival of the planet.

In spite of the traditional reticence of the legal profession on issues such as this one, our organization grew quickly to a membership of over eight hundred (800) members of the legal profession and has chapters in sixteen (16) Canadian centres.

The Quebec Chapter, Juristes pour La Paix et la Securité, has over a hundred (100+) members. As lawyers, we're not experts in the technical aspects of either producing, storing or disposing of nuclear wastes.

Neither are we experts on the effect of radioactive and toxic materials on the flora and fauna of this planet. And we're certainly not experts on the composition and stability of Canadian Geological Formations or their suitability for the task as AECL proposes, of receiving high level nuclear waste.

We are however specialist in procedure and





processes of public participation. We're called upon daily to evaluation and challenge when needs be the processes and practices of governments and other institutions where these may affect individuals and the communities that they form.

It's therefore the responsibility of lawyers to assist them in exercising their democratic right, intervene effectively in decisions that will profoundly affect them for generations to come.

We're also concerned, and this bears noting, that Canada's environmental assessment regime criticized and much maligned as it often is, is something that we have to be proud of and that needs to be strengthened and protected.

Lawyers for Social Responsibility has a number of concerns relating to processes and determination of the scope and content of this Environmental Review Process that we feel obliged to raise at this early stage, that is at the first round of public consultations on this panel's work.

In my organization, we've consulted with confrères presenting substantive comment on the scoping of this environmental assessment and we're confident that our concerns have been and are being adequately raised at this hearing in Montreal and at other





hearings in centres elsewhere.

I therefore wish to beg the indulgence of the panel and comment mainly this evening on process and procedures and the terms of reference that will determine this panel's work.

Mr. Chairman, if this is in order, may I continue.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR. ANDREW ORKIN: Thank you.

An inevitable consequence of embarking on a process of research, education and advocacy on the issues of nuclear war was for Lawyers for Social Responsibility to discover that nuclear weapons of mass destruction are part of the complex globally integrated nuclear fuel cycle.

The reason we're here this evening is that Canada as the world's largest miner, miller, refiner and producer of uranium, is therefore also a major participant in this nuclear fuel cycle.

Inevitably therefore Canada is also a world class producer of hundreds of millions of tons of low and high level nuclear waste.

In the seven (7) years of its existence, Lawyers for Social Responsibility has thus, we feel, logically, turned its attention to the nuclear fuel





cycle as an integrated whole.

At our annual conference in Vancouver in 1989, after some years of deliberation, the following resolution was passed and I'll give it to the Commission... to the panel in full but I'd like to read portions of this into the record if I may.

"Whereas Canada is the world's largest miner and producer of uranium for nuclear fission... accounting for more than 30% of the world's supply of fissionable uranium, Whereas the mining, milling and refining of uranium has produced and will produce vast quantities of radioactive waste that will remain hazardous to all life for thousands of years, and must be isolated from the environment effectively forever. Whereas Atomic Energy of Canada Limited continues to promote the sale and installation of nuclear technology including Candu and Slow Poke reactors at home at abroad.

Whereas these technologies produce large quantities of high level radioactive waste including the reactors themselves at the end of lives measured in mere tens of





years, which must be isolated from the environment effectively forever. Whereas there is no demonstrated method of safely and reliably disposing of low of high level nuclear waste and it appears, will not be for the foreseeable future. Whereas much of Canada's uranium, mining development and concomitant creation of nuclear waste occurs on or is proposed for aboriginal territory, where native peoples will suffer the consequences to their land, traditional lifestyles and human rights caused by this activity, without having consented to them and with minimal or no benefit.

Now therefore, Lawyers for Social Responsibility calls upon the Federal Government of Canada to immediately impose a moratorium on the further development of all aspects of the Canadian nuclear industry, including mining, milling, refining, import and export of uranium and other fissionable materials and on the further development and implementation of nuclear technologies, excluding essential

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medical uses.

We further call on the Federal and provincial governments to undertake a national process of inquiry into and debate on all aspects of the Canadian nuclear industry, including questions of end use and environmental, health, social, economic and other aspects.

We further call on the federal government to immediately strengthen the regulatory regime applicable to the Canadian nuclear industry, to insure a safe and healthy environment for the Canadian people now and for all future generations to come."

Lawyers for Social Responsibilities call

for a moratorium on the further use, development or expansion of nuclear industry in Canada, pending a full public discussion of all of its aspects, is not a radical or an original idea.

With respect to high level waste in particular, this was the conclusion of the British Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution in 1976, which recommended that it would be irresponsible and morally wrong, to commit future generations to the consequences of fission power on a massive scale until





it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt, that at least one (1) method exists for the safe isolation of these nuclear wastes for the indefinite future.

This caution has been repeated by a number of other commissions and bodies, including the US

President Advisory Council on environmental quality in 1977.

The California Energy Commission in 1978, Canada's Porter Commission, the House of Commons

Eleventh Hour Report of the Committee on Forestry and Environment, and the British Columbia Medical Association.

Existing wastes, many of which are the legacy of decades of ignorance and secrecy, are the unavoidable responsibility of all Canadians.

But to continue the production of ever increasing quantities of high level and lower level nuclear waste, while the issue of its safe management remains in the theoretical realm, is in the view of Lawyers for Social Responsibility, unacceptable.

To do so is to commit the Canadian people to the multiplication of the dilemma which this panel by its very existence proclaims. We do not yet have a solution, or the consent of the Canadian people to any solution.





In legal terms, this is to compound and entrench a prejudice prior to and during discussion about that prejudice and its resolution.

In ethical terms, this weakens any attempt at obtaining the consent of the Canadian people to a profound hazard and its management that will affect generations to come.

In another context, that of the Rafferty
Almeda dam project, a Federal Environmental Assessment
Panel quit recently, because the work that was the
subject matter of its review, was proceeding in spite
of that review.

Lawyers for Social Responsibility is concerned that the daily continued production of nuclear waste, radioactive Currie by radioactive Currie, and toxic ton by toxic ton, while only beginning to discuss its possible management, is ethically and legally unacceptable.

We repeat our urgent call for a moratorium on all aspects of the Canadian nuclear fuel cycle and call on this panel to do so too, or join its principal Rafferty Almeda colleagues, in resigning until a such a moratorium is declared.

We're engaged in a process that will have an impact on future generations to come. The efficient





functioning of this panel is an essential and "lawable" goal.

The imposition however of unrealistic deadlines for such... for example, such as the mid-summer deadline for submissions of funding applications for these scoping hearings, was unacceptable. The results of this panel's work will be judge we feel, in part at least, on the quality of public participation.

A number of organizations of which we're aware, have already been impacted by some of this assessment's procedures and deadlines and their protests appear to have been received but ignored.

environmentally and socio-economically acceptable or sound method of disposal has been found for high nuclear waste, is to have any credibility whatsoever? It is the view of Lawyers for Social Responsibility that the job cannot and should not be rushed and that the constraints of concerned Canadians who are not on a nuclear industry of FEARO payroll, must be genuinely addressed.

In the same vein but as to funding, more than half a billion tax dollars have been spent over more than a decade in research on this particular proposal. Little more than five hundred thousand





dollars (\$ 500,000.00) and that's approximately .01% of that amount will be made available for public participation in a substantive evaluation of this proposal.

With all respect, it is the view of
Lawyers for Social Responsibility that funding at this
level cannot serve to achieve the democratic objectives
of full public participation.

Recent surveys have shown that the Canadian public relies on and trust public interest groups more than any other sector for environmental information and effective advocacy on behalf of the environment and human safety and security.

This scepticism is unfortunately in our view, not without some justification. In the age of Three Mile Island, Saint-Basile le Grand and Haggersville. What quantity and quality of intervention can the tiny amount of public interest funding made available on this task be expected to generate.

This panel's procedure in the views of
Lawyers for Social Responsibility must "maximumly"
honour the spirit rather than pay minimal lip service
to public participation otherwise the consent of the
Canadian population to this momentous proposal cannot





and will not have been obtained.

Lawyers for Social Responsibility is of the view that these terms of reference are wholly unacceptable for this important task.

Firstly, we wish to record our objection to their preparation without the effective input of all organizations and individuals concerned with this process.

Our substantive objections to the terms of reference, which I will elaborate briefly upon in a moment, leads us to the conclusion that the terms of reference amount to an attempt to fetter, not to facilitate, full environmental review, to predetermine an outcome favourable to the proponent, and one that would exclude discussion that might increase public scrutiny of the Canadian nuclear fuel cycle.

It is clear to us as lawyers that any government or person who unilaterally drafts terms of reference can, by limiting the scope and content of an inquiry, severely bias its outcome. It's our view that this is the case and we wish to publicly state our disquiet and our reasons for it.

The terms of reference of this high level waste disposal proposal require the panel the assess the proposal only in terms of a generic site and state





that no site selection for a permanent disposal facility will be undertaken until the concept has undergone public review and been accepted by the governments of Ontario and Canada.

To quote: "Since site selection will not take place until a disposal concept has been accepted as safe, the panel shall not consider any specific potential sites."

This apparently benign provision could at first blush, seem protective in intent. Why submit a particular community or the panel for that matter, to the work rigor and stress of reviewing or being reviewed as a particular site or sites, before the concept has been found to be safe.

This is the first public review of high level nuclear waste disposal in Canada. This is not to say however, that we have absolutely no idea as to what is likely to happen when a proposal to site a high level nuclear waste repository is made in a particular community or area.

At least if on a geological basis, on a social -- if not on a geological basis, on a socio-political one. In 1985, the US Department of Energy abandoned its most recent proposal, to site such a facility in Vermont, near to the Quebec border. Like





a number of proposals before it, in Main, New
Hampshire, Tennessee, Kentucky, Wisconsin and
Minnesota, a vast indication of public disapproval,
which included in this most recent case, the voices of
Quebec and the Federal governments and the Eastern
Townships communities closest to the proposed site,
forced the Department of Energy to abandon this
proposal.

Members of Lawyers for Social
Responsibility in the Eastern Townships were
prominently involved in criticizing that proposal on
legal and other grounds.

Atomic Energy of Canada's efforts to undertake high level wastes disposal research in Northern Ontario, in the late 1970's was similarly rebuffed by the citizens of that region.

It must also be noted that the Government of Quebec, is refusing to participate in this Environmental Assessment, because it says, it refuses to allow disposal of nuclear waste on Quebec soil.

Hence we feel, the concept of generic site review. In our view, this is cynical and dangerous manipulation of the Environmental Review Process.

First, to isolate environmental review of the proposal to dispose of nuclear waste in the





Canadian shield, is to remove the technical and scientific inquiry from the specific environment in which it is to occur.

But secondly and more importantly we feel as lawyers and as citizens, it is an attempt to isolate the process of obtaining a technical green light for nuclear waste disposal from the population slated to receive that proposal.

In our knowledge of the likely reaction of any particular community to such a proposal, this is an attempt to sidestep a fundamental component of Environmental Review, and that is the informed, motivated and possibly alarmed participation of that community or communities for which generations to come, will be closest to the results of this panel's deliberations.

Environmental Assessment and Review

Process guidelines with which I'm sure you're very
aware, provide in section 3, subsection 2,:

"subject to the approval of the minister and the minister of the initiating department, consideration of a proposal may include such matters as the general socio-economic effects of the proposal."

In addition other government departments





with specialist knowledge, are mandated in section 19 of the same guidelines,

"to provide information with respect to the social impact of a proposal and to advocate for the protection of those interests."

It should be noted that very recent Court rulings have held that these guidelines have to a significant degree, force of law.

Lawyers for Social Responsibility submits that the assessment of the socio-economic and social impacts of the siting of a high level nuclear waste disposal facility, cannot be considered or assessed without the involvement of a specific population of affected individuals.

To do otherwise is to undertake a process that in spite of the involvement of any number of socio-economic and social experts, is purely technocratic and technical and not an environmental assessment in the full sense, considered and mandated by the statutory order.

More importantly, to do otherwise, we fear, could be an attempt to manufacture a document that can at some future stage, be held to the noses of the selected community who could then be told: "The





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Environmental Assessment has been done, the proposal is safe." and who's anticipated objections could thus be sidestepped, ignored or even prevented.

Is it possible that a selected site might one day be on native land. Are the social, cultural, spiritual and environmental impacts of such a possibility to be considered hypothetically without reference to the people of an affected nation.

We submit that the dilution of public input inherent in this aspect of the terms of reference is a travesty of the Environmental Review Process that Canadians of present and future generations are entitled to.

The terms of reference specifically exclude intermediate and low level radioactive waste such as components of decommissioned nuclear reactors or uranium tailings.

It is our understanding that for each unit by volume or weight of nuclear fuel waste, there are many thousand of units of intermediate and low level wastes that require isolation for similarly lengthy time frames.

We're concerned that by this exclusion, the nuclear industry may be permitted to address the single aspect of Canada's nuclear wastes dilemma, in





spite of its magnitude, that is arguably not the most significant or pressing.

The terms of reference specifically exclude "the energy policies of Canada and the provinces and the role of nuclear energy within these policies."

It is quite conceivable that the electrical energy produced by present and future nuclear waste that is the subject of this inquiry, could be generated by conservation alone or a combination of conservation and other technologies that will not entail the further production of nuclear waste.

Lawyers for Social Responsibility are concerned that the exclusion of discussion in this environmental review of the necessity of producing nuclear waste in the first place, is a further travesty of full and open and holistic environmental review.

Finally, the terms of reference exclude fuel processing as an energy policy. We are concerned that any discussion of the option of centralizing Canada's nuclear high level nuclear wastes in one location, without a discussion of the environmental and social impacts of fuel reprocessing as an energy policy, is to partially mislead or not fully inform the





Canadian public about the full intentions and whole agenda of the proponent in this regard.

Indeed the terms of reference themselves of your panel, define nuclear fuel waste as and I quote

"solid fuel bundles discharged from Candu reactors or derived high level nuclear wastes should the used fuel ever be reprocessed at some future date."

Lawyers for Social Responsibility is concerned at the deliberate exclusion of discussion of reprocessing policy, is to possibly mislead even a hypothetical generic wastes site community, into believing that it is not extremely likely also to be home, to a plutonium extraction plant and a fuel reprocessing plant.

If this is possibly the case, this is a very significant potential environmental impact of the proposal and should be open for discussion at this time.

Lawyers for Social Responsibility as I've outlined in my brief presentation, has analyzed the terms of reference, and we feel that to proceed headlong into this Environmental Assessment, as we fully intend to do over the coming months, without recording our concerns in this regard, would be





unacceptable to our mandate.

I thank the panel for its attention and I'd welcome any questions.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you Mr. Orkin. May I ask my colleagues on the panel if they have any questions they would like to put to this participant at our hearings? Mr. Van Vliet?

MR. PIETER VAN VLIET: Mr. Orkin, you made a statement to the effect that it was ethically as well as legally wrong to continue with nuclear activities in Canada. Are there specific laws in Canada you can refer to that make you make that statement?

MR. ANDREW ORKIN: Well...

MR. PIETER VAN VLIET: What is well within
its assessment?

MR. ANDREW ORKIN: One of the jokes that are always made by lawyers is that you'll never get a black and white answer, that you'll always get a grey one and I'm afraid I'm going to give you just that.

The feeling that I and other colleagues
have and I'm in no position in this forum to give a
legal opinion, this would be something you'd have to go
to Counsel of the Federal Government or of the FEARO
office in particular for, is that the avenue of
environmental review as recently opened up in the





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Rafferty Almeda case deserves reference and much consideration at this point in time.

Few of my colleagues would have hazarded a guess that the so-called environmental review guidelines would be given the force of law that they were in that case.

And I think that this is an arena given burgeoning public concern about the environment, that the Courts are going to be paying increasing attention to, is whether or not mere guidelines about full and informed and holistic environmental review of a given proposal or merely guidelines may no longer be the case.

And it is my hope that it won't be solely in the arena of judicial review of the environmental assessment but rather that panels such as yours and prominent voices such as the many voices that have been appearing before you in your various hearings, will be able strengthen the Law in this regard.

I think a falling back on the law is the weakest, the weakest position. The Court of Public Opinion I think is going to provide a far stronger reference for the Canadian population concerned with this and other proposals.

I'm not sure whether that answers your





question.

MR. PIETER VAN VLIET: I take that, to conclude from your statement, that there are no laws being violated to date?

MR. ANDREW ORKIN: I wouldn't, I wouldn't put it that way. What I was referring to is a large body of environmental common law which as I'm sure, you and many other people are aware is incremental and garnet, one small step at a time, of which this Rafferty Almeda decision out of the Courts of that province, are one example. I wouldn't feel at all that any specific laws are been broken.

MR. PIETER VAN VLIET: Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Dr. LaPierre?

DR. LOUIS LAPIERRE: The question regarding -- you were critical of the time frame and the funding allotted to the preparation and the major trustee of the brief, looked at social, economics and the possible impact to society.

Do you have any idea of what lead time you would want to prepare such documents and I guess an indication of funding, if the level is not sufficient?

MR. ANDREW ORKIN: I have a very clear idea if this is not an impudent response as to what kinds of lead time I certainly don't want.





And that was my experience in the summer when, if my memory serves me correctly, I received, my office received the package from the from the FEARO office towards the end of June.

I was out of town on work in California until close to the end of July, to return to this envelope and discover that I had until the end of August, to submit, to canvas my organization in the middle of Summer and submit a funding request.

August was my vacation. As a result of which Lawyers for Social Responsibility simply didn't put in a funding request. We did prior to the deadline submit a protest as I believe a number of other organizations did as well.

Two (2) months in normal circumstances could be considered to be an adequate time frame. In the middle of summer when at the start of that period, it's indicated to FEARO that this is unacceptable, I felt was not an acceptable way of proceeding.

As to the amounts of money, I think certainly from the perspective of Lawyers for Social Responsibility, if we were to submit a budget which would enable us to participate as a non-profit organization, and that's not charging usual legal fees, it's probably not even charging for our time, but





merely with respect to obtaining the expert advice that we require, the budget that the FEARO has, taking all of the participation of organizations such as ours across the country into account, is probably inadequate to a factor of ten (10) or a hundred (100).

That is a back of the envelope guess on my part. There are organizations such as Dr. Edwards' Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility who I think, with a track record of many years of participation in this field, would enhance this proceeding considerably, if they have a meaningful budget to hire staff, rent premises, consult across the country and obtain the expert advice to participate in these substantive hearings.

The 500,000.00\$ that has been made available for total public participation, in my view, given a six hundred million dollar proposal, is a drop in the ocean.

## THE CHAIRMAN: Ms. Roy?

MS. LOUISE ROY: Vous avez mis en relation de très larges enjeux qui sont liés soit à la présence de déchets nucléaires ou à la gestion des déchets nucléaires dans le sens d'une approche holistique et vous avez souhaité aussi qu'une large discussion publique puisse s'engager sur toutes ces questions.





Est-ce que vous avez des suggestions sur la façon d'entrevoir les principales étapes d'une telle discussion en prenant pour acquis, si je vous ai bien compris, que la première c'est un moratoire sur la production de déchets nucléaires, de nouveau déchets nucléaires?

Quelles seraient les autres étapes qui vous apparaîtraient à la fois crédibles et efficaces pour faire un tel débat?

MR. ANDREW ORKIN: If I have you correctly, what steps should be undertaken to engender an effective and full public debate in this regard.

I think a prerequisite which is one you've repeated for me, is that of a moratorium. I think anything short of a moratorium on the further production of high level nuclear waste, I can only concur with Dr. Edwards' words, is -- would render this process a sham.

It is a prejudging of the issue if this panel were to find after so many months or years of work, that there is no safe disposal method, in the interim, to have continued with the production of high level nuclear waste, is to proceed in bad faith, not on the part of the panel but on the part the Canadian Government. And on the part of the proponent.





That's my major concern. That

demonstration finally and belatedly of good faith to

the Canadian public concerned about this question,

would in my view, be the, not only a prerequisite but a

fundamental beginning and opening up of this question,

that would greatly encourage debate on the issue.

What further steps could be taken, an indication that the entire agenda is up for grabs, that's a colloquialism, that the energy agenda is open, is fully open for discussion rather than being in any way predetermined and rubber stamps are perhaps being sought for well-laid and well-preconceived plans.

Practical steps, an undertaking of a massive public consultation process with which we are not unfamiliar in the Canadian political scene.

We have done full commissions of inquiry, with broad and open agendas, which by their formats and by their openness, visit and encourage the participation of a very broad spectrum of the Canadian population.

We've seen through the 70's a massive

Canadian concern about issues of nuclear power and

nuclear waste. This concern has not gone away. If

anything, I believe that this concern is not latent but

it's on the rise.





I unfortunately haven't had the privilege of travelling with your commission but I'm sure you've found interest high or reasonably high in other centres.

I think if there was a perception on the part of the concerned Canadian energy, environmental and public participation community, that we were really opening Canada's energy agenda and all of its environmental impacts up for discussion, you wouldn't have to worry about encouraging participation or finding it.

It would beat a path to your door and you would be busy beyond your wildest imagination. I'm not sure if that answers your question.

MS. LOUISE ROY: En partie. Merci.

THE CHAIRMAN: Further questions? A propos your last remarks, you did note what I had to say in my opening statement...

MR. ANDREW ORKIN: Yes I did.

THE CHAIRMAN: ... to the effect that something of a broader look at the environmental implications of various sources of production of energy is at least started. Exactly how it will develop of course is beyond my capacity to say but I'm sure you'll want to follow that....





MR. ANDREW ORKIN: Yes, indeed.

THE CHAIRMAN: ...with interest as it starts to emerge. I would perhaps put one question to you. Did, I take from your remarks towards the end of your presentation, that you are assuming that there would not be an Environmental Assessment of a specific site at some later stage?

MR. ANDREW ORKIN: No, I made no assumption on that level at all. What I was saying is that I feel that to -- which I think I dealt with at some length, to conduct an environmental assessment absent a particular community, is to prejudice the participation of such a selected community which I feel would be pivotal in this panel's doing a complete job.

And that the social and socio-economic and cultural and perhaps spiritual aspects of such a proposal, cannot be considered absent a specific environment and a specific population.

I'm confident that at some period in the future, were this panel to find that the proposal is safe, hypothetically, some process of consultation of a target or target communities would be undertaken.

My fear is that any favourable finding on the part of the FEARO process at this point, on a hypothetical basis, would as I said, be held up to that





community as saying this is now beyond discussion, we've already done that. All we are asking you now for are your perhaps particular and unique views on this situation but the terms of reference of that situation will probably... would probably not re-open the work that you had already done. And I think that, that is a major danger.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you for that clarification of your position, Mr. Orkin. Thank you very much for appearing before us today.

---Mr. Orkin withdraws.

THE CHAIRMAN: The next participant, the Health Professionals for Nuclear Responsibility, Dr. Eric Notebeart. I'm not sure if I'm pronouncing correctly, if not please make the correction for me. PRESENTATION PAR DR ERIC NOTEBEART.

Bonjour mesdames, messieurs. Je représente les Professionnels de la santé pour la responsabilité nucléaire qui est l'aile québécoise de l'Association canadienne et de l'Association internationale des médecins pour la prévention de la guerre nucléaire. Je suis médecin et travaille à titre de président par intérim de l'organisme actuellement.

Je voudrais tout d'abord remercier le Bureau fédéral d'examen des évaluations





environnementales d'ouvrir cette Commission chargée d'examiner la gestion des déchets de combustible nucléaire aux citoyens, citoyennes et groupes intéressés.

Je parlerai donc aujourd'hui d'un point de vue spécifiquement médical; je vous rappelle que notre organisme représente six cents (600) professionnels de la santé, essentiellement des médecins au Québec, et à peu près huit mille (8 000) au Canada.

Après un préambule qui situe la question de l'énergie nucléaire dans une perspective médicale, je traiterai du projet précis tel qu'élaboré par Energie Atomique du Canada Ltée, puis de questions connexes, et enfin terminerai avec notre position en ce qui a trait à ce domaine-là.

En guise de préambule je vais présenter trois (3) catégories d'études qui forment la base de notre position. Tout d'abord, évidemment, la question d'Hiroshima-Nagasaki.

Lors de notre dernier congrès international à Hiroshima en octobre mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-neuf (1989), l'état des travaux de plusieurs chercheurs a été présenté et c'est tout récent ces choses-là.

Ainsi, l'incidence de leucémie,





particulièrement de leucémie à présentation atypique, de leucémie myéloïde chronique, cinq (5) à six (6) ans après la bombe il a été statistiquement extrêmement élevé dans la région des deux (2) villes mentionnées.

On parvient à peine aujourd'hui, après une latence à laquelle on s'attend, après une latence de quarante (40) à cinquante (50) ans, à une augmentation de l'incidence du cancer du sein, du poumon, de l'oesophage, de l'estomac, du colon, de la vessie, de l'utérus, du myélo multiple. C'est des choses importantes.

Cependant, il y a des cancers dont
l'incidence n'augmente pas: le foie, la vésicule
biliaire, par exemple. Et ceci, directement relié à la
dose des radiations et à la proximité de l'épicentre
des deux (2) bombes atomiques.

Je vous rappelle que les études qui ont servi de base à ces travaux-là sont des études tout à fait crédibles qui ont été publiées dans le New England Medical Journal of Medecine ou dans "The Lancet" ou dans d'autres journaux médicaux importants.

D'autres médecins, le docteur Awa, entre autres, se sont intéressés aux effets génétiques après les bombes atomiques, en particulier ils se sont intéressés à la fréquence des grossesses qui se sont





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terminées en mortinaissances, la fréquence des malformations congénitales, la fréquence de décès dans la première (lère) semaine de vie chez les mères exposées. Son équipe s'est intéressée au taux de décès des enfants nés après le premier (ler) mai quarante-six ('46), donc neuf (9) mois après la bombe, ce qui nous montre l'effet de l'irradiation des gonades de la mère ou du père.

Son équipe s'est intéressée à la fréquence des anomalies chromosomiques, à la fréquence des mutations telles que détectées par électrophorèse des protéines.

A chaque fois on montre une incidence augmentée de ces problèmes-là; cependant, c'est vrai, non statistiquement non significatifs. Il ne faut pas oublier que l'échantillonnage est très petit et qu'il y a plusieurs sources d'erreur.

Une autre équipe, l'équipe du docteur

Yoshimoto termine actuellement l'étude des cancers chez

les enfants, les jeunes filles qui étaient exposées et

qui avaient, à ce moment-là, peut-être entre un (1) an

et cinq (5) ans; alors on est rendu à la deuxième (2e)

génération et on arrive aussi à un taux augmenté de

différents types de cancer. Ce sont des choses qui

nous préoccupent beaucoup.





D'autres ordres d'études, ce sont des études comme celle effectuée à Sellafield, de Gardner et al, que l'on connaît bien, qui démontrent chez les descendants de pères travailleurs à Sellafield une incidence beaucoup plus élevée de leucémie et de lymphomes, en particulier en fonction de la dose d'irradiation, en particulier chez les pères irradiés à 100mSv et plus.

Maintenant c'est difficile d'extrapoler, c'est difficile de partir des études d'Hiroshima et Nagasaki pour arriver aux situations actuelles; c'est difficile d'essayer de se projeter dans le futur pour essayer de voir qu'est-ce qui se passerait si jamais il y avait un accident avec les sites d'enfouissement. On a quelques éléments d'aide, les études de Beir que tout le monde connaît bien, Beir V la dernière qui est sortie en quatre-vingt-dix ('90).

Ce comité-là étudie, finalement, les effets biologiques de radiations ionisantes et soumet ses recommandations ou soumet ses travaux au Centre National de Recherche Américain.

Une méta analyse de plusieurs travaux amène à des choses qui sont intéressantes; je n'ai pas le tableau, je ne peux pas vous le montrer mais les gens du panel ont le tableau, en fait ce qu'on voit





c'est que, finalement, pour une population d'un (1) million d'habitants, les malformations à trait autosomal dominant qui ont une incidence à peu près de deux mille cinq cents (2 500) par million de nouvelles naissances par génération, vous voyez une augmentation de cinq (5) à vingt (20) cas par dose d'irradiation de un (1) rem sur une génération de trente (30) ans; j'espère que je ne deviens pas trop abstrait, mais ce que ces travaux-là concluent c'est que finalement lorsqu'il y a une irradiation, une source extérieure, autant les maladies autosomales dominantes que les maladies liées au X que les maladies récessives, voient une augmentation de leur incidence à chaque génération.

C'est parfois une augmentation qui est petite, j'en conviens, mais c'est une augmentation qui est présente, et la question qu'on se pose est la suivante: Est-ce qu'on a éthiquement le droit de dire à nos arrières-arrières-petits-enfants que oui, grâce à nos choix énergétiques, il y aura quelques leucémies de plus, quelques lymphomes, quelques cancers de plus? Je pense que pour nous la question fondamentale c'est vraiment ceci; même si on arrive à trouver que l'incidence est faible, elle est présente.

Je vais poursuivre et je vais arriver au centre de notre problème.





Ce que mentionnent ces auteurs-là, ils mentionnent par exemple que pour les maladies autosomales dominantes on a une augmentation de six (6) à trente-cinq (35) cas par million de personnes par rad; pour les maladies liées au X, cinq (5) par million par rad; pour les maladies récessives inférieures à une (1) par million par rad, million de population.

Ce sont des travaux qui nous préoccupent et qui nous invitent à une prudence extrême.

Maintenant étudions un peu le projet
d'enfouissement des déchets nucléaires tel qu'élaboré
par Energie Atonique du Canada Ltée. Je me suis arrêté
plus spécifiquement, même si on parle d'un concept,
plus spécifiquement au projet tel que présenté
d'enfouissement dans le Bouclier Canadien.

Dans le document on mentionne qu'après cinq cents (500) ans l'essentiel des rayons gamma va être transformé et qu'il restera essentiellement des rayons alpha et bêta. Ce que l'on veut rappeler ici c'est que les déchets sont faits à quatre-vingt-dix-huit pour-cent (98%) d'uranium-238 dont la demi-vie est quatre point cinq (4.5) milliards d'années; d'uranium-235, d'uranium-234 dont la demi-vie est de deux cent cinquante mille (250 000) ans.





L'uranium, on le sait, se désintègre, par exemple en radium-226, la demi-vie c'est mille six cent (1 600) ans, mille six cent soixante-deux (1 662); ça donne aussi du radium-222 qui est un gaz; ça fait aussi du polonium-218, de polonium-210 qui est aussi toxique certainement que le plutonium-239; de l'iode-129 dont on connaît les effets sur la thyroïde et dont la demi-vie est de dix-sept (17) millions d'années.

EACL ne semble pas s'inquiéter du fait qu'après cinq cents (500) ans les émissions sont réduites à point quatre-vingt-deux (.82) mSv à l'heure. Qu'est-ce qui arriverait s'il y avait une catastrophe dans cinq cents (500) ans si, par exemple, la population était exposée à ce point quatre-vingt-deux (.82) mSv à l'heure? Et bien c'est simple, en deux (2) semaines seulement les individus auraient accumulé un rem. Je vous ramène au tableau que j'ai mentionné tantôt. En deux (2) mois? On aurait doublé le risque de mutation génétique, on aurait atteint cent (100) rem.

Qu'est-ce qu'il adviendrait si l'accident survenait dans la vie, par exemple, de mes petits-enfants, dans cent (100) ans? C'est très très simple: en un jour ils vivraient l'équivalent des explosions atomiques. Après quelques heures leur risque de





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mutation doublerait déjà.

On a de la misère un peu à envisager ceci avec sérénité, comme professionnel de la santé.

Etudions plus précisément le projet d'enfouissement en quatre (4) barrières.

L'enceinte la plus externe, comme vous le savez, consiste en un matériau de granit - je ne suis pas le premier (ler) qui le mentionne, on l'a déjà dit - le granit, une de ses caractéristiques c'est d'être très cassant, donc de faire facilement des fractures, donc possiblement d'amener la voie à des courants d'eau souterrains qui atteindraient, à ce moment-là, la troisième (3e) barrière, celle qui est faite d'argile et de sable.

C'est vrai que c'est imperméable l'argile et le sable, mais pas complètement, surtout pas quand on sait que les déchets radioactifs risquent d'émettre de la chaleur et à ce moment-là on peut douter de l'effet tout à fait tampon de cette troisième (3e) barrière-là.

On parle de la deuxième (2e) barrière en titane ou en cuivre - il y a d'autres matériaux possibles - est-ce qu'on est bien sûr qu'ils soient à l'abri de la corrosion dans ces situations-là?

Imaginons que, finalement, ces barrières





sont perturbées. Qu'est-ce que va faire la mise en circulation d'éléments radioactifs dans un écosystème? quelles vont être les transformations au niveau biologique, au niveau moléculaire, cellulaire puis au niveau du règne végétal puis du règne animal? Je ne pense pas qu'on a répondu du tout encore à ces questions-là.

J'ai mentionné un mot à propos du transport. On mentionne qu'on a fait subir les conteneurs à des stress de, par exemple, huit cents (800) degrés Celsius de température, on a fait tomber les conteneurs de neuf (9) mètres de haut, ça nous semble loin en deçà de ce que doivent être des normes de sécurité pour des conteneurs transportés sur les routes canadiennes.

Je vais aborder, avant de terminer, les questions connexes, c'est ce dont nos amis ont parlé, les "terms of reference" si je comprends bien. Tout le projet des déchets nucléaires tel que mentionné, finalement ne touchent que point zéro un pour-cent (.01%) de tout l'uranium utilisé. Il ne traite pas du tout des résidus de concassage dont cent soixantequinze (175) millions de tonnes sont à l'air libre actuellement. On pense que ça peut être un problème majeur de santé publique et on aimerait certainement





que la Commission d'évaluation de l'effet des déchets s'arrête à cette question-là.

On n'a pas parlé non plus des réacteurs déclassés, de tout le matériel afférent à ces réacteurs là qui font partie aussi des déchets de l'industrie nucléaire.

Nos recommandations sont finalement simples. En fait les professionnels de la santé demandent donc à Énergie Atomique du Canada de ne pas procéder à la mise en chantier du site d'enfouissement.

Peut-être de conserver, actuellement, les déchets, si on ne parle que des déchets, de la façon actuelle pour pouvoir mieux, actuellement, évaluer les effets, les interactions avec l'environnement de ces déchets-là. Une fois qu'ils seront enfouis on ne pourra plus monitorer l'effet de ces déchets-là.

On demande aussi à Énergie Atomique du Canada de poursuivre les travaux de recherche fondamentale en géologie, en physique, en chimie, en biologie, en vue d'obtenir des résultats beaucoup plus probants, voire conclusifs, dans le futur, et de soumettre à nouveau ces résultats aux personnes, aux groupes qui sont intéressés comme nous ce soir.

Merci.

PAR LE PRÉSIDENT: Merci beaucoup docteur.

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C'est un argument à étudier plus profondément et nous allons le faire certainement, mais entre-temps est-ce qu'il y a des questions que les membres de la Commission veulent poser maintenant au docteur Notebeart?

Merci beaucoup et merci pour le point de vue de votre organisation, c'est très utile pour nous de l'avoir. Merci.

--- Dr. Notebeart withdraws.

THE CHAIRMAN: The next person I have on my list wishing to address the panel and those present is Mrs. Mary Evans Bapst. I wonder if she would come forward.

## PRESENTATION BY MRS. MARY EVANS BAPST:

I am not a technician, scientist, or health professional. But I have served for six (6) years as an active associate member of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, IPPNW, in various capacities including temporary assistant in the Boston Central Office, Regional Contact Person and member of the IPPNW Executive Board of Switzerland, where I lived for thirty (30) years and currently as executive secretary of IPPNW's Quebec chapter.

I have also been an official delegate at four (4) IPPNW International Congresses as well as a





half-dozen regional ones and I have read material related to nuclear matters over many years. I'm probably better informed than the average citizen on the issues we are considering here today.

But I'm here because I'm a mother and a grandmother, and I wish to explore as specified in the terms of reference of this panel, one of the social implications of a possible nuclear fuel waste facility: FEAR.

If I occasionally use examples situated outside of Canada, it is because the bulk of my life has been spent elsewhere, but I consider the lessons of that experience to be applicable here.

Two (2) weeks ago, at a sometimes heated discussion following the presentation of the NFB film "Uranium", Ian Wilson of AECL suggested that it was not appropriate to become emotional over the issue of nuclear waste.

I spoke to Mr. Wilson after the meeting saying in substance humans were created as rational beings gifted with emotions. This combination is what keeps us in balance. I believe there is a place for rational fear. It serves as a sort of distant early warning system in our daily lives and is an important aspect of child training and eventual arrival at





wisdom.

"Attention, tu vas tomber, te brûler, te faire mal". I raised my children in French. Fear teaches us to be worry of the unknown, to learn prudence. It serves to galvanize psychological defence mechanisms. It makes adrenalin flow. It also makes my hands shake! It can unite weak individuals into strong coalitions. It become a great force for evil or for good. It is the basis for confrontation and a powerful justification for peaceful conflict resolution.

Fear can also foster anguish leading to psychosis and cause individuals and communities, social stress amounting to a severe health hazard.

yet found satisfactory solutions for disposal of the wastes of a hazardous technology still in its earliest infancy, but which threatens uncounted future generations with un-measurable -- because still largely unknown effects -- little wonder that many people live in fear and demand, sometimes rather emotionally, more reliable information.

Such fear must be taken into account in any study relating to nuclear applications, unless the technology exists, again as some fear, only to perpetuate itself, to the exclusion of assured





permanent benefit to all the inhabitants of this planet.

How might such fear be addressed? Here is an example. On September 21st of this year, as the result of a public initiative gathering more that a hundred thousand signatures, 53% of Swiss voters obtained a ten (10) year moratorium on all new construction and exploitation of nuclear facilities pending deeper study of the problem of nuclear fuel waste disposal.

This is all the more striking when one learns that 70% of Swiss electricity is nuclear generated. The population of one of the world's most highly developed countries is willing to forego a certain degree of comfort in the short term for fear of allowing a major mistake to affect the very long term.

The government accepted the challenge and the matter was put to a federal vote: democracy at work.

My family's chalet lies in a township where for the past ten (10) years, the Swiss CEDRA, Commission d'étude des déchets radioactifs, has been attempting to establish a nuclear fuel waste disposal site in a disaffected section of a salt mine, Les Salines de Bex.





projected site.

This area is highly dependent on tourism.

Three (3) major resorts and a spa lie within a fifteen

(15) kilometres radius, Villars, Les Diablerets, Leysin

and Bex-les-Bains, Gstaad, the Bernese Oberland and

Zermatt, are approached by major highway and rail

systems passing within a two (2) kilometres of the

What of transporting radioactive cargo through this area or equivalent places in Canada? Road and rail accidents happen everywhere. So less frequently, do earthquakes. Both have occurredd within my lifetime in the area I just mentioned. Such events have raised social consciousness to the level of fear and there are many questions that must be satisfactorily answered before the concept of nuclear fuel waste disposal, indeed the concept of continuing to create these wastes, can be accepted.

Are the AECL and the Canadian Government prepared to guarantee present and future security, for all practical purposes forever, in the treatment and disposal of nuclear fuel waste?

Are they aware of the level of concern, the shadow of real fear, and the extent of the denial of that fear, under which Canadians live?

Have they studied the phycological reports





on children in various parts of the world who live in fear of some form of nuclear catastrophe occurring to them before they have time to grow old?

A vignette of Hiroshima: the daughter of two (2) survivors told me, weeping that her only son, now 19, does not expect to live to age of 40 given the state of the nuclear world.

My own four (4) children and their budding families live in Geneva, barely eighty (80) kilometres upwind, usually, of the French experimental fast-breeder reactor called Super Phénix, at Creys-Malville.

Geneva, Lauzanne, Grenoble, Lyon, Mâcon,
Dijon and their surrounding agglomerations include some
five million (5M) inhabitants, all menaced not only by
extrusion, the professional euphemism for explosion,
but also by contamination from ill-managed waste,
inadequate transport norms, all forms of natural and
unnatural accidents which could affect nuclear
generators and fuel wastes accumulation sites. And I
have not yet mentioned industrial and governmental
secrecy as well as the attendant police repression
which have pervaded the imposition of nuclear programs
on the French and neighbouring Swiss populations.

Might this become standard practice in Canada? Is it ethically permissible for a few





political and industrial leaders to impose on a nation an unproven technology which may cause genetic damage to all living creatures and poison the very substance of the planet for the rest of its existence?

The hisses and boos directed at some of the conciliatory statements made by AECL participants at the Uranium film panel certainly indicate public distrust. How are these fears to be effectively and legitimately allayed?

Until all the above questions, and many others, are adequately answered, it cannot be morally acceptable to proceed with further waste accumulation. Ignoring the problem will not make it go away. This by the way, is a powerful argument for waste-containment as opposed to burial, our "out of sight, out of mind" attitude may only compound environmental problems future generations will be condemned to deal with.

A recent Canadian Nuclear Association CNA television ad, shows children contentedly playing in a model city, supposedly lit by nuclear generated electricity.

An earlier one state that CNA is, I quote, "engaged in ongoing research for the responsible management of nuclear waste."

If equal time and funding were available





to anti-nuclear groups, the public would have access to information which, were no more reliable, would at least allow for a reassuring possibility of choice.

The people who feel threatened by nuclear technologies must be allowed to register their apprehension without being ridiculed, and be guaranteed serious consideration of their legitimate fears.

Their distrust may be well-founded if one judges from a memo circulated within the industry suggesting defamation and infiltration of anti-nuclear groups as possible ways to silence them.

Populations meant to benefit from the advance of science should not become its victims.

Scientific integrity is a moral must. Even more so in this instance where the future well-being of the planet could be compromised forever.

Yet another fear provoking reflection, nuclear technology was initially developed for the avowed purpose of mass killing and destruction.

Despite many sincere attempts to improve its image and convert it to more humanitarian ends, it quietly continues to kill through occupational sickness, accidents, fallout and genetic damage resulting from nuclear power plants and their attendant wastes.





The nuclear debate seems to me, all too often, to be based on statistics and projections of the coldest, driest kind. I would like to see it raised to another level.

We humans are, after all, this planet's only rational creatures, gifted with foresight and compassion.

Government and industry seem to depend more on annual productivity reports than on human factors which are difficult to quantify on paper.

I remember a graph sent to me in Chicago
by my civil-engineer fiancé who live in Geneva. It was
his calculation of our happiness-curve as determined by
the distance in kilometres between these two (2)
cities, the time between now and our wedding date
several months hence, and key events occurring in the
interval such as birthdays, important decisions etc.

Hindsight proved the curve to have had little relation to reality. But in the same mail, he sent a living rose from the garden that was to be mine. There is a message here if we are wise enough to read it. Allow me this.

Every aspect of social health related to nuclear techniques and their radioactive wastes must be exhaustively examined and publicly reviewed before we





continue down this unfamiliar road which is no garden path. Care must be taken to separate short term economic gain from subsequent damage to the social fabric. The quality of the mental health of human beings, among them your grandchildren and mine, must come first.

Also, before any final decision is taken concerning nuclear fuel waste disposal, which would affect millions of people for millions of years, fairness requires that we spend millions of dollars to examine all possible options not causing environmental damage or destruction.

Expenditure equivalent to the sums spent ramming through the nuclear agenda has never been allocated to serious study and implementation of alternative programs such as energy efficiency, conservation, solar, geo-thermal et cetera. Instead of paying to poison the planet, we should be eager to invest in safety, which would contribute to our sanity. That such millions are available is obvious, we know where they are going. What we don't seem to know is where we are going.

Government must publish a White Paper detailing every aspect of the above studies, with criteria and projects for the implementation of safer





options, complete with timetables, comparative cost estimates, as well as environmental and social impact studies.

The social aspect must include studies on job loss and creation, the possible psychological and educational implications of reconversion, and must show real sensitivity toward local issues and indigenous populations.

All of this will require not just money, but time. Decisions entailing long term consequences should not be rushed in to. We may not have enough patience, money or honesty, but we certainly have plenty of time. It stretches without limit before us. The question is, are we going to use it wisely.

In conclusion, I am deeply concerned about the narrow terms of reference established here.

Studying nuclear fuel waste on its own is rather like considering the treatment of a possibly malignant tumour, without relation to its effect on the patient.

The scope of these hearings must include examination of all the links in the nuclear chain and recognition of their relationship to each other: uranium mining, tailings, processing, reactors, plutoniums, weapons and every poisonous waste generated along the way.

Meanwhile, a moratorium must be declared





on nuclear development including the mining of uranium.

It is the cause of our predicament.

Allowing the problem to increase while admitting ignorance of how to deal with it is not only illogical but irresponsible. I firmly believe that solving these questions places upon our generation a moral responsibility we cannot, and dare not, evade.

And for you help in an honest search for solutions that we and all future generations can live with, I thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much Mrs.

Bapst for the time and thoughts that you've certainly put into that presentation.

Are there any questions which any members of the panel would like to put to Mrs. Bapst while she's here? Dr. Wilson?

DR. LOIS WILSON: Yes, I'm interested that you've mentioned the perceived fears and the real fears of the public around this question. And you've raised the question "how are these fears to be effectively and legitimately allayed."

Do you have any answer to that or by whom and with...

MRS. EVANS BAPST: No.

DR. LOIS WILSON: Just a moment, and are





there any questions that could be addressed to AECL which might help to do that?

MRS. EVANS BAPST: My question can be answered by another question, your question can be answered by my question, this is why I'm here, to ask the questions.

We must all search for these answers together. I don't have solutions. The first solution that I did suggest and that was mentioned by all our panellists, was moratorium. Not to go ahead with anything that we are not sure of until we can guaranty. Because if we can reassure the population, than -- except that I wonder if we can.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Van Vliet?

MR. PIETER VAN VLIET: Mrs. Bapst, you make reference in your presentation to a memo that have circulated within the industry suggesting defamation and infiltration of anti-nuclear groups possibly to silence them. Do you have that memo?

MRS. EVANS BAPST: I don't have it with me but I know where to get my hands on it and I can produce it. I'll see that you get it.

MR. PIETER VAN VLIET: Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Any further questions?

Thank you very much indeed Mrs. Bapst.





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---Mrs. Bapst withdraws.

THE CHAIRMAN: This completes the list of people who were inscribed before hand and before this meeting opened, to speak to us this evening.

But as has been the case in other centres,
I now open the meeting to any others who would wish to
address us while we're here.

If there is no one who would like to speak to us, may I remind you that if there are some thoughts which you'd like to convey to us in writing, please so.

We will welcome them as much as your oral presentations at this series of meetings. We would appreciate it if you could try to get those to us by about the end of this month.


And with that, I would like to thank you all for being present this evening to take part in these proceedings. I'd like to thank particularly those who made presentations to us, thoughtful ones and ones which we'll certainly give further attention to.

I'm going to close this part of the evening's proceedings but please feel free, I hope some of you will, to stay a bit longer and have some of that informal conversation amongst each other and with members of the panel also, which is frequently a very valuable part of any meeting of this kind.






Thank you very much indeed for coming. shall be back tomorrow morning for a continuation of the session in Montreal. Thank you very much, merci beaucoup. -- Whereupon the hearing was adjourned at 9:10 p.m. to recommence at 09.00 a.m., Friday, November 16th, 1990. I, YVAN G. LEMAY, the undersigned Official Court Reporter, hereby certify the foregoing is a true and faithful transcript of these hearings taken by means of stenomask. YVAN G. LEMAY, Official Court Reporter 







FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL

ASSESSMENT REVIEW

OFFICE

BUREAU FÉDÉRAL

D'EXAMEN DES ÉVALUATIONS

ENVIRONNEMENTALES

Held at: Auditions tenues au:

Le Nouvel Hotel Montréal, Québec

Date: Friday, November 16, 1990

Vendredi le 16 novembre, 1990

Volume: 14

### BEFORE/DEVANT:

MR. BLAIR SEABORN

MS. LOUISE ROY

MR. PIETER van VLIET

DR. LOUIS LAPPIERRE

DR. WILLIAM FYFE

Chairman/Président


Member/Membre

Member/Membre

Member/Membre

Member/Membre







FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT REVIEW OFFICE
ON NUCLEAR FUEL WASTE
MANAGEMENT

BUREAU FÉDÉRAL D'EXAMEN

DES ÉVALUATIONS
ENVIRONNEMENTALES
DE LA GESTION DES DÉCHETS
DE COMBUSTIBLES NUCLÉAIRES

SCOPING MEETINGS
RÉUNIONS DE DÉTERMINATION DE L'IMPORTANCE DES PROBLEMES

Hearing held at/Auditions tenues au: Le Nouvel Hotel, Montréal, Québec.

Friday 16th/Vendredi le 16 novembre 1990

09:00 a.m. - 09:00 heures



VOLUME 14

## BEFORE/DEVANT:

MR.	BLAIR SEABORN	Chairman/Président
MS. MR. DR.	LOUISE ROY PIETER van VLIET LOUIS LAPIERRE	Member/Membre Member/Membre Member/Membre
DR	WILLIAM EVEE	Member/Membre





## APPEARANCES

1			
2	MR.	JEREMY STILES	ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION FOR PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
4			
5	MS.	CAROL KARAMISSINES	PRIVATE CITIZEN
6			
7	MR.	DON WEDGE	PRIVATE CITIZEN
8	DR.	MICHAEL R. DENCE ROBERT H. HAYNES M.A.J. METICH	ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA, CANADIAN ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING
10			
11	MR.	WALTER ROBBINS	PRIVATE CITIZEN
12	MS.	JUDITH BERLYN	PRIVATE CITIZEN
13	MRS	. GENE PERRAULT	MONTREAL RAGING GRANNIES
14	MS.	ANETTE HENRICKSA	PRIVATE CITIZEN
15			
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--- Upon commencing at 9:00 a.m.

LE PRÉSIDENT: Si vous voulez vous asseoir, on peut commencer la séance de ce matin.

Soyez les bienvenus à ces réunions de détermination de l'importance des problèmes tenues par la Commission d'Evaluation Environnemental, chargée de l'examen du concept de gestion et de stockage des déchets de combustibles nucléaires.

La présente réunion sera tenue et en anglais et en français, il y a un service de traduction bien sûr. On peut présenter dans une ou l'autre des deux (2) langues officielles.

Il y a des écouteurs si on veut être sûr de suivre dans une langue différente pour le participant.

Permettez-moi de vous présenter les membres de la commission qui sont avec moi ce matin.

Celui qui vient de nous échapper ou essaie de s'échapper au fond de la salle maintenant, c'est monsieur Pieter Van Vliet, de Régina, qui ingénieur en mécanique, aussi membre du Sénat de l'Université de Régina.

A ma gauche immédiate, monsieur Louis

LaPierre de Moncton, professeur du département de

biologie de l'Université de Moncton et président du





Conseil de l'Environnement du Nouveau-Brunswick.

A ma droite immédiate, madame Louise Roy de Montréal, consultante de le domaine de l'environnement et des affaires publiques. Elle était auparavant vice-présidente du Bureau d'Audiences Publiques sur l'environnement, et en ce moment, elle est membre du Conseil Canadien de Recherches sur l'Evaluation Environnementale.

Et encore à la droite de la table,
monsieur William Fyfe de Londres Ontario, professeur de
géologie à l'Université de Western Ontario, où il est
doyen de la faculté des sciences.

Mon nom est Blair Seaborn. Je suis président de la Commission. J'habite Ottawa, je suis actuellement à la retraite. Et j'étais anciennement et précédemment, sous-ministre de l'environnement et président de la Commission Mixte Internationale.

Les membres de notre secrétariat, monsieur Bob Greyell à la table ici et au fond de la salle, madame Suzan Toller et je crois madame Suzan Flanagan qui sont tous là pour vous aider si vous en avez besoin.

Cet examen est effectué conformément au processus fédéral d'évaluation et d'examen en matière d'environnement.





One of the requests put to the panel, has been to examine the nuclear fuel waste management and disposal concept, a proposal for permanent disposal of used nuclear fuel deep in the granitic rock of the Canadian shield.

This is a proposal which has been put forward by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, one which would have nuclear wastes inside corrosion resistant containers placed in holes drilled in the floor of a room inside a vault, something like a very deep mine.

Let me say a few words about the panel's mandate. The terms of reference state that the panel is to review the safety and acceptability of the concept for geological disposal of nuclear fuel waste in Canada, the one proposed by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited but, in addition to the AECL proposal, we shall examine a broad range of nuclear fuel wastes management issues including long term management, transport and environmental, social and economic effects.

We shall look at approaches to nuclear fuel wastes management and disposal being developed elsewhere in the world. Since site selection will not occur until a disposal concept has been accepted as safe, the panel will not consider any specific sites but will review the potential availability of sites and





the methodology and criteria required for selecting them.

Let me also say a word about what is not in the panel's mandate and therefore, will not be addressed in this review. The energy policies of Canada and the provinces, the role of nuclear energy within those policies including the construction, operation and safety and new or existing nuclear power plants, fuel reprocessing as an energy policy and the military application of nuclear technology, all of these are excluded from our mandate.

I would like it to be very clear however, that the members of this panel are very much aware of the broader concerns related to the use of nuclear materials and the use of nuclear power for the generation of electricity.

The panel has been urging a broader review of the comparative environmental implications of the various methods of generating electricity. Steps have now been taken to get such a review under way. Letters have been sent from the federal Department of Energy to provincial departments, and to a number of interest groups both environmental and energy, with a request that comments by returned quickly on proposed terms of reference and I hope that this review will be under way





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before too much longer.

The purpose of these scoping meetings is to allow participants to identify issues that need to be addressed in the Environmental Impact Statement that is to be prepared by AECL. The panel is not requesting the presentation of opinions on the substance of the disposal concept at this time.

Following these meetings, the panel will prepare draft guidelines for the preparation of the Environmental Impact Statement and we shall be inviting public comment on those over a period of at least thirty (30) days.

Once the panel is satisfied and then on that basis, we'll give of course the final version of our guidelines to AECL, they will undertake the preparation of the Environmental Impact Statement, a process which may well last a year, a year and a half  $(1\frac{1}{2})$ .

Once the panel is satisfied that AECL has addressed satisfactorily all the items identified in the guidelines, we shall hold public hearings.

Participants will be asked to discuss the acceptability of AECL's disposal concept in detail at this stage of the Review.

The panel will consider all comments

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submitted to it, and will as its final act, prepare a report to the ministers of Environment and of Energy, Mines and Resources.

I would ask that those who have registered to speak should attempt to summarize their concerns in approximately fifteen (15) minutes unless they had made some previous request for an additional ten (10) minutes of time.

The panel will pay equal attention to written and to oral statements. Panel may ask questions of clarification following each presentation.

If you would like to make a presentation and have not yet made that known, perhaps you'd be good enough to speak to a member of the secretariat so that we can get your name on the list.

In addition to what we receive at this round of public meetings, we will accept written submissions identifying issues and concerns up to and including November 30th, 1990.

May I call now on the first (1st) of our participants for this morning, Mr. Don Wedge. Is Mr. Wedge not here? I know that he had not signified his presence to the secretariat but we were expecting him this morning.

If not, I'll move on to the next person on





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my list, and hope that Mr. Wedge will appear before we go too much farther.

The Royal Society of Canada to be presented and the views to be presented by Mr. Michael Dence.

We don't seem to be doing very well. He's coming at 09:40, O.K. fine. I think that the confusion may have arisen from the fact that we were expecting to have a presentation here this morning from the World Uranium Hearing, but because if would have been in many ways duplicative of a very good presentation we heard in Quebec City, the decision was taken by that organization that they would not repeat what they had put forward in Quebec, on behalf of the Union Québecoise pour la Conservation de la Nature.

Those of you who are interested in those views of course, can have access to the transcript and also to the written presentation as you can to any other transcripts and written presentations from others who have participated in hearings elsewhere.

If Mr. Dence is not here, then I wonder if we could surprise him and call on him first, because I know he's here, Mr. Jeremy Stiles of the Environmental Coalition of Prince Edward Island.





#### PRESENTATION BY MR. JEREMY STILES:

I would like to thank FEARO for making it possible for islanders to have some input in this process. My only regrets are that we were unable to meet on Prince Edward Island. I'm making this presentation today on behalf of the Environmental Coalition of Prince Edward Island.

This issue is of particular concern to islanders since the Maritime Electric Company Limited has recently signed an agreement with New-Brunswick Power to purchase 20MW of nuclear generated capacity and energy each year for three (3) years, beginning in the Fall of 1991. The agreement was approved by the Public Utilities Commission of Prince Edward Island this past summer.

Under the terms of the agreement, NB Power will provide 20MW of capacity and energy from Point

Lepreau at NB Power's costs. These costs include operations and maintenance, direct fuel and heavy water costs, inventory carrying costs, capital related charges, debt guarantee charges, decommissioning charges and fuel adjustment charges.

Under the terms of the agreement MECL is entitled to its proportionate share of the actual net capacity and net energy output of Lepreau based on the





ratio that 20 MW represents of the units net operable capability based on 635 MW or approximately 3%.

This agreement has Island rate payers contributing substantial dollars directly to the continued operation of the Point Lepreau facility.

Many Islanders are concerned that this agreement only the first (1st) in a series that will ultimately result in a much larger financial investment in Point Lepreau II.

In light of the fact that Islanders are now directly contributing to the coffers of the nuclear industry in Canada, members of the Environmental Coalition of Prince Edward Island have some concerns regarding the disposal of high level radioactive wastes in the shield and with this particular forum.

The panel's consideration of only the abstract concept of deep geological disposal with no reference to a specific site contradicts what many Canadians have been asking for throughout the Green Plan hearings.

That is that a more holistic approach must be taken by governments in their approach to Environmental Impact Assessments of proposals such as this.

When the terms of reference are as





confined as these a full and comprehensive assessment of the issues cannot hope to be obtained. This results in a gross disservice to the Canadian public.

The recent decision against a fixed crossing to Prince Edward Island is a classic example of how assessing the abstract concept fails to satisfy anyone.

Decisions about nuclear waste disposal involve trade offs between the public's health and environment and the health of the industry are primarily moral and ethical. The Coalition believes these decisions must be made by the public.

A report entitled the Eleventh Hour
published in 1988 unanimously recommended a moratorium
on the construction of nuclear power plants, until
Canadians have agreed on an acceptable solution.
Similar recommendations have been made by governments
in Ontario, England and California, the latter of these
has followed up with the appropriate legislation, i.e.
that is legislation that will not allow the
construction of any new nuclear plants until
satisfactory solution for disposal is in place.

In spite of this, it is of interest to note that our Federal Government recently increased its support for nuclear expansion in this country.





Nuclear wastes pose serious environmental and economic problems. It is not appropriate to isolate one part of the public concern for the release of radioactive emissions into our biosphere from the nuclear fuel chain, when as a society, we are concerned about the cumulative impacts of all radioactive waste products generated from the entire nuclear fuel cycle.

Clearly, the terms of reference that you have been given do not enable you to adequately address the concerns of the Canadians. I put it to the panel that if you are unable to get the terms of reference expanded to address some of the other concerns, then you should resign.

The recent decision by AECB to issue a license to N.B. Power for the storage of high level radioactive wastes on site, was a slap in the face to my fellow Maritimers who voiced their concerns directly to the AECB.

The Environmental Coalition of P.E.I.

request that a full environmental impact assessment be

conducted on the storage of radioactive wastes in

concrete canisters above ground at the Lepreau site.

Dr. Timothy Binder, is the director of the World Crisis Solutions Foundation, and publisher of their newsletter. He suggests that the reduction of





ozone in the upper atmosphere is directly related to the release of radiation from bomb tests and venting nuclear power plants. He thinks that the radiation may be changing the structure of oxygen in such a way that it cannot make its normal change to ozone.

Dr. Binder visited the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in Boulder Colorado, and spoke with a researcher named George Mount who told him: "Yes, we know that radiation destroys ozone."

During the bomb tests in the 60's they found a 2% reduction in ozone. The American government is now reviewing the old data, this suggests to me that they are reconsidering the nuclear connection to ozone destruction. The question is, are they prepared to tell the public about it now?

The importance about clarifying the influence of radioactivity in our environment must be made a high priority and the assessment of one link in the chain does not adequately address the concerns of Canadians. In order to put things into perspective re the toxicity of these wastes, I will quote from a conference held in 1986 in Manitoba.

Norm Rubin did the calculations for the amount of water required to dilute to safe drinking levels the amount of high level radioactive wastes





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produced in three (3) years by the Darlington station.

According to his calculations, if the wastes were dispersed, they have enough toxicity to contaminate the water in all of the earth's freshwater lakes to the point of undrinkability. This is three (3) years production from one station.

Incidently, according to Mr. Rubin, the low level waste produced in one (1) year from the uranium mine tailings produced for Darlington, if these were dispersed into Lake Huron, they would be sufficient to render that water undrinkable.

I think it's important that we don't skirt the issue by referring to the total volume of these wastes as being insignificant and keep in mind that the toxicity and the longevity of these wastes.

Finally, it seems that the nation and in turn the world, let loose a demon of unprecedented virility and complexity when it released the atom from the research labs. For forty (40) years, toxic wastes have been thoughtlessly created with no safe long term means of disposal. Nuclear wastes must be isolated from the environment and actively maintained for their entire life.

The Environmental Coalition of Prince
Edward Island believes that the cost of such





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maintenance must be borne by the waste generators themselves. Hastily conceived out of sight and out of mind solutions are no solution at all.

It is highly doubtful that the nuclear industry will be able to find a community willing to accept a high level radioactive waste disposal site and the government is not likely to win public support for any solution which involves forcing a community to take the waste against its will. Therefore, Atomic Energy Canada Limited and the AECB should be making plans for phasing out the nuclear industry in this county in order to avoid creating any more high level or low level nuclear wastes.

It's obvious that the AECB does not know what they are doing and they are not doing a very good job of not doing it. Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you Mr. Stiles.

Could I ask members of the panel if they have questions they'd like to put to Mr. Stiles. Dr. LaPierre?

DR. LOUIS LAPIERRE: Mr. Stiles, thank you very much for your presentation. At the end of page one (1) of your presentation, you indicate that these decisions must be made by the public.

Could you elaborate on that, what do you really mean that the decisions should be made by the





public? How should they be made?

MR. JEREMY STILES: I think it's crucial that the public be involved in the process. These kinds of forums do tend to get some members of the public involved, people who are already involved in the movement, in the environmental movement, tend to make efforts to be here.

has to be a massive education campaign put out to make people aware of the volumes and the toxicity and the entire fuel cycle that's involved here. It's no good to look at just one component of this. And then when people are brought up to speed on the issue, they can then formulate their own opinions on it. It's no good for AECL or AECB to stand up there and blast off their side of the issue and then for the environment movement to come up and blast off its side of the issue and leave the public in the middle like "who do I believe?".

Because both sides tend to be a little extreme. So I really believe that education has to happen and then people, once they are informed should be involved in the process. It's important that it's not done hastily. I mean these things are going to be around for hundreds of thousands of years and to put





them into an out of sight out of mind solution, which seems to be the proposal, I think is wrong.

DR. LOUIS LAPIERRE: So do you have any -if not AECL and if not the groups which you represent,
who should do the education, public education?

MR. JEREMY STILES: I say both organizations can do education but I think they need to be working together to put the issues out and I think the school systems, government, I mean it's a complex process. It's very detailed and this type of forum brings in certain types of people but the average Joe on the street isn't that aware of it. So I mean whatever it takes, I think people would have to sit down and figure out what would be the best way of doing it.

DR. LOUIS LAPIERRE: Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Fyfe?

<u>DR. WILLIAM FYFE:</u> When P.E.I. decided, signed this agreement, before that was signed, was there much discussion of the possibility -- we've heard this in many places, that those who use it, store it?

MR. JEREMY STILES: This issue was discussed ten (10) years ago on P.E.I. when there was a different government in, when the Lepreau was first (1st) being built. And the government of the day made





the decision, made a recommendation to the P.U.C. not to approve it. A proposal had been put forth and it happened around the time of Three Mile Island.

And it resulted in election windfall for the opposition at the time. The issue was thoroughly flushed out then and the Premier who became then, was very concerned about a catastrophe such as Three Mile Island, wiping out the Island's economy because we are responsible for the plant. I was totally taken aback this past spring when the notice came out that NECL was looking to purchase 20 MW. The Environmental Coalition of Prince Edward Island acted as an intervener to the PUC and made our views known.

Because of the amount of time allowed and just the logistics of the process, and because the Environmental Coalition is all volunteers, we didn't have a lot of professionals that we could count on and pay to put together our side of the story whereas NECL had "Morinco", Montreal engineering Company, put its side together and no doubt they were paid big bucks to do it.

So we came in looking at the issues strictly on the economics and conservation and the fact that NECL was negligent ten (10) years ago for not adopting a conservation program. So no, the actual





waste users should store the waste issue was not brought up this past time.

THE CHAIRMAN: Madame Roy?

MS. LOUISE ROY: M. Style, vous avez insisté sur l'importance -- you don't have a translator with you -- Alors, vous avez insisté sur l'importance de clarifier l'influence de la radioactivité sur l'environnement global.

Est-ce que vous pourriez suggérer ou identifier certaines études qui ont mis de l'avant une approche reliée à l'évaluation des impacts cumulatifs de la radioactivité sur l'environnement, ou identifier certaines études ou certains chercheurs qui travaillent dans ce sens?

MR. JEREMY STILES: Yes, I would be able to do that but I wouldn't be able to do that right now. It would be a matter of going back to Island and speaking with some of my colleagues and sister organizations across the country. And I'm quite certain that we could come up with that.

MS. LOUISE ROY: Alors, est-ce qu'on peut se fier sur vous pour nous acheminer ces informations le plus tôt possible?

MR. JEREMY STILES: Certainly.

THE CHAIRMAN: It would be helpful to us





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if you did that because that can become part of the written record as I said earlier, it's the oral presentations and various written submissions in a number of occasions that we've gone along, we had asked the participants if they could send us some supplementary information which will add to the value of what we've received at these meetings. So thank you for that. Dr. LaPierre?

DR. LOUIS LAPIERRE: Just a small question, the Environmental Coalition of Prince Edward Island, is coalition of who and how big is your group?

MR. JEREMY STILES: The Environmental Coalition, we basically adopted the name because the name Coalition is kind of not accurate and that but the Government recently formed a group that had the name that we wanted to use.

So it is a coalition in one sense, the structure of the organization in its bylaws, is set up that we have two (2) executive coordinators and we have committees that deal with the issues.

We have active committees in recycling, education, energy, waste management, forestry, pesticides, alternatives to pesticides. And we have approximately two hundred (200) paid members in the organization of a population of a hundred and thirty





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thousand (130,000) a group that just began two (2) years ago, I think we're doing alright.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Van Vliet?

MR. PIETER VAN VLIET: Mr. Stiles, you make reference to the fact that nuclear wastes must be isolated from the environment and actively maintained for their entire life.

Do you have any suggestions as to where that might take place?

MR. JEREMY STILES: Well, I think it should be above ground. I toured Pinewa or Lac Dubonnet or the WhiteShell or whatever it was ten (10) years ago, where ever the site was and my impression at the time, the planning was you know, to put the stuff underground and seal it and leave it and I mean that thought just sent shutters up my spine that we would actually entertain you know, this stuff is going to be so toxic for so long, that we would actually entertain the possibility of putting this stuff, thousands of meters or feet or whatever it is, below the surface of the earth and sealing it off and saying oh yes, well it's taken care of now. I mean those plutons have been stable for a billion years and they'll be stable for another billion years.

It's got to be stored on the surface of





the ground and I don't think that these concrete canisters at Point Lepreau are the answer either.

Again, I think that it's absolutely imperative that the public be involved in the process in whatever decision is made, beyond this level, at a grass roots level, at a school level. I mean, you just can't -- we're dealing with stuff that my -- I mean how many generations do we go here, my children's children.

I mean anything that presupposes that you can put it out of sight and it will be taken care of.

I read in doing research for this, I came across an old proposal, an old concept that was to put in steel cylinders, like bullets or something, the waste, the high level waste, take it off the continental shelf into these clays that lie on the bottom of the ocean, I guess they cover two thirds of the ocean, drop it through the clay and at the impact that it would be travelling, would mean that when it went through the clay from, you know, from the ship through the water, would send it down, you know, a thousand meters or so into the bottom of the ocean bed and the clay would seal itself. That's how clay behaves, it heals itself.





I mean, that is ludicrous to assume that this thing is

-- the concept again of this, you know, let's put it
away somewhere and it will be taken care of and we
won't have to worry about it and that'll be it. I

mean, you've got to have it on the surface, people need
to know that it's there. I mean, pyramids would be
great. I mean you can walk in and out of it and people
will see great big pyramids with high level radioactive
waste in them and they'll know they're there right.

But anything that hides it, that hides it or conceals
it from the public.

MR. PIETER VAN VLIET: Should that be located at the power stations themselves or anywhere else in the near a community?

MR. JEREMY STILES: If it's anywhere else then you get into the problems involving transporting it and again you have to look at that, I mean, the problem with the power stations is they're located next to -- tend to be in highly densely populated areas but I think it's imperative that we deal with what we have and don't produce any more.

We can't, we can't adequately control what's out there now and to continue creating high level or low level radioactive wastes and releasing them into our environment, that ludicrous.





MR. PIETER VAN VLIET: One more question
Mr. Stiles, you also mentioned that cost must be born
by the waste generators, do you mean the power
generators or the people that use the power?

MR. PIETER STILES: Yes, that's kind of tricky, I thought of that as I was writing it. I mean the companies, I mean the people, I mean Ontario Hydro but ultimately, that'll get passed on to the consumer which is unfortunate, but again if we deal with this, the waste that's out there now and don't produce anymore, then I think it might be easier to sell.

THE CHAIRMAN: Any other questions from panel members? If not, thank you very much indeed, we do appreciate the fact that you've come here to make your views known on behalf of your group in P.E.I. Thanks very much.

---Mr. Stiles withdraws

THE CHAIRMAN: If Mr. Dence has now arrived, we'd like to hear from him and if he hasn't, I'll give everybody a five (5) minute break for a cup of coffee, including myself.

Is Mr. Dence here yet? He's expected at 09:45, I think he had another appointment. Let's just pause for a minute to take a cup of coffee and then we'll hear from Mr. Michael Dence of the Royal Society.





---Recess taken

---On resuming

THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen,
mesdames et messieurs, si on peut prendre les places,
on peut recommencer la séance de ce matin.

Could I call first please, on Miss Carol

Karamessines who has asked to speak to us this morning,

please.

## PRESENTATION BY MISS CAROL KARAMESSINES:

Alright, I haven't come thinking I would, but as I came through the door this morning, I heard the panel talking about a future inquiry into the alternatives in terms of generating electricity and I wanted to make sure that someone from Montreal read into the public record that the panel should be aware and I was assured they actually are, but I just want to have a citizen put this into the record.

That the terms of reference for such an inquiry must include saving electricity through energy efficiency programs and as an example of that, I want to refer the panel for the Quebec context, to a study done for the Grand Council of the Cree, which was submitted to the Mai Parliamentary Commission on hydro electric energy in Québec, called -- okay, I am sorry, I didn't understand the concept.





The particular study is called, it would be the "Complément technique to the mémoire", to that May Parliamentary Commission.

And the appendices thereof which were separate studies done by the Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington D.C. and by William Marcus and Ian Goodman of California and Boston, two (2) energy consultants, these separate studies arrived at the same conclusion, that if proper energy efficiency measures were to be introduced into the Quebec context and given certain other policy choices open to the Quebec government, there would be no necessity for the new mega projects until I think about 2015 or 2020. And these were separate conclusions by these separate energy consultants in the US. And one of the things that was part of that policy decisions the Quebec government would have to make, would be annulling the export contracts to say New York.

And so then, you might wonder well what would New York do. And with reference to that, there was a study released at the beginning of this year which was done for a New York governmental agency by the Environmental Defense from Washington D.C., I believe Peter Miller there, which put forward evidence to indicate that one third of the energy, electrical





energy now used in New York State, now generated -- not really generated because some of it is bought I guess from NYPA but all the private utilities in New York State, all of the energy that they give out to their consumers, one third of that could be cut right away if sixty-four (64) energy efficiency measures marketable items, I think sixty-two (62) of the sixty-four (64) are already on the market, were to be put in place and used.

And that's really all I want to say that
we can't leave that out of the argument, of the debate.
We cannot leave out energy efficiency because these
mega projects are destructive. The alternative nuclear
is dreadful but so is hydro electric mega projects in
the wilderness area. Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Don't leave for just a moment please. Thank you for bringing that to our attention. Although I think you're attending to bring it more to the attention of the Review which we understand is about to be formed.

Perhaps I could just mention to you that the draft terms of reference for that review, had been sent out recently for comment by a number of environmental groups.

I just happen to know from a conversation





last night, that Gordon Edwards of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility has, has that draft and is intending to comment. You might like to be in touch with him and feed your ideas back in that way if you'd like to.

MS. CAROL KARAMESSINES: Thank you very much, I know he's aware of these issues too.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, I'm quite sure he is but you might like to speak to him, but thanks for taking the trouble to bring this to our attention.

MS. CAROL KARAMESSINES: Thank you, thank you very much, thank you.

---Ms. Karamessines withdraws

THE CHAIRMAN: Right, thank you. I understand that Mr. Don Wedge is here now and I wonder if he would be good enough to come forward to make his presentation to us.

## PRESENTATION BY MR. DON WEDGE:

Thank you Mr. Chairman, panel. I too want to bring you citizen input on this. I was a teenager at a boy scout camp in 1945, in a remote part of England, no radio, no phone, nothing and yet somehow, the word got through that there had been an atomic explosion of some sort. We couldn't believe it because we'd been brought up to believe you couldn't split an





atom, you couldn't do anything with an atom.

I almost still don't want to believe it because for all the good it's done, it brought an incredible amount of harm and nuclear power holds not only this great potential for generating energy but a great potential for misusing it.

We have the military fears and incredibly, we have these peaceful fears. The sense that no matter what's done with the waste, it's still going to be a problem centuries from now, a million years from now perhaps.

Of course we've got to find a solution for the waste the exists. But I'm fearful that in finding that solution, we will create the support to go on.

What are we reading about as the world faces the problem, I have a selection of pieces from recent newspapers here, Pakistan wants to speed up, Switzerland, Sweden pull out, moratorium in effect in the United States on new constructions, and different ways the world's looking at it, fearful that Canada will look for its energy solution in restoring new nuclear power or new projects with their dangers.

So one half of me wants to say I hope we don't find a solution to the waste problem because that will discourage the foolhardy from going on with new





projects.

But of course, we must find the solution.

We're all fearful of nuclear war and what that will do

or nuclear accidents and what they have done. And what

it is, a hundred and thirty thousand ( 130 000) people

I think was the last I saw, directly affected by

Chernobyl.

I'm worried that these probability or possibility of burying nuclear waste in the shield will take care of it in the relative short term but in the long term, it seems to have the potential of an equally great disaster to humans.

Once the waste has been buried there in such a remote way I have a sense that it won't be easy to monitor and if changes occur, which are unforseen, it will be very difficult to correct them and take adjusting measures.

I understand the project is to be buried very deep into hard rock but even so, I don't know how anyone can be sure there won't be seepage and seepage into the water system in a very fundamental way.

So, my fears are that there should be developed a way of disposing what we have that is more not visual but at least more easy to monitor and to correct if it goes right.





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And whatever we do, we should not continue with the ongoing creation of this waste. We have no right to decide the fate of people centuries and a millennia from now just to suit our own convenience.

We have to be more wise and more worthy of being human beings than to risk people so far into the future just for our convenience. That's my view.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you very for letting us share those views with you Mr. Wedge, are there any questions which any of the panel members wish to put to our participant?

Thank you very much indeed for taking the trouble to appear before us this morning Mr. Wedge.

---Mr. Wedge withdraws

THE CHAIRMAN: The next participant will be from the Royal Society of Canada, Mr. Michael Dence is here and two others from the Society. I wonder if they would come forward and make the presentation, if they're prepared to do that now.

DR. MICHAEL R. DENCE: One member is still en route. I could begin the process by introducing our presentation if you wish.

THE CHAIRMAN: Well perhaps you could -you're expecting him momentarily are you not?





DR. MICHAEL R. DENCE: He's in a cab somewhere, he's in a cab somewhere between here and the university.

THE CHAIRMAN: It can't take him all that long to get here then from the University. Perhaps we could -- perhaps you could go ahead at least, tell us a little bit about what you've done within the Royal Society to bring together the views of the very wide interest which you have there.

DR. MICHAEL R. DENCE: Perhaps one other member could join us.

THE CHAIRMAN: Good, good. I could suggest you could even say a word about the Royal Society and particularly how you come at this problem Mr. Dence, that would be quite helpful.

## PRESENTATION BY DR. MICHAEL R. DENCE:

I'd be happy to Mr. Chairman. This presentation has been prepared by a joint panel which is drawn from the Royal Society of Canada and the Canadian Academy of Engineering.

And Mr. Matich here is a fellow of the Canadian Academy of Engineering, and will speak to the issues that the panellists or the committee members from that organization brought to the committee.

Dr. Robert Haynes who is the person who is





en route, is the Chair of this Committee. And the other members of the committee were Dr. Ludwig who is a Professor of Mathematics at the University of British Columbia, who has worked on the statistics of biological matters.

Dr. Grant Garven, who is Associate

Professor at Johns Hopkins University, who is a

Canadian geologist with expertise in hydrogeology.

Dr. Donald MacDonald is the other member from the Academy of Engineering, an Engineer with expertise is tunnelling and excavation process in particular.

Dr. Denis Shaw from the University of McMaster, who is a member of the Committee, Geochemist with wide experience in trace element geochemistry and the rocks of the Canadian shield in particular. The evaluation of almost everything.

And the other member of the committee was Dr. Vera Vikis-Freibergs, who is a Professor of Psychology at the University of Montréal, with expertise in experimental psychology, psycholinguistics, psycho-pharmacology, et cetera.

I have a brief resume of the membership of the committee and a few lines on the expertise of the members.





In addition, I was assisting the Committee in my capacity as Executive Director of the Royal Society of Canada and we asked two (2) people to be witnesses to the Committee to assist them in their discussions.

One was Dr. John Fyles, the former Chief Geologist of the Geological Survey of Canada and the other was Dr. Les Shemilt of the department of Chemical Engineering at McMaster University, of course who has had a long experience with this particular task and here's our Chairman.

---Dr. Haynes joins the panel

While he's getting his coat off, I could just say that the Committee met over a two (2) day period in late October at Royal Society's offices in Ottawa.

I could say that the Society and the Academy of Engineering are the two bodies in Canada now which act as National Academies in the arts, sciences and engineering.

Combined membership at the moment is about fourteen hundred (1400) and I think it's fair to say that it includes many of the leaders in humanity, social sciences, natural sciences and engineering in Canada, across Canada. In both cases, members are





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elected by votes of their peers in the appropriate disciplines and fields. Both organization are non-political and they're uncommitted on these issues and take no particular point of view on any issue controversial or otherwise.

Committee, in this case a joint committee and to ask that Committee, having set up Committee by vote of the council or board of the organization, they then ask for that committee to deliberate. And then the council or the board of the Academy receives the report and in accepting it, testify that they are satisfied that the standard of the work that's been done and it adheres to the necessary levels of scholarship that the Organizations expect but they do not necessarily endorse the views put forward. Now in this case, because of the time constraints, there's been no time for either body to actually see what has been put to you today so they will eventually see it.

The membership of both organizations will see it and it's conceivable there will be an avalanche of further material come to us and to you as a result. But we will see what happens there.

We have put together a brief overview which Dr. Haynes has been responsible for and he will





speak of that in a minute.

In addition, I do have material here amounting to about fifteen (15) pages of view points that have been written in by members of the Committee following our meetings in October. Obviously the time is not available to go through these in detail, but if the discussion wishes to bring some of them up, I will be happy to or Dr. Haynes or Mr. Matich will be happy to put them to you as an indication of the style of the topics that came up. Not all of them were during the discussions. Once you set the wheels in motion, the thoughts come and what we've received here are slightly more mature thoughts then the ones in the discussion in October.

But that process will undoubtedly continue as well. Now I don't know whether Dr. Haynes has had time to compose his thoughts and carry on.

DR. ROBERT H. HAYNES: Yes, thank you very much.

THE CHAIRMAN: Could I first of all say by all means, do draw on what your members, or members of your Committee have said, but I hope you'll be good enough to table that with us, leave a copy with the secretariat of these, if you have no objections, of those individual comments. I think that would be





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useful for us to have as part of our record and to get the opportunity for us to read, we members of the panel to read it.

DR. MICHAEL R. DENCE: What I would like to leave with you today sir, is the introductory material.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

DR. MICHAEL R. DENCE: Some of the preliminary comments and I could leave of course these unfinished you see, unsorted comment but I would like to have the opportunity in the next few days of just arranging them slightly more...

THE CHAIRMAN: Even better then send that alone to us, is that the idea?

DR. MICHAEL R. DENCE: Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: That's very good, that's fine thank you. Could I then, could I ask Dr. Haynes if he would take the mike then.

And we've been asked by the technicians and interpreters to speak fairly closely into these microphones, so it will be well picked up. Dr. Haynes. PRESENTATION BY DR. ROBERT H. HAYNES:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. pleasure for me to be able to speak to you and the panel today regarding an issue which I consider to be





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an extremely important one in Canada and more particularly for the future.

Not just the immediate future but the very long distant future. I think I should say at the beginning, that I in fact, did serve for five (5) years, as a member of the Technical Advisory Committee on the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management Program. The first five (5) years of its operation in fact and I remember very vividly the first (1st) meeting and a discussion that I had afterwards with some of my colleagues who were on the committee. And I said to one "it's incredible what we are doing. We are sitting here and we're discussing issues and making recommendations that could conceivably have effect not just over the next thirty, forty, fifty, one hundred years, but over what might be regarded as geological time.

And so therefore, it's extremely important to have some firm idea of what it is one is doing.

Then I said the only comparable situation that I could recall would be the discussion and the calculations that went into the explosion or ignition of the first (1st) atomic bomb when a number of scientists thought that perhaps the heats generated would be sufficient to ignite the waters in the sea and the water vapour in





the atmosphere and then deep turn the earth into a fireball.

And I said the person who did the calculations that made it on the basis of which that decision to explode the first bomb went ahead must certainly have been a rather brave man. And to my considerable surprise, a member of that Committee, professor Maurice Price of the University of British Columbia, one of the world's most distinguished Theoretical Physicist, turned to me and said "Bob, he said, I did that calculation."

And I said: "Maurice, I said you did that calculation?" and he said "yes". And he said "furthermore there is no problem. All you have to do is to believe that the laws of physics are correct." And so in a way, I think we are in that kind of situation with respect to nuclear fuel waste management that is to say there really is a very serious problem which must be dealt with. However, if the laws of physics are correct, I'm quite sure it can be dealt with satisfactorily.

In view of my experience not only with the Technical Advisory Committee but also with the Joint Committee of the Royal Society and the Academy of Engineering, I am very concerned that this discussion





does not become a forum for what I would call a competing ideological positions. I think that's very unfortunate because that rarely lens clarity or honesty to any issue. You get obfuscation and posing by all parties to such debates.

I think the reality of the situation is that we do indeed have a problem, that exists at the present time. There is spent nuclear fuel at various nuclear power stations. That fuel has been sitting for varying periods of time depending on its age and the age of the station and it will, it possible for it to continue sitting precisely where it is for a good number of years into the future.

None the less, I think that it's desirable to design some means of handling it that does not require its permanent siting, where it is at the present time.

So I think that would be my first (1st) point as the Executive Secretary of our Society, Dr.

Dence has already indicated to you, the Royal Society and the Academy of Engineering officially do not take official positions on issues.

Therefore, I think it's particularly important that this committee and those with whom are discussing this issue, understand that we do not





represent either a pro-nuclear or an anti-nuclear position.

However, the main point that I would make is that it doesn't matter where you stand in that particular and important socio-political debate, the problem that we face is here and it will not go away.

So therefore I would hope that if this is understood, then all Canadians, independently of whether they think nuclear power is a good thing or a bad thing, would be able to participate in helping those involved and indeed the panel, your panel, to come to some rational and sensible position with respect to the environmental assessment of the program proposed by AECL.

In the summary that has been presented to you this morning, a number of points are made. The first (1st) point and I think it's a very important one, is that the Environmental Impact Statement should be a review of the generic concept of deep geological disposal of spent fuel bundles.

It is not a normal Environmental Impact
Statement. The environmental impact studies that I
have been party to or have read in the past, if my
memory is correct, would all refer to specific sites.

Specific places where something was





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proposed to be done. Where in this case, one is looking at or reviewing or trying to review the environmental impact of an idea or a concept as presented by AECL.

Now of course, the concept is not entirely devoid of some degree of site specificity. The concept for example, does not entail the depositing of nuclear fuel bundles in the mid-ocean trenches in the expectation that they would ultimately be displaced into the magma, into the lower depths of the earth. Rather it is a proposal in which the disposal site would be located in a particular geological area, though a very large one. That is to say within the Canadian shield precambrian rock formations, a very large area.

But the important point is that there is no specific site as yet chosen within that area for the purposes of discussion.

So this makes, this -- the fact that what you are being asked to review is a generic concept rather than a specific site, I think makes the whole issue much more interesting and perhaps, some ways, perhaps simpler I think, and in other ways, perhaps more complex than a normal Environmental Impact Statement.





So that really is the first (1st) point.

The second point that we make in the overview is that, it's by no means clear to us, whether the questions that we have proposed and which will be proposed in more detail in the document that will be submitted to you next week I trust, it's by no means clear to us in all cases, whether the questions that we propose for consideration by your panel, fall within its official terms of reference or are appropriate or are indeed even appropriate for inclusion in the EIS which you must ask Atomic Energy of Canada Limited to prepare.

Related to this also is another point and

Related to this also is another point and that is that insofar as I personally know, and I think this would — this degree of ignorance would have affected the other members of our joint committee, it would appear to us that no Environmental Impact Statement for a generic concept of this kind has ever been requested by any other governmental organization, either in Canada or abroad. And thus, it's going to be up to the panel to make use of all the information and suggestions available to it, to fashion the terms of reference for the document and in the hope that the final document is credible and acceptable to experts in the field, to regulatory agencies and I think, most importantly, to the general public.

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So I think that whatever you do with respect to instructions with regard to the Environmental Impact Statement, I think they should be framed in such a way that the final report will have a high level of credibility and acceptability to all of the interested parties. And that's a very broad spectrum when you consider that it ranges all the way from technical experts through regulatory officials, to the general public.

And indeed, it's the hope of our Joint

Committee that what we consider to be really a

pioneering effort in this regard, will indeed not only

satisfy Canadian needs and concerns but also will serve

as a guide or even perhaps a standard for similar

assessments that will be carried out in other

countries.

The next issue and which is really I think one of the most basic issues that we discussed, relates precisely to the scope of the Environmental Impact Statement.

Now obviously, the scope of such a statement could in principal, be either very broad and address a wide range of socio-political as well as technical issues, or it could be focused very narrowly on technical matters only.





And it is the view of our Joint Committee that the Environmental Impact Statement indeed must be broad rather than narrow in scope and that even more importantly, it must be written as far as possible in a language for the lay public, if it is indeed to be credible and acceptable to the diverse communities concerned with the issue.

In particular FEARO and AECL, the Atomic Energy Control Board and the federal and relevant provincial governments must be prepared to deal with the possibility that AECL's present concept or scenario for deep geological disposal may indeed prove to be technically acceptable but publicly unacceptable.

That possibility must be entertained in forming your terms of reference. On the other hand, you cannot logically rule out the possibility that it's publicly acceptable but none the less it poses grave technical or economic difficulties that perhaps would escape the immediate notice of the public, of the interested public.

However I think we concluded that we see not need to address either of these two (2) possible though unfortunate results with detailed contingency plans. I think the main point would be for the panel to have these possibilities at least in the backs of





their mind.

And so, we would then conclude that the crucial point is that the Environmental Impact
Statement should be sufficiently broad in scope so that
Canadians can feel confident that all the important
issues have been addressed clearly, honestly and openly
without any hint of obfuscation and even more
importantly, without any hint of ideological bias with
respect to which side the group is on, with respect to
the continuing general debate over nuclear power.

The point is that the issue that is being posed here has got nothing to do with the question of whether we have nuclear power or we do not.

And so therefore there's a paragraph in this summary report which I will just read out to you because I think it's a very important one.

And that is that "the diverse problems of nuclear fuel waste management are unlikely to be solved either by some simple, inexpensive technological fix, nor are they to be solved by closing down the nuclear power industry."

The spent fuel bundles are sitting in Pickering right now as we sit here. Thus the Environmental Impact Statement should begin first with a clear and explicit statement of the nature and





magnitude of the present problem, on the assumption, first (1st) on two (2) assumptions, they should state the magnitude of the problem on two (2) assumptions.

And they are extreme assumptions, but I think it's important. The first (1st) assumption would be to state the magnitude and nature of the problem on the assumption that no new nuclear power stations will be constructed and that all present stations will be closed down at the end of their useful lifespan.

So then, the point is that if the entire nuclear industry is closed down tomorrow, every plant is decommissioned, then what is the nature and magnitude of the problem. That's the problem at one end of the spectrum.

However, the other end of the spectrum I think it is the Environmental Impact Statement should address the question of whether the present waste management problem will become more severe either quantitatively or qualitatively, on the assumption that nuclear generating capacity is expanded to meet a much higher proportion, say 90% of Canada's electricity needs in the foreseeable future.

So the question then is, how does the magnitude or nature of the present problem change if the percentage of nuclear power generated in the





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country, increases virtually to what is maximally possible?

So they're two (2) extremes scenarios to be sure, but I think that if the Environmental Impact Statement works against this background, then it will also aid to have a more realistic final judgment.

Well, in addition to defining the magnitude of the present and possible future technical problem of nuclear waste management, the issues of greatest concern to the Joint Committee could be classified under four (4) categories which we have indicated here.

I'll just speak briefly to them and then turn the microphone over to my colleague, Mr. Matich of the Canadian Academy of Engineering for some more specific technical commentary from the engineering standpoint.

The basic issues, the most fundamental issues that we raised indeed were for the most part semantic in character. And this is an area where semantics are extremely important. And I want to give you an example of what we mean, if I can find the material.

I do not have the precise material I see that I wanted, however I do have sufficient material to





illustrate the point of semantics.

What I had and which I cannot, for the moment find, were a couple of quotations describing the overall objectives of the nuclear fuel waste management program or programs...

Oh yes, I found one. First (1st), a statement that is contained in what I believe is a still not distributed or still restricted OECD document.

And in the executive summary, there is a sentence that reads as follows "Radioactive waste disposal systems are designed to isolate the waste from humans and the environment for the necessary times to ensure that no potential future releases of radioactive substances to the environment would constitute an unacceptable risk."

There is a similar statement which is, although the words are slightly different, in a recent document produced for popular consumption by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited.

Now that is a fair and honest statement.

However, there are semantic problems with it. And the problems are that all of the words are essentially, all of the words in that sentence are words from ordinary English.





But in fact, they're being used in a rather technical sense. And so therefore, it's this kind of difficulty I feel, that creates a lot of the problem and a lot of the argument that swirl around this issue.

And so therefore, what we would urge is that you request the AECL or those people who are involved in the preparation of the Environmental Impact Statement, to do the usual academic thing, which is to define their terms. Now, I'm quite sure that they would be expected to define technical terms, pieces of technical jargon that would occur in the report. And I'm sure there would be a glossary at the end that would contain these definitions.

But I don't think that is nearly as important as producing clear definitions of those words that are words of ordinary English or ordinary French, simply because these are the kinds of words that will give difficulty and over which debate will emerge.

So secondly, I think it's important that these explanations of the terms, first of all, of course should themselves be in non-technical language, but more importantly, they should be both exclusive and inclusive.

And I'll try to make that clear in just a






minute with an example. That is to say the definitions should define what is included in the understanding of the word but also what is not included in the minds of the writers. And one would hope that on this basis, ambiguity would at least be minimized.

Now, thinking back to the sentence that I just read to you from the OECB document, some of the key words there, I'll just go through as follows and I'm not going to go through them all, but I'll just do this by way of example.

The first is the word <u>environment</u>. It must be made completely clear what it is that one means by environment. You can take any object, I could take this glass of water, the environment of this glass of water, in principle, is the entire rest of the universe, going right out to the edge, if there is an edge. Now the question is, what environment is relevant to the impact of this glass of water that's sitting here on the table. So that's the first point. And furthermore, these environments in the parlance used for example by Professors at our Faculty of Environmental Studies at York University, environments are not just physical or geological or astronomical environments.

They are also climactic, they are





biological, they're psychological, they're economic, they're social, they're religious, they're ideological and so on. Indeed, one person has said environments can even be supernatural. And I think that if you read the magazines at the checkout counters in the supermarkets today, you will quickly realize that the supernatural environment is very much with us and it's one that's of deep concern to a lot of people. So therefore, I think that it's awfully important to be very clear what one means by environment.

Now, if this report is going to have some degree of public credibility, which obviously is the object of the exercise, then I think it's abundantly clear that the environment cannot be restricted to the immediate physical, geological or even biological environment of the waste disposal site.

But some account must be taken of the setting into motion of this program on the psycho-social, economic, ideological and so on environment of Canada and perhaps even North America.

The second point of course is to understand that these environments will change in character with time. Over the time span that this site will be in operation, it's by no means clear that we will have the same kind of society as we do today in





Canada.

Or that we will necessarily have even the same kind of geology. I'm sure professor Fyfe will correct me. I know the precambrian rock is a very ancient and very stable formation. It is said to have a low level of seismic activity. But I believe a low level does not mean a zero level. And so therefore, it's rather difficult to predict even what the geological environment might be in millennia ahead. So that's an example of what I mean by definition. What environments are to be considered.

Then, it's an Environmental Impact
Statement. What does one mean by impact or
consequences.

In general, one thinks of impacts or consequences as being bad or undesirable. However, it's also possible that there could be no impact at all. It's also possible that impacts could even be good. If you consider the psycho-social and economic environment, it might well be that many people would consider that the employment opportunities that would emerge from such a program would be a good thing. And so therefore, impacts can be good, bad or indifferent. And again, I think it should be clearly stated what is meant by that.





A word that was discussed most extensively by the Committee, was the word <u>disposal</u>. And you see it in the OECD report, radioactive waste disposal systems.

Now, I think that in the current state of science, it's abundantly clear that geosphere and the biosphere are very closely interconnected and interrelated. In fact I believe I've heard professor Fyfe even say that the biosphere has had as great an impact on the geosphere as have other forces that emerged strictly from physical origin. So therefore, the idea that one can somehow erect a barrier between the geosphere and the biosphere might not in fact be correct.

It depends on what one means by barrier and the degree of its permeability. Under those circumstances, one must ask what one means by disposal. Is it possible that a better word would be displacement. In other words, the radioactive waste is not being disposed of, it is being displaced to another position, another location in the geosphere/biosphere of which we are a part. Now I think you will see from that example how the issue becomes a rather different issue in character just depending on what word you use.

A word that is frequently used is





permanent and indeed it has been an assumption of the Program from the beginning that this would be a permanent disposal site.

Now does one really mean forever? From here to eternity? Does one really mean that the moment the radioactive material is put down into the depository site, the doors can be locked, the keys thrown away and everyone just goes home and in a year or two, the grass grows over the site and the trees grow and people have totally forgotten that is even there.

Now, that kind of scenario seems to emerge from some of the language used in the work describing this area. However, I'm by no means sure that's really what is intended. So therefore I think that the use of these words must be carefully defined. I have no fundamental objection to the word disposal or permanent in — if they are clearly defined. But very often, they are not defined and because they're plain words of the English or French language, one can have problems with them.

I will not go on to talk about this any further. The issue of <u>safety</u> of course is a big one.

My wife is a lawyer and she has told me that in the minds of many people, brought up in a legal





background, there is such a thing as safe or safety. You know, "doctor, is your procedure safe?" and of course, the reality is from a scientific point of view, that in this valley of tears, nothing is safe. And so therefore, I think it must be very clear how that word safe and safety is being used so that the readers of the Environmental Impact Statement will have a clear idea of precisely what is intended when it is used.

Well I think that's enough on semantics.

I've just been trying to make a point.

The next point that I would make, relates to the assumptions that have already been made within the program itself. I would urge the Panel to look at the forth annual report of the Technical Advisory Committee on nuclear fuel waste management program, issued in July 1983.

It happens in that report, there is an appendix which lists all of the major decisions that have already been made with respect to this program and which of course, have affected the program development.

I think that it's desirable for the panel and those who are involved in the Environmental Impact Assessment or Review, to be explicitly knowledgeable about these decisions and what the reasons were for their being made. For example, in 1978, a decision was





confirmed that the reprocessing...

THE CHAIRMAN: Excuse me for interrupting, but you have gone longer of the two limits which were set for the Society.

DR. ROBERT H. HAYNES: Oh, I see, O.K.

THE CHAIRMAN: I don't want to cut you off too much but I think we're all anxious to hear from your colleague.

DR. ROBERT H. HAYNES: Yes, very well, I will conclude then in a sentence, this will be all spelled out in the subsequent document. We are concerned that you look at the assumptions that already underlie the program, for example, with respect to reprocessing of the fuel bundles.

We would hope that radiological criteria for the performance of the site be taken fully into account and there are a number of statistical concerns with regard of a technical nature which I won't go into here, but which will be in the final report.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much indeed,
Dr. Haynes. I believe now, we could hear from Dr.

Matich on behalf of the particular viewpoint of the
Canadian Academy of Engineering.

## PRESENTATION BY MR. M.A.J. MATICH:

Thank you Mr. Chairman, it's a pleasure





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to make some comments on behalf of Dr. Don McDonald and myself.

And I'd like to mention at the outset that these are our views. They're not necessarily the views of the Academy or of other members of the Academy as a whole.

Some of the points I make have already been discussed by Dr. Haynes and I'd like to read quickly from a summary that I have, if I may. These points are elaborated on, in greater detail in a written memorandum which we have for distribution to you. And following are some items and these are strictly from an engineering point of view, which we think AECL would be advised to include in the scope of their Environmental Impact Statement.

Firstly, the matter of terminology which Dr. Haynes has already addressed, we think is very important. That all words and technical terms should be clear, correct and unambiguous and consistent within the scientific community and also readily understandable by the public.

Secondly, with regard to the disposal site, in the concept which is being assessed, the disposal site comprises an underground repository in a stable host bedrock as you've already heard.





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requirements.

It's understandable that AECL should strive to find "an ideal site of this type", not withstanding this worthy objective, the realities will require than less than perfect site be utilized and if so, AECL would be advised to demonstrate that such a site can be upgraded to satisfy minimum acceptable

AECL would also be advised to justify the choice of this concept from the available variance of the concept or the basically different concepts.

In regard to natural analogues, the demonstrated attention given to the study of natural analogues dealing with radioactive regimes in bedrock is commendable and should be broaden to give a strong emphasis as well to natural hydrogeological regimes in other than a radioactive setting.

Fourthly with regard to risks, the AECL is advised to give due consideration to all safety risks as well as risks to the environment regardless of probability or timing relative to closure.

Emphasis should be placed on ability to manage risks in engineering works based on current knowledge and future research, development and performance assessment.

Regarding transportation of the spent





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nuclear fuel, since transportation of used nuclear fuel is one of the riskier parts of the concept, the Impact Statement should demonstrate that attendant risks can be safely managed in the Canadian environment.

As long transportation routes might be perceived to imply greater risks of accidents, AECL would be advised to justify the choice of a disposal site or sites distant from the sources of spent nuclear fuel.

I'd like to make some comments regarding a pilot plant stage as follows, that there's a long history of successful precedent in industry for the use of a pilot plant stage in the scaling up of major new processes to full scale operation. AECL would be advise to give serious consideration to the use of this procedure wherever possible in developing the concept, including the maximum use of the pre-closure phase for this purpose. In this regard, optimum use should be made of full scale testing of components of the disposal system under conditions representative of final conditions on re-establishment of the ground water regime and the post-closure stage.

Full use of "accelerated testing" techniques should be made where appropriate.

In respect of permanent monitoring, it's





appreciated that the objective of developing a disposal system that does not rely on surveillance and monitoring in the post-closure phase is commendable. However, it is believed that the concept would be enhanced by comprehensive monitoring and surveillance program in the post-closure stage at least to the point where the results of the program indicate that it can be reduced or discontinued with assurance. This would have benefits to future generations.

Contingency plans, without implying deficiencies in the concept, the latter must include the provision of contingency plans which would demonstrate capability to manage and correct in a timely manner, all situations where unfavourable departures from expected performance are encountered and also take advantage of situations which are more favourable than planned.

And nine, subsequent reversal of a decision, it would be advisable to explain in detail the role of major decisions in the development of the concept as well as the implications of subsequent reversals of these major decisions.

An example of this would be a decision to reprocess the spent fuel at a date subsequent to the start up of the pre-closure stage.





Those are some of our comments Mr. Chairman, in a summary form. Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Speaking for myself and I suspect members of the panel as well, you have both given us a great deal of food for thought, which we'll try -- we've certainly benefited from right now.

And we will all look forward to reading in more detail the presentation which will be along to us soon, the written presentation which will support what you've said here.

However, I would like to take advantage of your presence to ask whether there are questions which even at this time, before we've had the chance to see your written material, any member of the panel might wish to put to you. Madame Roy?

MS. LOUISE ROY: Vous avez mentionné le caractère particulier de l'évaluation...

THE CHAIRMAN: Do you have on the headset?
MS. LOUISE ROY: Ca va, oui?

DR. ROBERT H. HAYNES: Ca va!

MS. LOUISE ROY: Vous avez mentionné le caractère particulier de l'évaluation que nous avions à faire dans la mesure où cette évaluation doit porter sur un concept.

Vous avez aussi soulevé les difficultés





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méthodologiques reliées à ce type d'évaluation et le caractère relativement novateur de cette approche.

Vous avez aussi mentionné la nécessité de rendre l'évaluation crédible pour des publics extrêmement diversifiés.

Je voudrais vous demander à partir de la connaissance que vous avez de ces différents milieux, scientifiques, le milieu scientifique, les différents publics, le grand public, les groupes environnementaux, les groupes sectoriels d'intervention dans notre société et à partir de la connaissance que vous avez aussi de leur mécanisme de réflexion et d'évaluation des problèmes, est-ce que c'est possible et souhaitable de regrouper dans un même canevas d'évaluation, un seul canevas d'évaluation, qui soit satisfaisant pour chaque milieu, les paramètres et les questions à couvrir ou si nous ne devrions pas plutôt envisager par exemple de procéder par étape, ou à partir d'une approche pyramidale ou de quelqu'autre approche qui soit différente, d'un seul canevas global soumis une seule fois et à partir duquel l'ensemble des études devront être produites?

DR. ROBERT H. HAYNES: Yes, I think the answer must be up to the Panel itself. I think your suggestion of at least two (2) documents could be a





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useful suggestion. Certainly, I think the important point is that if there is one (1) document, let it be what I would call a "plain language document".

However, if the regulatory agencies or the scientific community, the engineering community as opposed to the general public, express a desire for a more technically constructed report, then I think a second (2nd) document would perhaps be in order.

THE CHAIRMAN: Are there other questions?

Dr. Fyfe.

DR. WILLIAM FYFE: In your deliberations, given the time constance of this problem etc, and the fact that God knows who'll be living in Canada in five hundred years...

DR. ROBERT HAYNES: Does She?

DR WILLIAM FYFE: ...and this has come up
in some of our -- from other people who've presented it
to us, should this whole process be regulated
internationally?

DR. ROBERT H. HAYNES: The Joint Committee did not consider that possibility at all. It is my understanding that the International Atomic Energy Agency is very much involved with work in this area.

Whether or not the relevant governments or operating authorities in Canada would be prepared to





delegate or give up that degree of what might be called sovereignty, that seems to be a buzz word these days, to international agency, is another matter.

My own personal view would be that I think it would be very desirable for an international agency to play some considerable role. However, I think the basic question is the extent to which final responsibility or what I would call sovereignty be given up in this regard. The reason I say that is that there is another example which I've had direct experience with in the past year or two.

That concerns the international guidelines prepared by the ICSU the International Council of Scientific Unions, with respect to the granting of visas by governments for scientists to attend meetings in their country. For the Genetics Congress which was held in Toronto in 1988, we requested the government to — and in line with the UCSU requirements to provide an explicit written undertaking that visas would in fact, be granted to all bona fide scientists who wished to attend.

However, they declined to do this,

External Affairs declined to do this because they

simply did not want to, as it were, give up or abrogate
their authority in this matter.





So as an internationalist, I would hope that we would go as far as possible in the direction of international regulation and control but I think that it's a political and legal question that perhaps is beyond the competence of this Review.

THE CHAIRMAN: Dr. LaPierre?

DR. LOUIS LAPIERRE: My question is to either Dr. Haynes or Dr. Dence. It relates to the reliability of models. When you went through your discussions, did you spend any time or some time discussing the reliability of models to adequately integrate the changes that might take place over the time of the disposal processes ongoing, in order to predict with any degree of certainty what would happen in the long term future?

DR. MICHAEL R. DENCE: If I could respond to that, certainly that matter was discussed and in the written material that you will receive, there are two (2) or three (3) of the Committee members have addressed these particular problems.

They have a number of concerns about the statistical methods used, the power of the statistics that may be employed and the validity of models and there's quite a large list of considerations which you may wish to take into account.





So I don't think it would be appropriate to spend time now to go through all of this languish list of points, but I think you'll find them useful food for thought and certainly, it's fair enough to say that there's a high level of concern about the validation of the methods used in computer modelling and what is implied thereby.

DR. LOUIS LAPIERRE: Thank you very much.
THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Van Vliet?

MR. PIETER VAN VLIET: I'm not sure who might answer this but both Dr. Haynes and Mr. Matich have indicated the issue of studying a generic concept versus a site specific concept. In your opinion or those of the members of your organizations, how far can one go or is it valid to go to a generic concept evaluation versus site specific in view of many variances that could occur over a number of specific locations? How valid is it for the evaluation of a concept to be considered and express some opinion on it?

DR. ROBERT H. HAYNES: That's really a very difficult question to answer. If we had a site specific proposal before us, the difficulties would be equally grave in coming up with a credible and believable Environmental Impact Statement.





However the difficulties would be different from the difficulties that would be faced in handling the issue at the generic level.

I tend to have in my mind a picture of a spectrum that ranges from the outer extreme of complete abstractness and generality, the most extreme kind of generic concept on the one hand over to the other end of the spectrum, which would be a totally site specific proposal in which one knew the exact location in terms of geography, the exact depth, you knew, you had a complete geological and biological survey of the area in hand.

And then, you make an environmental impact statement, assessment rather. The reality of the generic concept that we are being presented with is that it is not at the generic end of the spectrum. It could be a more abstract concept that's being presented. So in short it's generic yes, but it's a little bit in the direction of site specific because there is at least explicit discussion of particular types of rock formations, particular kinds of biologies and particular kinds of human populations and so on. I think that locating the position of this proposal on the spectrum that would go, that would range from complete generality to complete specificity, is





something that one should take account of.

Indeed, I think it would perhaps be wrong to state that this is a completely generic concept as I indicated, the concept could entail disposing of the waste in the deep ocean trenches. Or putting it on rocket ships and sending it to the moon.

But that is still a disposal concept but the one we have is rather more specific. So, I think that therefore that it will be important to make it clear in the statement just how specific this generic concept actually is. But I don't see a simple answer to that at the present time.

MR. M.A.J. MATICH: I wonder Mr. Chairman, if I might add a few comments in answer to that question. We cover that point in some detail in the written submission and in which we advise that AECL should examine a number of matters relative to the so-called ideal site even at this concept stage.

Defining the characteristics of the ideal site for example, the likelihood of finding such a site and the means available for correcting any site defects and basically upgrading a site to meet minimum acceptable standards.

The maximum deviation from the ideal site that can be considered acceptable and demonstrate that





the field investigative techniques with suitable capability including the underground research laboratory, these techniques which are necessary for complete characterization of a specific site, in accordance with a concept will be available when needed.

Some of these techniques will be quite sophisticated and we think that even at this stage, that point should be covered as well.

And we felt that AECL should also demonstrate that it's considered alternatives which reduce the requirements on bedrock quality in an ideal site, stability over the long term and very low hydraulic permeability for example, those qualities of bedrock.

There are a number of other items that are mentioned in the write up.

MR. PIETER VAN VLIET: One more question, to what extent does the study of natural analogues relate to the generic concept, is there a correlation in your opinion, are they two different items or are there things to be learned from that in terms of the site specific location versus the generic concept?

DR. ROBERT H. HAYNES: I would like -- well I will give you my immediate reaction there. It





would seem to me that the study of the natural analogues such as the Okla reactor in West Africa for example, would be part of a kind of a confidence built in measure.

I think, I would have to say that when I first heard of that natural reactor, I was extremely surprised. I'm no geologist, but it had never crossed my mind that such a thing was even possible. And so therefore, I think the great merit of studying natural analogues, whether they be that or other kinds of natural analogues for example, natural analogues might provide insight into ground water flow and things of that sort, I think that these are really very important because they, as I say, in the context of confidence building measures, but in terms of direct technical relevance, I don't know. I really can't respond to that. Perhaps Mr. Matich could do that.

MR. M.A.J. MATICH: Yes, I think that they are important from a technical standpoint for both the concept assessment and of course later, assessing a specific site, not only in the confidence building aspect but in the technical information that can be derived from these analogues.

And in our report, we stress not only the analogues which deal with radioactivity regimes but





those that deal with ground, the ground water environment particularly situations where very slow or stagnant ground water situations exist or where recharge rather than discharge environments are present.

THE CHAIRMAN: I wonder if I could put a question, I think to Dr. Matich, and this to help us of course in the formulation of our guidelines, the wording of the guidelines is going to be extremely important to make sure that we have comprehensively covered what we expect to see in the Environmental Impact Statement.

You made reference to the desirability of looking at a pilot plant approach. I want to make sure that I followed you correctly there, particularly so that maximum use could be made during any pre-closure stage, of testing our monitoring capacity and also of testing the reliability of the various components of the proposed system.

I think that's the way -- you may want to elaborate on that, but then leading on to that, I thought you said that you would recommend or ask that AECL at least examine the matter of monitoring in the post-closure period.

And if that is the case, monitoring over





more or less what period of time, and with what in view, merely to see what is happening, to be able to take corrective action if something has gone wrong, eventually perhaps to retrieve should there be a change in policy as to what one does with the irradiated fuel.

Could you just elaborate a little bit on that part of what you were saying to help me make sure that I understand well what you wish to convey?

MR. M.A.J. MATICH: Perhaps Mr. Chairman,

I could just read from the paragraph in our memorandum

on that particular point.

And if I could repeat that we appreciate that the research that's being directed at a disposal system that doesn't call for monitoring and surveillance in the post-closure period is a very commendable one because this is much more, much more difficult objective than a system which relies on surveillance and monitoring over the long term.

And well, the idea when the permanent storage facility is completely filled after fifty (50) to a hundred (100) years, the door to it can be closed, the key thrown away and the operation forgotten is a good objective to strive for. The thought that no subsequent monitoring whatsoever would be needed is just not credible. An extensive and elaborate





monitoring program will be required throughout the life of the storing stage and thereafter for an extended period. And we felt at least to the point where you could reduce monitoring or discontinue it entirely with assurance.

We are not able to say how long that period might be. But we think this would be desirable firstly to show how the facility is working, to verify that it's not working in a harmful way or to establish what needs to be done if it's not working as planned, to provide operating information which can be used in the design and construction of new facilities for the same purpose if any are involved and to indicate when intensive monitoring could reduced or discontinued entirely with assurance.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, that's helped me. Dr. Haynes?

DR. ROBERT H. HAYNES: I would just like to add to that the possibility, I don't know whether AECL has ever considered this. The possibility of actually doing a very small scale field test in which one would simply take a very small amount of spent fuel material, and deliberately place it in a rock formation where there is a lot of ground water flow and just measure, using radioactive tracer methods, the





distribution of the material.

This is not going to tell you a great deal with respect to vault performance, but it might at least tell you something with respect to the movement of radioisotopes in the area.

This of course could be done at a level of radioactivity that would pose zero threat to anything but none the less, could be measured with sufficiently sensitive equipment.

## THE CHAIRMAN: Dr. LaPierre?

<u>DR. LOUIS LAPIERRE:</u> I guess my question might go to Dr. Dence. Within your group, you indicated there was someone in sociology, associated with your group, have you considered the question of inter-generational ethics and the ethics of passing on to future generations the caring of waste which is generated and used in one society, one generation?

DR. ROBERT H. HAYNES: With respect to the work of this particular Joint Committee, the answer is no. We simply did not have time to get into the area of ethics at all.

However, the members did have available to them, a report of a Swedish working group that dealt explicitly with the ethics, or the ethical questions of such programs. I can't remember if the specific issue

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of inter-generational ethics was discussed but I think this of course is an important one. The difficulty though with such ethical discussions is that they often can become self-justifying once the decision has been made to go ahead with the program. That is to say, we do have a problem, it must be solved somehow and it is going to pose a problem for future generations. therefore, the issue is not much advanced by philosophers making statements or assertions that it is unethical to burden human generations with such problems. We burden human generations, future generations with problems all the time, just in terms of genetic disease for example. So as I say, I think that the Joint Committee was aware of the issues but I'm not sure how much, how helpful the discussion is going to be.

DR. MICHAEL R. DENCE: Could I just add
that I think it's implicit in some of the thoughts that
are in the documents that you'll receive in the sense
that the issues that have been discussed are the
meaning of the word disposal versus long term
management and so on, do imply the general sentiment in
the Committee that some form of long term "management"
or other concern about the site will probably be
required.





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## THE CHAIRMAN: Madame Roy?

MS. LOUISE ROY: Un peu dans la même veine, est-ce que vous avez couvert d'une façon assez spécifique, les enjeux socio-économiques reliés à l'évaluation du concept lui-même, de telle sorte qu'on puisse avoir des paramètres de référence?

DR. MICHAEL R. DENCE: Again, the composition of the Committee and the time available didn't allow an explicit development of that theme but it was recognized as an important one and one that certainly should be taken up.

MS. LOUISE ROY: Merci.

THE CHAIRMAN: If no further questions from the Panel, I would like to thank you all very much for your thoughtful presentation, to repeat that we look forward to receiving the written version of what you have put together.

And I can assure you that it will studied most carefully by the panel and also by the Scientific Review Group of eminent scientists who are assisting us in this very difficult task. Thank you all very much indeed for your presence here this morning.

---Panel withdraws

THE CHAIRMAN: This completes the number of people whom I'm aware of, who asked to speak to us





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at this morning's session.

But if there is anyone else present who would like to take advantage of our presence here to speak to the subject, there is time available to do so.

If there is no such person, I must thank
you all very much for being present today, for
listening with us to the interesting presentations
we've heard and I thank particularly the several
participants who have gone to the trouble to sort their
thoughts out and present them to us.

Thank you very much indeed. We will resume at two o'clock this afternoon. We have a very small number of participants scheduled for this afternoon at least, therefore to make sure that those of you who are coming back are here at two o'clock (2.00 p.m.), because I think it will not keep us all afternoon.

Thank you very much indeed.

- ---Luncheon recess taken at 11:30 a.m.
- ---On resuming at 2:00 p.m.

THE CHAIRMAN: I wonder if you would take your seats so that we can begin this afternoon session of the Montreal version of the scoping meetings which are being held by the Environmental Assessment Panel, to review nuclear fuel waste management and disposal





concept.

The meeting will be conducted in both

English and French. You may present your views in

either language. There is simultaneous interpretation

and there are earphones to be picked up at the back of

the hall if you care to avail yourselves of that.

Could I introduce the members of the panel who are with me today, at this session. At this end of the table, to my right, Dr. William Fyfe who is from London Ontario, Professor in the department of Geology and Dean of the Faculty of Science at the University of Western Ontario.

On my immediate right, madame Louise Roy, an Environmental and public affairs Consultant living here in Montreal. She is a former Vice-President of the Quebec Public Hearing Board on the environment and a member of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Research Council.

To my immediate left, Dr. Louis LaPierre, a Professor in the department of Biology at the University of Moncton and Chairman of the Environmental Council of New-Brunswick.

And to appear momentarily, as soon as he's got his travel arrangements straightened out, Mr. Peter Van Vliet from Regina, a Mechanical Engineer, who is





also a member of the Senat of the University of Regina.

My name is Blair Seaborn, I'm chairman of the panel. I reside in Ottawa. I'm retired but I served previously as deputy minister of the environment and as Canadian Chairman of the International Joint Commission.

Secretariat members here, Mr. Bob Greyell at the table to the left of our main table and at the back of the room, Ms. Susan Toller and Ms. Susan Flanagan, all of whom are here to assist you in whatever way they can in the course of this session.

The review is being conducted in accordance with the federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process, EARP.

The panel has been asked in part, to examine the nuclear fuel waste management and disposal concept, a proposal for permanent disposal of used nuclear fuel, deep in the granitic rock of the Canadian shield. This is a proposal from AECL.

Let me say a few words about the panel's mandate. The terms of reference state that the panel is to review the safety and acceptability of the AECL concept for geological disposal of nuclear fuel waste in Canada.

In addition to that, we shall examine a





broad range of nuclear fuel waste management issues including long term management, transport, and environmental, social and economic effects. We shall look at approaches to nuclear fuel waste management and disposal being developed elsewhere in the world.

Since site selection will not occur until a disposal concept has been accepted as safe, the panel will not consider any specific sites but will review the potential availability of sites and the methodology and criteria required for site selection.

I should also say a few words about what is not in the panel's mandate and therefore will not be addressed in this review.

The energy policies of Canada and the provinces, the role of nuclear energy within these policies including the construction, operation and safety of new or existing nuclear power plants, fuel reprocessing as an energy policy and the military applications of nuclear technology.

I would like to make it quite clear however that the members of this panel, are very much aware of the broader concerns related to the use of nuclear materials and the use of nuclear power for the generation of electricity.

The panel has been urging a broader review





of the comparative environmental implications of the various methods of generating electricity. I am pleased to say the steps are now under way to get such a Review started. The department of energy in Ottawa has been in touch with provincial counterparts and with a number of energy and environmental groups to seek their reaction to some proposed terms of reference for such a broader review. I hope that responses to that request will come in quickly so that the review may be started and under way in the not too distant future.

The purpose of these scoping meetings is to allow participants to identify issues that need to be addressed in the Environmental Impact Statement that will be prepared by AECL.

The panel is not requesting the presentation of opinions on the substance of the disposal concept at this time. Public hearings will be held later to discuss whether AECL's proposal is acceptable.

Following these meetings, the panel will prepare draft guidelines for the preparation of the Environmental Impact Statement and will make those draft guidelines available to the public for a period of at least thirty (30) days for comment.

Once we have that comment in, we shall we





shall finalize the guidelines and convey them to AECL.

AECL is expected to take at least a year to a year and a half  $(1\frac{1}{2})$  to prepare its Environmental Impact Statement and will then present it to this Panel.

Once the Panel has satisfied itself that the AECL has addressed satisfactorily all the items identified in the guidelines, we will hold public hearings. Participants will be asked to discuss the acceptability of AECL's disposal concept in detail at that state of the review. The panel will consider all comments submitted to it and will at its final act, prepare its report to the ministers of Environment and of Energy, Mines and Resources.

I would ask that those who have registered to speak attempt to summarize their concerns in fifteen (15) minutes unless they have previously requested an extension of an additional either five (5) or ten (10) minutes.

We shall pay of course equal attention to written and oral statements. The panel may ask questions of clarification following each presentation.

Anyone who would like to make a presentation to panel but is not yet registered may speak to any of the members of the Panel's secretariat





in order to get themselves identified and on the list.

We shall be accepting written submissions identifying issues and concerns until the end of this month, up to and including November 30th, 1990.

We have two (2) people who had asked well in advance to present their views at this afternoon's session and they will be taken first (1st).

But I have had a special request that we might have a pre-presentation, if I may put it that way, from the Raging Grannies who will come back to make their full presentation after we have heard from first Mr. Robins and then Miss Judith Berlyn.

So if the singing Grannies would like to give us their opening gambit now, we will be glad to hear them.

## SINGING PRESENTATION FROM THE RAGING GRANNIES.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you for the opener.

I will now call, if he feels he can follow that act, on the first (1st) person inscribed to speak to us this afternoon, Mr. Walter Robbins, Coalition pour la Surveillance du Nucléaire.

Mr. Robbins, would you come forward to the table here please, if you could.

## PRESENTATION BY MR. WALTER ROBBINS:

I think we grandfathers are going to have





to organize ourselves in the same way!

Mr.Chairman, and members of the panel, my name is Walter Robins, and I represent la Coalition pour la Surveillance du Nucléaire, COSUN.

Before telling you about COSUN and my own interest in this particular assessment, and before raising the three (3) principal issues we have identified, I would like to make a statement for the record.

On September 23rd 1988, federal Energy Minister Marcel Masse launch this assessment with the following words, quote

"It will be one of the most important environmental assessments ever undertaken in this country and will provide an essential foundation for future decisions on energy policy."

Imposing words, for what? Over two (2) years later, is proving to be one of the quietest, low-key, unnoticed and unpublicized federal Environmental Assessment Review Processes, EARP, ever undertaken in this country.

Mr. Chairman and panel members, I suggest to you that this silent EARP itself, is an issue that you must address.





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In view of the minister's statement, I further suggest to you that if a significantly larger segment of the Canadian public is not involved in this particular assessment, than any conclusions and recommendations resulting from this exercise must be discarded as unrepresentative and invalid.

The terms of reference established for this assessment are ridiculously narrow. The fate of Canadian and perhaps world energy policy may well rest in the outcome of this assessment.

Limitation of these terms of reference to one segment of the nuclear fuel cycle is a cynical and rather transparently self-serving act on the part of AECL and the government of Canada.

COSUN is particularly upset by the light and hurry up manner in which this Assessment is being conducted.

FEARO has had over two (2) years to plan, organize and administer this. Yet when the public is asked to become involved, it has been given ridiculously short time frames for preparation. These scoping meetings are a case in point. We want to know why we have had no response to the personal letters which were sent to each of you panel members, through the FEARO office, requesting that the time frame for





the scoping phase be extended through the winter, to provide adequate preparation time. Here's another copy of that letter in which we also sharply criticise the pitifully small amounts of intervener funding made available for this particular EARP. I would like to give you these procedures. That ends my opening statement.

Now the Coalition pour la Surveillance du Nucléaire is based in Sherbrooke Québec, was formed under the name of the Coalition CHUS, in the spring of 1988 to deal with questions and that were surrounding a plan by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, to place an experimental nuclear reactor at the Sherbrooke University Teaching Hospital. The Coalition identified fundamental problems with that plan which was finally discarded by the University Hospital Board of Directors in December 1988.

At that time, the Coalition included over thirty (30) specific organizations and thirty-six (36) municipal governments, representing about thirty thousand (30,000) people, including a representative cross-section of regional, linguistic, cultural and national backgrounds.

Most of these organizations and individuals in the Coalition, are on what could be





called a standby basis, ready to jump in if the region is ever again threatened by projects which potentially, have major environmental consequences. Currently, some of the Coalition organizations meet regularly as a watchdog group. Thus, COSUN is still actively involved in a variety of environmental and nuclear issues including the James Bay II project, health and safety problems at Gentilly II, Québec's only operating nuclear reactor as well as this particular nuclear waste issue.

During 1985, some of the people who later became active in COSUN were directly involved in the controversy over the efforts of the United-States department of energy, nuclear waste management program, to characterize and undertake research in various Canadian shield rock formations located in Canadian water sheds in Northern Vermont and elsewhere.

The US granite rock underground nuclear waste research effort was finally discarded in 1986, after the US heeded formal diplomatic protest by the Government of Canada, under the present prime minister.

As for my own involvement, I'm a retired human resource management consultant with senior public administration experience with the US government, which I served for twenty-two (22) years. I also served for





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six (6) years as the senior management development officer for the government of Manitoba. My wife and I retired and moved to the Eastern Townships of Québec just over two years ago.

As a former property owner in the rural municipality of Lac Dubonnet Manitoba, I became directly involved with the nuclear waste issue in 1980.

I was one of the leaders of the Manitoba
Citizens Group, concerned citizens of Manitoba, which
successfully lobbied for the present Manitoba law, bill
28, prohibiting the permanent underground emplacement
of nuclear waste anywhere in that province.

During 1986, I was part of a coalition which lead a successful Canadian effort to prevent the US federal Department of Energy from characterizing and researching several geological formations located in Northern Minnesota, within the Winnipeg River, Hudson Bay watershed. I received a personal letter of appreciation from Minnesota governor Rudy Perpich for my help in that situation.

In 1986, I testified before the

Parliamentary Standing Committee on environment and I'm

the author of the book "Getting the shaft, the radioactive waste controversy in Manitoba", published by

Queenston House Winnipeg 1984. My association with





nuclear issues also includes, as part of my tour of duty with the US government, two and one half years  $(2\frac{1}{2})$  as a member of the organization and personnel division of the Headquarters, United States Atomic Energy Commission, near Washington D.C.

Now, I'd like to raise three fundamental regulatory type issues directly related to AECL's proposal which COSUN believes should be addressed.

1: questions surrounding the legitimacy of the concept assessment itself.

2: questions relating to this specific EARP as it is being applied to the AECL's proposal.

3: questions concerning the credibility of institutions involved with this proposal.

of the concept assessment itself. Variably, Atomic Energy Control Act provides the government of Canada with broad sweeping powers, does it allow for the actual permanent disposal of any nuclear materials. Question: can it be conclusively demonstrated that those who framed that act, who are obviously concerned with use and control of nuclear materials, had even remotely considered the permanent disposal of these materials? Under what authority did AECL proceed with its research in the first place?





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Do not the people of Canada through its

Parliamentary system, have the right to expect that

something as important as the disposition of irradiated

nuclear fuel, would be specifically sanctioned by an

act of parliament?

Are we to blindly accept the thesis that a method for disposal of nuclear fuel waste can simply be undertaken by administrative, decision making practices in the absence of specific laws?

effectively reject this concept of underground burial of high level radioactive waste in Cambrian shield rock, when in 1986, it successfully engaged in formal diplomatic efforts, to prevent the United States government from characterizing and conducting research in Cambrian shield rock in a number of northern states. Has not our government already said that it has no faith in such an undertaking?

2: Questions relating to this specific

EARP as it is being applied to AECL's proposal. Is

AECL misusing and abusing the environmental assessment review process by having provided this panel with an incomplete proposal? This question is critical when examined in the light of the FEARO guidelines, an official documentation of the EARP process. I refer





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specifically to the conditions for public meetings as outlined in FEARO's description of the characteristics of public hearings.

I quote from the official government document, the federal environmental assessment and review process:

> "A panel obviously needs technical and scientific analysis from experts but it also needs to hear from the people who could be affected by the proposal, particularly those who live near the proposed site. Although an impact may not appear significant to the experts, it may be so for people living and working near the site. Local residents may have information and insights not available to the outsider".

Further the report of this panel is to include a number of items not the least of which are:

> "the characteristics of the proposed site and impacted area",

ladies and gentlemen, that's part of your job.

So how can AECL's proposal meet these obviously crucial considerations in the hearing process, in the absence of a specific site and without





consultation with the affected local community? And is not AECL's concept assessment proposal grossly incomplete until and if it can deal with the above stated requirements, by locating and characterizing and researching an actual site, deemed to be potentially suitable as an underground nuclear waste repository? The FEARO hearing criteria are quite consistent with a significant body of scientific opinion which holds that the viability of the underground isolation theory cannot be proved outside the parameters of a specific site, identified for a potential repository use. This is a critical issue. For example, the Union of Concerned Scientists, recommend that in situ research should:

"be performed only at sites deemed"

"be performed only at sites deemed potentially usable for full scale high level nuclear waste repositories.

Because the suitability of a given site is so highly dependent upon the particular characteristics of that site, decisions to develop a site should be willingly abandoned if serious defects become apparent at any stage of repository development".

And that's just one of a number of





scientific organizations that have made this same point. In the light of the above issue, should not this panel now recommend the indefinite suspension of this Environmental Assessment until such time as AECL is able to provide a complete proposal, that is a concept assessment that is based not just on generic research and computer analysis, but on the missing but essential step of characterization and research into a potential nuclear waste site as well.

3: My last point. Questions concerning the credibility of institutions involved with this proposal.

Many questions can be raised about the institutional framework surrounding AECL's proposal as well as the credibility of organizations that have played a role in the efforts leading up to the proposal before the panel. Following are some of the more serious ones. Government of Canada. How could the present Minister of Energy, be permitted to set the terms of reference for this EARP and possibly be in a position to pass judgment on this proposal, in the light of his position as a member of parliament for that portion of eastern Manitoba, in which AECL has a complex of research facilities and major facilities for this underground research program.





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Has not the minister publicly characterized himself as quote "AECL's friend in Court"?

Is not even the term conflict of interest too weak to describe the situation.

Atomic Energy Control Board. Did not the Atomic Energy Control Board prejudge the results of this EARP process by publishing its regulatory document R-72, geological considerations and siting a repository for underground disposal of high level radioactive waste on September 21st, 1987?

How could any responsible control board of the government of Canada prepare regulations for the "siting of such a nuclear waste repository", years before the Canadian public would have the opportunity to examine and judge the underground isolation option itself. Has AECB also published contingency regulations for all the other possible options, for nuclear waste, that is long term on site storage, deep sea bed, shooting it into space or whatever."

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. How can this crown corporation be taken seriously as a reputable scientific body in the light of its perennial prejudgments of its research results.

Perhaps the Winnipeg Free Press expressed





this point best in its October 12th, 1985 editorial, which took AECL's then president James Donnelly to task with these words:

"Mr. Donally should know better than to announce results of a research program, talking about this nuclear waste disposal program, before such a program is completed. By doing so, he invites the criticism that Atomic Energy of Canada set out to prove that underground storage of radioactive waste was safe and it intends to do exactly that."

That's Winnipeg Free Press. Is it possible that AECL's conflict of interest, that is marketing nuclear technology on the one hand and doing the waste research on the other, has contributed to these prejudgments?

How can a profit oriented organization like AECL continue to spend public funds on its theories in the light of growing negative public response?

Has not its own commission public opinion polls from 1978 to the present, conclusively demonstrated that the Canadian public does not want this concept or the results that could stem from it?

Can you imagine responsible business





organizations continuing to force its agenda in this manner over a twelve (12) year period in the light of such obvious customer dissatisfaction?

Has not AECL cast doubt upon its own credibility by not providing the scientific criteria for what constitutes the best possible underground nuclear waste repository site?

How does this jibe with AECL's public relation statements to the effect that communities will line up to bid for the economic benefits which would supposedly accrue to the recipient of such a facility? Is AECL providing this panel with a scientific concept assessment or a prescription for a new job creation program? Has not AECL exhibited an institutional pattern of behaviour which ignores or down plays adverse data relating to its concept. It has been said that in science, every answer raises new questions. But you would not know that from the media adds, which for years have extolled the virtues of this concept.

Where is the down side? Should not this

Panel require that AECL develop a complete inventory of

each and every unanswered and partially answered

scientific question raised in all the scientific

studies conducted for this concept. I'd sure like to

see it.





Other agencies: during the years of this concept assessment, ladies and gentlemen, why have there not been any truly independent agencies oversee the work of AECL on its own program? The Technical Advisory Committee is a creature of AECL. AECL is accountable to the federal Department of Energy, Mines and Resources. AECB is also accountable to EMR.

Again, where were the independent agencies?

This concludes COSUN's presentation on scoping issues relating to regulatory, legislative and institutional concerns inherent in AECL's concept assessment proposal. Thank you for listening.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you Mr. Robbins.

Could I ask if members of the Panel who would like to put any questions of clarification, either clarification or precision from Mr. Robbins, on the base of this presentation which we've had from him? Mr. Van Vliet?

MR. PIETER VAN VLIET: Mr. Robbins, I take it from your comments that you're not particularly in favour of an underground disposal?

MR. WALTER ROBBINS: Fair enough.

MR. PIETER VAN VLIET: That may be an understatement. Do you have suggestions as to other means of disposal that could be considered?





MR. WALTER ROBBINS: Well, I don't think you can dispose Sir, of this in the dictionary sense of the term. But I'm sure others have made that point.

I have a report from Dr. Arjin Macagionni, who's with an international research firm and I've seen other reports which are now, recent reports, now suggesting that in view of the uncertainties involved in underground isolation, it would be preferable to maintain the high level nuclear waste at the site using new technologies, and researching new technology into dry storage techniques, more sophisticated monitoring techniques.

Oh, this is going on actually, this sort of effort as you no doubt, know well. And that although it's hardly a permanent solution, I'd just like to point out that the mere fact that we have a problem here does not necessarily means that there's a solution.

I know that's hard for many of us to accept including myself, because as you know from my background here, I was part of the institution that helped develop this particular technology, although I'm not a scientist but I worked closely with them and it's hard to accept that. But I think some day, I still have faith that there will be methods and techniques





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24 25 developed to deal with these materials more effectively than simply using the old, age old mankind "dump your stuff in the ground" idea. I really do.

And I think that if we keep it above ground, we monitor it, we get better at that technology and as the reactors eventually have to go out of commission, you know, many of them are probably going to be moth balled, maybe the entire installation needs to be moth balled and quarded, I don't know that.

But I really think that that would be preferable to taking the risks of underground emplacement particularly in highly water saturated conditions as we have in the Cambrian shield.

I don't know if that answers -- that would be, that would be my preference.

MR. PIETER VAN VLIET: O.K. thank you.

MR. WALTER ROBBINS: Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Madame Roy?

MS. LOUISE ROY: Monsieur Robbins, dans la mesure où la question posée porterait uniquement sur les déchets nucléaires actuels, est-ce que vous croyez qu'il est nécessaire de faire un examen des différentes alternatives de gestion de ces déchets, d'une part.

Et est-ce que c'est possible de le faire séparément d'un examen de site potentiel, pour





appliquer cette technologie?

MR. WALTER ROBBINS: Pour appliquer cette technologie?

MS. LOUISE ROY: Oui, au fond, ce que je veux dire c'est est-ce que la réserve que vous avez actuellement sur l'examen d'un concept sans qu'on sache où le concept pourrait être appliqué, sans qu'il y ait de site d'identifié, reste le même lorsqu'il s'agit de gérer les déchets actuels seulement?

Est-ce que c'est nécessaire d'avoir un examen des différentes alternatives de gestion des déchets actuels et est-ce qu'on peut le faire sans que déjà un site soit identifié pour les stocker, par exemple?

MR. WALTER ROBBINS: Bonne question.

Malheureusement, je n'ai pas mon traducteur pour la question, je pense vous dites some of the waste could if I understood this, and you can clarify, some of the waste could be dealt with the way it's been suggested by the proposal.

MS. LOUISE ROY: I'll try to make it in English but my English is not very good.

MR. WALTER ROBBINS: Better than my French
I suspect.

MS. LOUISE ROY: As far as the actual





wastes are concerned, do you feel a need to assess different options to manage those wastes--

MR. WALTER ROBBINS: Ah, okay.

MS. LOUISE ROY: --separately than a site selection assessment. So should we assess the options first (1st) and then when the safety or the acceptability of one or other options for managing actual waste could have been set, go to a further step and then try to make a site assessment?

MR. WALTER ROBBINS: No I...

MS. LOUISE ROY: No?

MR. WALTER ROBBINS: I think that if you're going to use the underground isolation process that it would be essential that the research -- I'm not saying that generic research that has already happened shouldn't happen. What I'm saying is that it's incomplete until a specific site is selected. The characteristics of that particular site are so crucial.

For example, at Yuca Mountain, Nevada, which is a dry site essentially, they're very concerned that three hundred feet (300) I believe, under that site, there is an aquifer which over eons of time, could possibly invade, intrude on the site.

So the specific site itself, is essential to the completion of the research. That's why I say I





believe this panel is being given an incomplete, incomplete proposal. Until you receive the data concerning the specific site, all you have is part of the story. I don't know, I hope that -- yes for this option.

As far as other options go, certainly there needs to be more research into above ground storage, long term storage, possibly for hundreds of years, before some other.

There needs to be more research into transmutation which, right now, is not practical, although in the future, it very well could be. It might, you know, a hundred years from now, there might a scientific breakthrough in that area, which permits scientists to actually reduce the toxicity, reduce the radioactivity of some of the more longer lived elements and deal with them. So let's give time and science a chance by doing that. I guess money becomes a problem doesn't it. You can't obviously spend all your money on fifty different options.

On the other hand, right here, we're simply looking at one very restrictive option. We're looking at just this type, just the granite rock and the Canadian shield rock. And that's, you know, that's rather restrictive. I know that AECL did some





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preliminary analysis of some other options. But if you read their early consulting reports, you will find that those were dismissed almost out of hand. It was as if well, we're going to put them down here on the report just to satisfy someone but we're really going after this rock.

But by the way, the rock was characterized as solid rock in many of the news media reports and even some of the official reports originally. And later on, it was found that it certainly wasn't solid. Major fracture zones in the underground research laboratory etc, were not known at the time, at the beginning of the drilling. But I'm making a speech again, sorry, go ahead.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you then very much Mr. Robbins for the presentation, also for your response to the questions which we've put to you.

MR. WALTER ROBBINS: Well thank you very much.

---Mr. Robbins withdraws

THE CHAIRMAN: I'd like to call next on Miss Judith Berlyn who will be speaking to us this afternoon.

## PRESENTATION BY MISS JUDITH BERLYN:

I'm not used to these, so tell me if I've





got it right. Thank you.

Good afternoon, my name is Judith Berlyn.

I'm a professional Librarian whose undergraduate work

was in philosophy. I'm a member of the Steering

Committee of the Canadian Peace Alliance, an umbrella

coalition of several hundred groups and Coordinator of

its Ouébec section.

I'm a member of the Ambassadors for
Disarmament Consultative Group and a member of the
Board of the Canadian Coalition to Nuclear
Responsibility.

I'm here not as a representative of any of the public interest groups with which I work as a volunteer, but as a concerned private citizen.

The questions I would like to see
addressed in the Environmental Impact Study of the
concept of disposing of nuclear fuel waste by burying
it in the Laurentian shield, are primarily questions of
ethics and of logic. As a background to such
questions, I'd like to briefly recall the words and
thoughts of three people much wiser than I.

First, Albert Einstein's famous words of 1946:

"The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything, save our modes of





thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe."

Next, words that were put in the mouth of a cockroach called Archie, by author Don Marcus, in 1935, ten (10) years before the world started to experience to unleashed power of the atom. Archie the cockroach lived in Marcus' office and would write messages to him overnight by jumping from key to key and the typewriter.

He addressed Don Marcus as "Boss". This is one of his messages, exerted:

"Dear Boss, I was talking with an ant the other day, and he handed me a lot of gossip which ants the world around are chewing amongst themselves. I pass it on to you in the hope that you may relay it to other human beings and hurt their feelings with it. Here is what they are saying: "It won't be long now, it won't be long. Man is making deserts on the earth. It won't be long now before man will have used it up so that nothing but ants and centipedes and scorpions can find a living on it.

What man calls civilization always results





in deserts. Man is never on the square.

He uses up the fat and greenery of the earth. Each generation wastes a little more of the future with greed and lust for riches. Men talk of money and industry, of hard times and recoveries of finance and economics. But the ants wait and the scorpions wait. For while men talk, they are making deserts all the time, getting the world ready for the conquering ant drought and erosion and desert, because men cannot learn.

It won't be long now. It won't be long till earth is barren as the moon. Dear Boss, I relay this information without any fear that humanity will take warning and reform. Signed Archie".

The third bit of wisdom is contained in Elie Loiselle's reflections on the biblical story of Noa. I've not found this written but have heard him talk about it twice (2) in Montreal during the 1980's.

Elie Loiselle points out that in Noa's time, the only power that could destroy creation was the power of God. This remained true until our own century.





Now human beings also have the power to destroy creation. And so we face the ultimate test of free will. Because we have this power, we have to chose whether or not to use it. We have to chose whether to save or to destroy creation.

I'm here as the daughter of a civil
Engineer who did pioneering work in prestressed
concrete, and who has seconded in 1943 to the American
government, to work on the Manhattan project. My
father was one of a group of engineers whose job it was
to design the waste containment facility at the bomb
plant, at Handford, Washington. I believe they did
their very best and the were the best in the West at
the time. And yet the waste storage tanks they
designed failed prematurely.

One of the problems of technology is that it is impossible to design for forever. Yet forever is, to all intents and purposes, what is required, what is required of technology in this situation.

We want a guarantee that lasts virtually forever, which cannot be given because sooner or later, everything fails. This dilemma poses both ethical and logical questions which I would like to see address in the EIS.

I am here as a mother of three adult





children, two of whom have told me at different times in the past, that they do not expect to live to be as old as I am now.

Unable to say that this was foolish of them, I felt compelled to become part of the process that is creating the pressure that will change the kind of political decisions which will be made in the future.

I am also here as a beggar. As is everybody else who comes before this Panel. The process in which we are all engaged is designed to make us beggars, because we have no control over it and no real power with respect to it. If we had either of these, we would have been consulted when the terms of reference were being drawn up in the first place. So we are participating in a process that is both an opportunity and a trap. It provides an opportunity to be heard but at the same time, it is a trap, because it gives the appearance of consultation without the participants having any input into the deliberations or the decision making.

For this reason, I find the process to be both inadequate and unacceptable. This in no way reflects on the Panel, merely the process.

Now an observations about structure. The





purpose of this Review is to determine whether or not the concept of disposing of nuclear fuel waste by burying it five hundred (500) to a thousand (1 000) meters deep in the Canadian shield is acceptable to Canadians. Acceptable not only technologically and in terms of safety but acceptable also in social, political and economic terms. The Panel has augmented its expertise by appointing a Science Review Group to assess the safety and scientific acceptability of the concept from a technological perspective.

I'm struck by the fact that there is no equivalent Humanities Review Group HRG if you like, to assess the ethical and logical acceptability of the concept from a philosophical perspective.

It is precisely those aspects in the question of acceptability that I would like to see AECL address. And I would like it to address them according to the precepts of situation ethics as propounded by Joseph Fletcher and others as the new morality of the 1960's.

As I understand it, situation ethics holds that all principles are relative to concrete situations. How to do the right thing depends on our responsible estimate of the particular situation.

Situation ethics put people at the centre of concern





not things. Obligations is to persons, not to things to subjects, not to objects. What is good derives from the needs of people. The morality of an act is a function of the overall context of the situation in which it is performed.

The terms of reference of this Review

Panel are so narrow, that they preclude consideration

of the overall context of the situation they are to

assess. This is both unethical and illogical and also

unacceptable.

The terms of reference as they stand

preclude consideration of the possibility that approval

of the concept is very likely to have at least two

potentially disastrous consequences; namely:

1: that it will be tantamount to issuing an unlimited license for the production of radioactive waste.

And 2: that it will be an obvious invitation to other country who are in the same bind as we are, to ship their nuclear waste to Canada for burial.

The likelihood of these consequences must be considered by any serious EIS of the concept. It is imperative that all the ethical, logical, sociological, political and economic assumptions of the EIS be

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clearly stated and the reasons for them given, so that they may be readily known and judged.

To change our ways of thinking, to take warning and reform, to chose to save creation. I have no doubt that we have the capacity to do these things.

It remains to be seen whether or not we have the Will. I'm glad of the opportunity to come here and beg it of you, to help us find that will, thank you very much.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you Ms. Berlyn for that very thoughtful presentation which you've given to us. Are there any questions which members of the panel would like to put by way of clarification or do we find the message very clear as presented by Ms. Berlyn? Dr. LaPierre?

DR. LOUIS LAPIERRE: Thanks a lot Ms.

Berlyn for your presentation. To come back to your comment on a Humanities Review Group, the Humanities Review Group which you identified, would you have any specific questions that you would want this group to answer?

MS. JUDITH BERLYN: I'd be happy to draw up a list.

DR. LOUIS LAPIERRE: You would. Well, I
think we'd appreciate obtaining such a list.





MS. JUDITH BERLYN: Fine, I will get it to you by the 30th, is that it?

DR. LOUIS LAPIERRE: Thank you very much.

THE CHAIRMAN: That would be helpful, it's quite apart whether or not we have Humanities Research Group, you do have a Panel here and the panel is most anxious to have comments such as these, particularly ones which could be relevant to how we frame the questions which we will be putting in turn to AECL requiring them to answer and we'd like your thoughts on that if you had a moment to put them to paper and send them to us. Could you do that?

MS. JUDITH BERLYN: Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Any other questions from members of the panel? Thank you very much indeed Ms. Berlyn for that presentation and for your offer to follow up with something in writing. We appreciate that.

---Ms. Berlyn withdraws

THE CHAIRMAN: I have next on the list, that we've already had an introduction from them, a presentation by Mrs. Gene Perrault on behalf of the Raging Grannies, Mrs. Perrault?

## PRESENTATION BY MRS. GENE PERRAULT:

Good afternoon, my name is Gene Perrault,





I'm here as a representative of the Montreal Raging Grannies, which is a chapter of the National Peace Group which originated in Victoria.

We understand that the scope of this

Review includes future steps to be taken in the management of nuclear fuel wastes in Canada.

The scientific ring of the Raging Grannies has done an exhaustive research in this area and we are here today to announce the technological breakthrough that cracks the nuclear wastes nut.

The Grannies concept has many advantages over that of Atomic Energy of Canada. For one thing, our technology is exportable. AECL's concept makes us very angry, because it will only encourage other countries to send their radioactive wastes over here.

Doubtless to be transported up the already endangered Saint-Lawrence river. We would like the Environmental Impact of that aspect of the transportation problem addressed in the Environmental Impact Study.

I will now unveil the Grannies technology by reading radioactive road resurfacing. My assistant here, should we stand up... alright.

First of all, we take the lid off one container of asphalt and add, while holding our breath,





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THE CHAIRMAN: I call next please on Ms. Anette Henricksa, I hope I have that Henricks or

-- inhaling one micron of this material causes lung cancer -- one quarter pinch of plutonium.

Pour in quickly before measuring cup melts, one half cup of strontium, if strontium is unavailable, cesium may be substituted.

Then mix well and spread evenly on road surfaces and reapply once a millennium. The warranty is that: guaranteed to glow in the dark, and be selfdefrosting for at least a thousand (1000) years.

Immediate benefits: improves visibility, reduces accidents, eliminates the need for salting roads and saves millions of dollars in snow removal.

And the long term benefits: discourages the use of roads thereby reducing CO2 emissions and diminishing global warming.

Thank you that is our recipe and we have a little song to finish off.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you to the Montreal

(SONG)

chapter. I take it that members of the panel don't have questions to put to the message that's being conveyed. ---Ranging Grannies withdraw





Henricksa, who has asked to speak to us. Please come forward.

## PRESENTATION BY MS. ANETTE HENRICKSA:

When I came here yesterday evening, I had no intentions of speaking. But there are some things that I feel have not been addressed and I'd like to address them.

The information, the ideas that I'm presenting have grown out many years of work in the Environmental Movement, in England, Canada and the United States and based on conversations and discussions I've had with hundreds, maybe thousands of people in that time. And, in all of those discussions, one of the things that I've through feeling is, there was a long, a deep malaise among the general public.

Albert Camus and I believe the book is
"The Accord", presented or dealt with the same feelings
of hopeless, helplessness, a moving towards abyss.

So this has left me with a deep feeling and concern about the possible psychological effects of the continued risk that the nuclear industry is placing us in. It also raises questions about what effect this has on the society as a whole. Doesn't it exacerbate the social problems, does it lead to increase use of drugs, just in order to deal with that reality. How





does it affect people's relationships to one another if they feel that ten (10) years from now, they're not going to be able to make it. How does it affect young children, and girls and boys when they think of having children.

The other question that raises for me is why so many people, or why so few people actually are actually involved in solving and dealing with the problem, while they continue in their sort of every day life, pretending that it's not happening except when you start talking about it with them. And you know I can only relate it to my own experience and when I was a child, I used to think that adults had all the answers. And when I grew up, I transferred that to a belief that the experts have all the answers. Thus my own personal, social responsibility was negated.

It was quite a difficult process for me to realize that experts are fallible, and quite often base their decisions on priorities that aren't necessarily environmental and they do not take the well being of human kind into account or not primarily. I'm not saying that aren't concerned, I'm just saying it's not their primary motivation for their decisions.

It's like, I see it like being on an airplane and being told that this airplane is heading





for Nirvana. That after a while, I realize that captains don't know where Nirvana is, they've loss their way and quite often, their idea of Nirvana is not my idea of Nirvana.

So, the way I understand it is, as power becomes increasingly centralized in the hands of experts, and as we, as individuals, become increasingly disempowered and penalized for refusing to conform to a logic of the technocracy, we have reached a point in this process in which the only responsibility imposed on the individual is an economic responsibility.

All is defined by economic imperatives.

Thus anything that will guarantee an individual's ability to participate in the consumer/producer equation, will find unquestioning acceptance with the general public, no matter what the consequences.

Humans are judged and rewarded for their values. Their youth value to the given order. That doesn't mean to say I'm not under any circumstances questioning the value of work. What I am questioning is to what end that work is -- what's the end of that work, where is that work going, what is the end result of our work.

So therefore, I see a great need to look at the alternatives and to visionville, to look at what





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else we can do.

You know, it scares me when I hear any alternatives are hydro or nuclear, there are other alternatives. People have been working on them for years. Unfortunately, they are marginalized and they're not taken seriously and it's very difficult for people to actualize those alternatives.

But in that process, knowing the environmental problems that result from either nuclear or hydro, their hopelessness grows. And in that hopelessness, I think we've got to look at how that affects our society and I'd like you to address that.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, thank you Ms. Henricksa. Any questions which anyone would like to put after that presentation, I think you've given a message of a very special sort to us. Dr. Fyfe?

DR. WILLIAM FYFE: Yes, I would like to thank you for the presentation and I think you're reinforcing what we've heard from many people.

We have a terrible problem with our educational structure, that people are frightened of experts, we should not be, we've taught the kids to read and write but not to understand the world they live in.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Ms.





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Henricksa for sharing your thoughts with us today.
---Ms. Henricksa withdraws

THE CHAIRMAN: We heard this morning from Mr. Don Wedge. He has asked if time permits, whether he might have another very few minutes this afternoon, to complete his thoughts.

He spoke very briefly, and he tells me he was not feeling particularly well, physically. He's feeling a little better now, and I said we could probably fit him in and hear one or two more thoughts that he wanted to convey to us. Mr. Wedge.

## PRESENTATION BY MR. DON WEDGE:

Thank you very much Mr. Chairman and Panel. I do indeed feel better now, I wasn't feeling very well this morning, so thank you for the opportunity to complete my thoughts.

I wanted to mention to you as a for instance, a note of the Anatole Kroczenko who died age 52, on July 1, this year, in Seattle and he died because he was a helicopter pilot who flew over the Chernobyl reactor in the 1986 disaster there.

And I think he's a visual symbol of the need to avoid any more martyrs of that sort in the cause of peaceful energy. We really have to avoid that kind of thing.





And it's the sort of thing of course that's given, made nuclear into a kind of dirty word. Dirty because I think it's potential for mass fast and slow death, is unparalleled by any other fuel or perhaps any other substance or any other mankind's activities.

It really is devastating, a hundred and twenty thousand (120 000) people became contaminated in Kazakhstan in September this year following a nuclear accident.

Six hundred and seventy thousand (670 000) people, I've now got the figure, are being tracked as a result of Chernobyl for possible bad effects. These are enormous things and it's of course nothing compared with nuclear war which is outside what we're talking about.

But it's huge, peaceful use of something that ought to be enhancing life, there's a very big downside.

And I want to draw your attention and I wonder whether this can be -- how you would include it in your further stages, that the profit from the building and the construction that we're talking about, those of further nuclear plants and the disposal of this terrible waste, those who advocate it and who





participate in it, have a tainted view. And I know the Environment Process, the Assessment process is to overcome that, but I don't think it does.

I think the average citizen's need is a bit that one of the early Christians facing the lions. We're not really heard by the Government and I instance that, the exclusion of the military from your concerns.

Military are enormous generators of nuclear waste. And that should be momented directly or indirectly. And it's also I think, other aspects of this process, I've noticed listening, I don't think ten thousand (10 000) years is enough.

The requirement should be for a process that will be safe longer than that given the time that it will take for certain of the components to disintegrate. We've not heard enough about the transport hazards. They're huge too. I've heard almost nothing today about that.

Even given that, though, I'm most worried, as I mentioned this morning, about the idea of the construction of this size is one kilometre or more deep into the rock and then, in this construction, at that level or below, must weaken the structure that we just cannot think of doing it in any area where there's even





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possibility of seismological influence in the stress itself, from a heat stress or anything else must be awful.

I think that probably it is better to keep it above ground. It's certainly not as close as it is now to the nuclear power stations with the risk of double, double accidents and double terror.

The temporary solution, the present temporary solution is not a solution. I think maybe there should be an interim solution to move it away from present generating stations and so on into a safer, a more remote area. There needs to be that interim station.

Now the costs associated with all this should not be met by in a general taxpayer way. Somehow, the cost should be associated with the people, the people who have benefited from these clean solutions to our energy needs.

They may be one and the same person, I know, but it should be presented in a way that it is, that the cost of the cleanup is associated with the benefits that we've enjoyed from cheap power -- cheap was it?

It costs, I believe two billion dollars for the Americans to get the first atom bomb worthy





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24 25 something like twelve billion dollars in today's money. We're talking similar amounts now, so we somehow have to associate those costs with its use in people's minds and in realities of costing.

I also wanted to mention the idea of an international solution to this, the permanent solution being international.

We find now that there's even there is really really unsafe waste, nuclear waste in east Europe and as the developing world gets its muscles, it's being shown in the Middle East now, it is going to want to use their muscles in many ways. One of them as we know is nuclear ambitions, ambitions for nuclear force but also ambitions for nuclear energy.

I have the distinct feeling that with the progress made in the United Nations and other international forum, at the moment, it could well become an instrument for peace and an instrument for world development, if together, we tackle the entire problem of waste management.

The world is people talking about building fifty (50) new plants a year to meet energy needs. It's an horrendous thought. We must avoid that, we must avoid it even in our country. We must avoid it on a world scale and find other solutions. We don't want





any more Anatole Kroczenko.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you Mr. Wedge, for sharing with us those additional thoughts from what you had to say this morning.

Are there any questions that anyone would like to put to Mr. Wedge. Thank you very much, sir.

MR. DON WEDGE: Thank you.

---Mr. Wedge withdraws

THE CHAIRMAN: Now, could I inquire whether there is anyone else here who would like to address us while we're still in Montreal, while the panel's assembled.

on behalf of the Panel, to thank you very much for being present at our meetings here in this city and particularly for those who have participated in a variety of ways in our meetings. What you have had to say will be very carefully noted by the members of the Panel.

A lot of it also by members of our

Scientific Review group and I'm quite sure it will help
us in moving forward in what we must do to try to

address was is admittedly, a very difficult question.

Merci beaucoup d'avoir assisté aujourd'hui et merci de participer si activement.





Bonjour et bonne fin de semaine.

--Whereupon the hearing was adjourned at 03.20 p.m. to recommence at 7.00 p.m., Monday, November 19, 1990 in Regina.

I, YVAN G. LEMAY, the undersigned Official Court Reporter, hereby certify the foregoing is a true and faithful transcript of this hearing taken by means of stenomask.

YVAN G. LEMAY, Official Court Reporter







EP150 -H22

FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL

ASSESSMENT REVIEW

OFFICE

BUREAU FEDERAL

D'EXAMEN DES EVALUATIONS

ENVIRONNEMENTALES

Held at/Auditions tenues au:

Regina Inn

Regina, Saskatchewan

15

Date: Monday, November 19, 1990 Lundi le 19 novembre 1990

Volume:

## BEFORE / DEVANT:

MR. BLAIR SEABORN CHAIRMAN

DR. LOIS WILSON MEMBER DR. LIONEL REESE MEMBER MR. PIETER VAN VLIET MEMBER DR. LOUIS LAPIERRE MEMBER








1 FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERAL D'EXAMEN ASSESSMENT REVIEW OFFICE DES EVALUATIONS 2 ON NUCLEAR FUEL WASTE ENVIRONNEMENTALES MANAGEMENT DE LA GESTION DES DECHETS 3 DE COMBUSTIBLES NUCLEAIRES 4 5 SCOPING MEETING 6 REUNIONS DE DETERMINATION DE L'IMPORTANCE DES PROBLEMES 8 9 Hearing held at the Regina Inn, Regina Saskatchewan, on Monday, November 19, 1990, 10 commencing at 7:00 p.m. 11 12 13 14 15 VOLUME 15 16 17 18 19 BEFORE: 20 MR. BLAIR SEABORN Chairman 21 DR. LOIS WILSON Member DR. LIONEL REESE Member 22 MR. PIETER VAN VLIET Member DR. LOUIS LAPIERRE Member

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## APPEARANCES

MR.	ROY HILL	CONCERNED CITIZEN AT LARGE
DR.	BRUCE COOK	ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL ENINEERS O SASKATCHEWAN
MS.	TANNIS GOLDENSTEIN	PRIVATE CITIZEN
MS.	MAISIE SHIELL	GRANDMA'S ENVIRONMENTAL FUND
MR.	AL TAYLOR	PRIVATE CITIZEN
MR.	JAMES HARDING	INTERNATIONAL URANIUM CONGRESS





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---Upon commencing at 2:00 p.m.

THE CHAIRMAN: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. If you could take your seats we could start this session and we start by welcoming you to this Scoping Meeting being held in Regina by the Environmental Assessment Panel, which is to review the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept. The Panel was appointed by the Minister of the Environment in October of 1989.

Let me introduce the members of the Panel who are with me here this evening. At my left, your right, at that end of the table, Mr. Peter Van Vliet, of this city, a mechanical engineer who is a member of the Senate of the University of Regina.

Immediately to my left, Dr. Louis LaPierre, from Moncton, a professor in the Department of Biology at the University of Moncton, also Chairman of the Environmental Council of New Brunswick.

To my immediate right is Dr. Lois Wilson of Toronto, who is President of the World Council of Churches and a Co-Director of the Ecumenical Forum of Canada, and to her right again, Dr. Lionel Reese, from London, Ontario, a physician at St. Joseph's Hospital in that city and a professor in the Department of Diagnostic Radiology and Nuclear Medicine at the





University of Western Ontario.

My name is Blair Seaborn. I'm Chairman of the Panel and I reside in Ottawa. I'm retired from the public service, but I served previously as Deputy Minister of the Environment and Canadian Chairman of the International Joint Commission.

The Members of the Secretariat, I would also like to introduce. At the table here to the left of the front table, Mr. Bob Greyell, who is Executive Secretary, and at the back of the room, Ms. Susan Toller and Ms. Susan Flanagan. All of them are available to assist you in any way that they can during the evening.

The review is being conducted in accordance with the Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process, EARP. This process ensures that the environmental implications of proposals for which the federal government has decision making authority are fully considered as early in the planning process as possible, and before irrevocable decisions are taken.

I hope that some of you may have had the opportunity to receive information on this review process and on the proposal of Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., AECL, at the open houses which were held in May and June of this year:

The panel has been asked in part to examine





the nuclear fuel waste management and disposal concept, a proposal for permanent disposal of used nuclear fuel deep in the granitic rock of the Canadian Shield. This proposal would see the used fuel sealed inside corrosion resistant containers and placed in holes drilled in the floor of a room inside a disposal vault. The vault would in some ways resemble a deep mine and would contain the used fuel in an area of approximately four square kilometres.

I would like to say a few words about this Panel's mandate. The terms of reference state that the Panel is to review the safety and acceptability of the concept for geological disposal of nuclear fuel wastes in Canada. The one I just described as put forward by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.

In addition to this AECL proposal, we shall examine a broad range of nuclear fuel waste management issues including long-term management, transport, and environmental, social and economic effects. We shall look at approaches to nuclear fuel waste management and disposal being developed elsewhere in the world. Since site selection will not occur until the disposal concept has been accepted as safe, the Panel will not consider any specific sites, but will review the potential availability of sites and the methodology and criteria





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required for their selection.

I'd like to say a few words about what is not in the Panel's mandate and will not be addressed in this review. The energy policies of Canada and the provinces, the role of nuclear energy within these policies, including the construction, operation and safety of new or existing nuclear power plants, fuel reprocessing as an energy policy, and military applications of nuclear technology. These are excluded from our mandate.

I would like to make it very clear, however, that the members of the Panel are very much aware of the broader concerns related to the use of nuclear materials and the use of nuclear power for the generation of electricity.

The Panel has been urging a broader review of the comparative environmental implications of the various methods of generating electricity. I'm pleased to say that steps are well underway to get such a review into motion.

The Federal Department of Energy has written to its provincial counterparts, both energy and environment departments, and to a large number of energy and environmental interest groups, seeking their opinions on some proposed draft terms of reference for





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such a review, and they are now awaiting responses from those various bodies consulted before moving ahead to get the review underway, something which I hope will take place before very long.

The purpose of scoping meetings such as these is to allow participants to identify the issues that need to be addressed in the environmental impact statement that will be prepared by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. The Panel is not requesting the presentation of opinions on the substance of the disposal concept at this time. Public hearings will be held later to discuss whether AECL's proposal is acceptable. Scoping meetings enable participants to assist the Panel in identifying issues that are of concern and questions which need answers.

Following this series of meetings, the Panel will prepare draft guidelines for the preparation of the environmental impact statement. We will invite public comments on these draft guidelines over a period of at least 30 days. After consideration of these comments, the Panel will finalize the guidelines and issue them to AECL. Once AECL has completed the environmental impact statement, a process, I might say, which is likely to take a year or a year and a half to do if it is to be a complete environmental impact statement, and have





submitted it to the Panel, that document will be available for at least a 90 day public review period.

To assist us in the evaluation of scientific and technical matters, a scientific review group of distinguished independent experts has been established by the Panel to examine the safety and scientific acceptability of AECL's disposal concept. A report of their findings and recommendations will be submitted to the Panel, who will distribute it also to the public.

Once the Panel has satisfied itself that AECL has addressed satisfactorily all the items identified in the guidelines, we will hold public hearings.

Participants will be asked then to discuss the acceptability of AECL's disposal concept in detail. We shall consider all the comments submitted and will, as our final act, prepare a report to the Ministers of Environment and of Energy, Mines and Resources.

The present scoping meetings will be conducted according to the meeting procedures published on August the 24th of this year. The Panel would appreciate it if review participants would restrict themselves to the identification of issues within the Panel's mandate. I ask those registered to speak to attempt to summarize their concerns in 15 minutes unless they've previously requested an additional 10. The





Panel will pay equal attention to written and oral statements.

Participants who have registered in advance will be asked to present their views to the Panel and the Panel may ask questions of clarification following each presentation. If there is anyone here who would like to make a presentation to the Panel and has not yet registered, please speak to any members of the Secretariat just to get your names on the list, and that will be within the limits of the time available, but I'd hope that we would be able to hear from you. We will certainly do our best to accommodate any of those who have registered even if they have registered quite late.

Court reporters will record the proceedings of each meeting. Transcripts will be made available to designated libraries. A compilation of written submissions will also be available from the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office in Ottawa. We shall accept written submissions identifying issues and concerns until the end of this month, up to and including, that is, November 30th 1990.

With this, by way of introduction, I would like to call on the first participant for this evening, Mr. Roy Hill. If Mr. Hill would come forward. Just take a seat up here if you would and then it's possible





for us to have dialogue with you and for you to be seen also by the members of the public who are here.

MR. HILL: Can I begin? Just begin?

THE CHAIRMAN: You can go right ahead.

## PRESENTATION BY MR. HILL:

Good evening, Mr. Chairman, Panel members and interested persons. My name is Roy Hill. I've prepared a written brief of my concerns and issues that I have identified on AECL's nuclear fuel waste management and disposal concept.

I am not against the use of nuclear energy for peaceful applications. I am not a radical. I do not represent any company or group. I would like to believe that I partially represent the majority of the uninformed Canadian public with respect to this important subject.

I am concerned about human and environmental exposure to nuclear waste. I do not know this technical subject and I am unfamiliar with the ins and outs of the nuclear industry. Therefore, I will read the document which I have prepared and then I will be happy to answer any questions as to the reasons of my written statements.

A Canadian citizen's concerns regarding the safe containment, handling, transportation and permanent





storage and disposal of used nuclear fuel bundles from Canadian based nuclear reactors.

This report contains my views, which may or may not agree with AECL's nuclear fuel waste management disposal concept. However, I believe that the procedures described will minimize the following concerns which I have as a member of the general public at large.

A) A longer radiation decay time should be allowed for fuel bundles when removed from the reactor.

A maximum radiation level should be established for a used fuel bundle before it can be transported to a disposal site. This will reduce danger to the public and environment if something goes wrong during movement.

Two, a chemically inert, virtually indestructible, waterproof, permanently sealed trackable shipping and disposal container needs to be designed to ensure used fuel bundle radiation stays shielded during transportation, to prevent exposing humans to this hazardous material.

The transportation criteria established must prevent accidental spills of this radioactive material and must also be guarded against terrorist attack. The selected routes must be away from residential areas.

Local authorities along the routes must be pre-informed





of shipments.

The permanent disposal sites selected should be remote, existing underground uranium shaft mines deep into the Canadian shield rock, such as Uranium City in Northern Saskatchewan. This is far away from the general public. This will minimize any chance of future exposure to long lived radionuclides contained in the used nuclear fuel bundles.

I believe more research efforts should be employed to develop a recycling technology for used nuclear fuel. This would reduce the need for extensive disposal sites and would also reduce the need to continue extensive uranium mining.

I believe better monitoring and release standards should be established at northern uranium mill mine sites for releasing liquid chemical process tailings to the environment.

That is a statement of basically my concerns and I have a detailed approach which I'll read now.

The following statements are my personal views, which I believe will contribute and maintain the public safety at large as well as minimize the negative impacts on our national environment in Canada, with respect to the long-term disposal and handling of the used nuclear fuel from reactors to future disposal





sites.

Continue existing practice at nuclear reactor sites of cooling down the highly radioactive nuclear fuel bundles upon removal from reactor calandria tubes in water filled thick walled concrete tanks for a minimum time of five years. The nuclear fuel will then be a thousand times less radioactive so that it will be less hazardous to move to dry interim storage. The measured radioactive level of a used fuel bundle on removal from reactor is so many rems. I don't know the value of that. I would like to know.

Continue existing practice at reactor sites of dry storage in thick walled concrete sealed above ground canister tanks for a minimum of ten years or until the natural decay of radioactivity level measures so many rems of radiation emitted from an individual used nuclear fuel bundle. At this stage at least 15 years after the fuel bundle was removed from the reactor it is placed an in inert thick walled casket and filled with bentonite prior to sealing the casket for transporting to a remote Canadian shield underground deep permanent storage disposal site, and the amount of rems should be established by the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada.

Each used nuclear fuel bundle which has been





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selected for shipment to a remote disposal site shall first be permanently sealed into a container of the following specification: Graphite reinforced thick walled rectangular concrete chemically inert casket filled with bentonite to repel water ingress. Casket lid shall fit air tight and be glued on to casket compartment which shall be equipped with lift sling The sealed casket will be capable of withstanding impact loads of falling off a truck travelling at 65 miles an hour without failure. shall be watertight and withstand compressive loads up to so many tons per square inch as established by a structural mine design engineer and accepted by AECB. The casket will be equipped with a powerful radio transmitter tuned to an individual frequency for tracking from airplane or satellite. This transmitter shall be embedded into the lid of the casket and will continuously emit signal for up to two years. Each casket must be serialized and clearly marked on all sides with radioactive warning logo. It shall be dated and marked as to reactor site origin and disposal site destination. An emergency phone number will be marked on all sides for control centre.

Once the caskets are ready for shipment the following transportation criteria should be adopted to





minimize accidental risk to the general population and environment as a result of damage to casket, contents and or terrorist attack during transport to remote storage disposal site in the Canadian Shield.

A maximum of five caskets will be shipped at a time by truck, train, ship or cargo plane. No other shipments will be allowed until previous shipment safely reaches its disposal site and is placed into underground permanent storage. Each transport vehicle shall be equipped with a crane.

Each shipment must have a pre-approved route plan and schedule which will be registered with all EMO, police, and provincial authorities four weeks in advance of departure to disposal site.

Each shipment will be monitored as to location every half hour on a 24 hour basis. Transport carrier will be equipped with radio to report in to manned 24 hour control surveillance centre.

Only day travel in good weather at posted minimum travel speeds will be allowed. No winter departures will be allowed.

The selected route must correspond to locally approved all weather dangerous goods routes to bypass residential areas.

Each shipment will be provided with an armed





escort to resist any terrorist attack for the purposes of obtaining the used nuclear fuel bundles. This security force shall consist of advance and rear guard vehicles with overhead and flanker helicopter gunships. This security force will be in place on a 24 hour basis and must contact the control centre every half hour. If half hour report is not made an airborne army unit will be dispatched to verify position and or defend recover caskets with radioactive contents.

The uranium oxide contained in the used nuclear fuel will naturally decay to safe radiation levels within 500 years of disposal. However, the used nuclear fuel also contains radionuclides such as Iodine-129, Cesium-135, Technetium-99, and Plutonium-239, which remain at hazardous radioactive levels for hundreds of thousands of years. If these radionuclides remain in an undissolved used nuclear fuel bundle sealed in a casket deep underground, it is felt by AECL research experts that there is little chance that the high concentrations could escape via ground water to the surface of the earth.

For any slim or remote possible chance of escape into the atmospheric environment by these forever deadly radionuclides, I believe that all used nuclear fuel bundles should be permanently disposed in old





remote underground existing uranium shaft mines in the Canadian Shield, far away from the general population. Such a mine can be found at Uranium City in Northern Saskatchewan.

The technology developed by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. for keep rock disposal vaults could be employed in this old underground uranium mine. The transportation costs would be greater, but the mine site preparation costs would be less because the main down shaft and tunnels are already in place, as well as equipment, housing and other facilities which would convert for use as a disposal site at Uranium City, Saskatchewan.

Small vaults could be dug into tunnel walls for permanent storage caskets then backfill with bentonite clay to waterproof chamber and fill chamber doorway with 10 foot thick steel reinforced concrete plug to permanently seal in caskets containing radioactive used fuel. Location plans shall be kept.

Year round security staff should be employed as well as radiation leak detection monitoring and reporting to central control centre daily. If radiation leaks are detected within 50 years of initial disposal, corrective technology must be developed and employed to prevent/arrest further leakage.





As a tunnel section becomes congested with side storage sealed chambers, the tunnel section can also be backfilled with bentonite clay between 15 foot thick reinforced concrete plugs every hundred feet to permanently seal tunnel sections.

At some point in the distant future, depending on nuclear reactor use and the amount of used nuclear fuel to dispose of, a decision would need to be made to either expand the existing mine tunnels or retire and seal the original disposal site after selecting another site in the remote Canadian north.

Retired equipment which is radioactively contaminated from decommissioned nuclear reactor sites could also follow the above steps for storage, transportation and permanent disposal.

I believe greater emphasis should be put into recycling technology for used nuclear fuel as an alternative to permanent disposal of fuel bundles and uranium mining. Apparently other countries, such as France, are reprocessing their waste nuclear fuel. So why can't we also begin to recycle our nuclear fuel waste?

I also believe that better methods and monitoring of liquid chemical tailings released into the environment from uranium processing mills at mine sites





needs to be more closely scrutinized. There have been a number of accidental releases of unknown quantities and chemical composition to Northern Saskatchewan's lakes, rivers and land. Tighter controls should be implemented to reduce chemical wastes into the environment at these northern uranium sites, mills and mines.

Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thanks very much, Mr. Hill.

You have done a very detailed presentation, particularly on some of the more technical matters here. We will be looking at that carefully.

Are there any questions which members of the Panel would like to put to Mr. Hill? Questions of clarification, precision, on that presentation?

Dr. Wilson.

DR. WILSON: Just on page 3 there, you suggest if radiation leaks are detected within 50 years of initial disposal corrective technology must be developed. Why did you settle on 50 years? I mean it could happen in a hundred years or a thousand.

MR. HILL: It could be five, it could be two, it could be 25. I just said 50 'cause this is going to last for hundreds of thousands of years anyway.

DR. WILSON: But are you suggesting it should be checked once and then --





MR. HILL: No, continual. It should be a daily leak check.

DR. WILSON: I just wondered about the 50 years.

MR. HILL: -I don't think we can put it in the ground and forget about it.

THE CHAIRMAN: Any other questions?

Mr. Van Vliet.

MR. VAN VLIET: Mr. Hill, you indicate that there are some radionuclides that are having a very long half life and suggest some ways of disposing of them.

Have you any suggestions as to how that might be done?

MR. HILL: Exactly the way they're doing it.

MR. VAN VLIET: In terms of --

MR. HILL: You know, you can't deal with these radionuclides as far as -- they're dangerous and they're very hard to contain. So if they stay in the fuel bundles undissolved they're perfectly safe.

MR. VAN VLIET: Thank you.

MR. HILL: But if they get out they're not safe and we know from Chernobyl that Cesium-135 is in Northern Labrador right now, in lichens that the caribou are eating. So it's kind of dangerous stuff, and I call it stuff because I don't know what it is.

MR. VAN VLIET: Thank you very much.





THE CHAIRMAN: I think there are no further questions. It is a clear presentation. We hear what you have to say. Thank you very much for taking the trouble to present that to us, Mr. Hill.

THE CHAIRMAN: The next person I have on my list was to have -- Harry Sabier, was to have spoken on behalf of the Association of Professional Engineers of Saskatchewan. I believe that the Association is now asking if they could make their presentation in Saskatoon. I just want to make sure that I'm not -- no? They're here now. Good. If you're here now please come forward.


Please proceed. I'm not quite sure of the origins of that false rumour about your desire to present in Saskatoon rather than here. We are delighted you are with us tonight.

## PRESENTATION BY DR. COOK:

---Mr. Hill withdraws

Mr. Chairman, panel members, ladies and gentlemen, my name is Bruce Cook. I'm president elect of the Association of Professional Engineers and I'm here to present the brief on behalf of the Association.

The Association of Professional Engineers of Saskatchewan, representing its members, is making this presentation to the Panel in recognition of its





responsibilities to ensure that the special knowledge of its members is made available to participate in a debate of particular concern to the public.

The Engineering Profession Act of 1930 is administered by the Association of Professional Engineers. The Association is governed by a council comprised of both elected members and representatives appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.

The Association is the only body responsible for assessing qualifications and regulating the licensure of professional engineers in the province. As such, it is the only engineering organization that represents all professional engineers in Saskatchewan.

At the end of 1989, the Association had 2,641 active members. The registers also included 211 engineers in training, 187 life members and 504 non-resident licensees.

The profession of engineering provides the knowledge which facilitates the translation of capital into wealth producing assets. The engineering profession is founded on the principles of a body of knowledge, provision of service to protect the public, maintenance of a closely scrutinized standard of conduct, and exercise of authority given to it by the public to regulate its practitioners.






By maintaining high entrance standards to the profession, and by enforcing the Code of Ethics of the profession, professional engineers have supervised the investment of many billions of dollars to improve the standard of living, the safety and the welfare of the citizens of this province.

There is in this particular issue a major challenge. High level radioactive wastes are accumulating at reactor sites in Canada and the challenge is to develop a concept for safe storage and disposal of nuclear fuel wastes in a fashion that will instill public acceptance and confidence.

We congratulate the Panel for incorporating due process beginning with the scoping workshop.

Although it will add a great deal of time and work, every opportunity must be given to allow the public to become more familiar with the project, the scientific principles involved, and to evaluate for themselves the level of confidence and the degree of safety that will accrue.

Education of the public will be a major challenge. A relatively small proportion of the Canadian population has sufficient background knowledge in the relevant sciences to make even rudimentary judgments on the processes and scientific principles





associated with nuclear waste disposal.

A substantial educational effort will be needed to translate scientific complexities using terminology that can be understood by the majority of the population, because only with this information can the public make a personal evaluation of the safety of the proposed concepts.

The issues to be considered. Isolation of nuclear fuel waste in a suitable geological medium is probably the most suitable storage and disposal option. However, working with natural materials always leads to certain degrees of uncertainty, and a step by step process is needed in projects of this nature.

It should be emphasized that engineers and scientists have devised rational methods for dealing with these uncertainties in what you might call a design as you build process. This is an iterative process that allows for knowledge gained during investigation, design and construction operations to be used to improve the project design. In this manner a high quality facility can be achieved.

Engineering design process incorporates investigation, analysis, design construction and post construction monitoring. This process incorporates as many iterations as required to produce post construction





modifications where monitoring and analysis indicates there is a necessity. This engineering method has withstood the test of time and has been used for many difficult projects, including many that have advanced the threshold of technical knowledge.

There is a very important role for the engineer in this project and any project of this nature. A development of the nuclear fuel waste management and disposal concept is engineering as defined in the Acts governing the practice of professional engineering in Canada.

Successful project delivery will depend on an engineering team consisting of professional engineers, scientists, technologists, technicians and trade people.

It is important that the work be undertaken under the jurisdiction of professional engineers since, of all of the team members, it is only the professional engineer who is required to subscribe to a code of ethics which requires him or her to owe a duty to the public, to the state, to maintain its integrity and to maintain its laws. In a project of this magnitude, and with the degrees of uncertainty and the lack of understanding of the public, it is particularly important that the work be overseen by a registered professional engineer who is prepared to take





professional responsibility for the work and discharge his or her ethical responsibility.

A time honoured system for the delivery of engineering projects has assisted engineers in their duty to protect the public. The system has three components. The engineering seal, a review board and public inquiry.

The engineer's seal is applied by the professional engineer taking overall responsibility for the work. The review board process consisting of specialist engineers and scientists is assembled to provide a detailed technical review. If the public expresses further concern, the public hearing is convened to explore and rule on the points of contention. The Panel is strongly recommended and encouraged to follow this process.

There is a strong need to ensure independence in a project of this nature. There is a cynical attitude on much of the public towards major institutions and it will be difficult to assure the public that an unbiased, independent evaluation is taking place.

It is recommended that careful consideration be given to the structure of the organization responsible for producing the storage concept. Above





all there has to be a freedom to act, independent of external pressures, and a review Panel free to undertake technical and socio-economic evaluations in an unbiased and an unfettered manner.

Great care is needed to demonstrate this at an early stage if the review process is to have credibility. The process must be completely transparent with all documents provided. Independence of action and a transparent process such that anybody can see into it are essential in maintaining credibility with a questioning public.

To briefly summarize, a geological isolation is currently the recommended option for nuclear fuel waste storage and disposal, but it is important that the uncertainties in dealing with the geological media are explained to the public.

Only a small fraction of the public in Canada has the academic background and knowledge to independently evaluate the waste management concepts and an education and interpretative program must be provided to communicate the complex technical concepts to the general public.

The traditional engineering design process consisting of investigation, analysis, design, construction, monitoring and post construction



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modifications must be explained to the public.

Development of nuclear fuel waste management concepts constitute professional engineering and must be delivered by an engineering team.

Professional engineers are the only members of the team subjected to scrutiny for professional registration, and the engineers are the only ones required to uphold a Code of Ethics.

The traditional delivery system for engineering design is applicable for this project.

It is recommended that all documentation should be issued under the seal of a professional engineer who will take responsibility for the work and who will discharge his or her ethical responsibilities to the public.

Subsequent scrutiny by a review board and public scrutiny through an assessment Panel are the other components of the traditional engineering process.

Finally, independence of action and a transparent process are required to foster and maintain credibility for the final storage concept in the eyes of the public.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Dr. Cook.

Questions from members of the Panel? Points





of clarification which you would like? Dr. LaPierre?

DR. LAPIERRE: I have two questions. The first one relates to a post construction monitoring. I wonder if you have any indication of the amount of time that this post construction monitoring should take place?

DR. COOK: Post construction monitoring depends on the nature of the project which you are undertaking, and it may be carried out for years and years and it may be carried on forever as is necessary. This is something which is assessed as time goes on and based on the assessment you continue as necessary.

To give you an example, an earth filled dam may be shifting with time and you would want to monitor the shifting of that dam continuously and take any corrective action as is necessary when you discover the need for it.

DR. LAPIERRE: The other question I have is, you indicated that an education interpretive program must be provided to communicate the complex technical concept to the general public. Do you have any idea who should do that?

DR. COOK: That is a difficult question to answer and it is one that the engineering profession has been groping with for a great deal of time.





It is a talented person, a skilled person, that we're looking for in this case, and wherever you can find such a person you make the best use of the available resources.

example, is the program on television, The Nature of Things, where you found one person who was able to explain things well and he uses the right terminology and that's the sort of person you have to use. Not all engineers are going to be very good at explaining things, and the engineer is not necessarily the person, nor in some cases the scientist is not necessarily the person. You should develop a core of people who have the ability to reach as teachers, and a core of people who can understand the scientific and engineering principles that are necessary to be described.

DR. LAPIERRE: Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Dr. Wilson.

DR. WILSON: I have two.

You mentioned the Code of Ethics. It is interesting, as we've gone across the country there are some who say the ethical thing to do with this nuclear waste is to bury it so that future generations won't have to think about it, and there are others who say if you do that then you rob future generations of their





ethical responsibility and their humanness. Where would you come down on that one?

DR. COOK: The problem that I see personally in this is that we have a responsibility today to provide the energy and to provide a safe storage for the fuel, and we have no option really when there is the fuel there that we have to somehow or other provide that storage.

As to whether it's going to have long-term effects, we would work very hard to try to minimize those long-term effects.

Now future generations are also going to be faced with the same sort of problems, where we've always had problems in terms of looking after the current problems that we have and the inherited problems that have been developed in the past. Society has undertaken this traditionally and I think society would continue to undertake it.

DR. WILSON: So you're at both ends.

The other thing you mention here is it's important that the uncertainties in dealing with the geological media are explained to the public. I agree but once they're explained that may not make them acceptable to the public.

DR. COOK: That is true.





DR. WILSON: So again I guess it is the same question that Dr. LaPierre asked because we're charged not only with the safety of this but the acceptability. Would the engineers have some contributions in that area?

DR. COOK: I think they would. If you were working with rock formations as the proposal here is envisaged to be, you were working with something which in the case of the Precambrian Shield, something that has been there for hundreds of millions of years, in fact billions of years. It's been there for a long time. It would seem to be as safe as the old expression the Bank of England. On the other hand, the same formation is part of a relatively thin crust on the earth's surface, and that relatively thin crust, therefore, is subject to faults, to cracking, and so on.

Now, in dealing with this sort of thing there are ways of working with it, and to give a personal example, I had the opportunity 36 years ago to see the Comano (phonetic) power project on the west coast of B.C. The Comano power project is the power plant that was built inside a mountain to provide the electricity to Kitimat. I don't know whether any of you have seen that or not. But this was a situation where they were working in a rock structure and where they took a great





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deal of time to figure out what the problems were going to be there, inside a mountain literally. There is no structure in the power plant. It's just a hole inside the mountain. They were able to solve the problems there and they are able to correct the problems as they go along.

My feeling is that the Canadian engineering expertise and knowledge of rock mechanics and the experience we've gained makes us probably one of the better countries in the world in terms of being able to tackle a project like this.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Van Vliet.

MR. VAN VLIET: Dr. Cook, you identified that a method for dealing with the uncertainties of such a project are described as a design as you build process, as you identified on page 3. How do you reconcile a design as you build process with an evaluation of a concept such as we are considering here without being site specific?

DR. COOK: It's a question of whether you know all the answers. Whether you start into something or whether you don't know all the answers, and in many situations we haven't known all the answers when we've started into the overall project, but recognizing that we don't know all the answers we carry on from there and





discover the answers as we go, and this is what requires design as you build.

One of the classic examples in Canadian history is building the railroads across the country. Laying down railway track seems like a very obvious proposition and yet Sanford Flemming in New Brunswick was developing most of the theories of soil mechanics as he went along. As he came to something new, like a new type of gravel, sand, whatever he came up with, he then had to figure out what the answers were, how am I going to continue on in this project, and that project, perhaps more than any other in Canadian history, was a real design as you build project. It is possible and it achieves the results.

MR. VAN VLIET: Is it still possible then to evaluate the concept without being site specific?

DR. COOK: I believe it is, yes. You deal with the overall concept and with the possibilities that you anticipate, and at the same time allow yourself escape routes as you go along. What am I going to do if.

One of the best industries in Canada in that respect, from my point of view, is the nuclear industry.

I've had brief experience with the nuclear industry and I was quite impressed by the amount of effort that the





nuclear industry puts into questioning themselves and saying what if. I was part of Hazards Analysis, for example, for the Whiteshell reactor and we were asking ourselves what if all the time, and the safety record of the nuclear industry has been quite phenomenal. Probably the best safety record that there is of any industry in Canada, if not the best.

MR. VAN VLIET: I have another question.
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, indeed.

MR. VAN VLIET: You're also indicating on page 4 that it must be shown that the design organization is given the freedom to act independent of external pressure. In your opinion is that possible within the structure of one corporation, be it an independent corporation or a crown corporation?

DR. COOK: I think it is possible and I think it's absolutely essential. If there are political pressures to make certain decisions, or industrial pressures to make certain decisions we have a very serious problem on our hands, and this problem has been something which has come up on a number of occasions in recent years, and the expression is blowing the whistle, where engineers in fact in cases have had to say the decisions being made in my company are not in the best interests of the public and I have to go public on that





thing.

I would very much hope that we can build an organization which could carry out a project like this without a need for any of the engineers in the process to have to blow a whistle.

MR. VAN VLIET: Do you see a potential conflict of interest between the producer of the waste and a corporation or an entity that -- or if the same corporation had to look after the disposal of the waste?

DR. COOK: There could be, yes, but on the other hand there could be a structuring of authorities to get around that, and knowing that the problem exists you would have to arrange that this is built into the overall organization and the lines of authority and responsibility.

MR. VAN VLIET: Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Dr. LaPierre.

DR. LAPIERRE: Dr. Cook, a question regarding your design as you go concept which I think might be quite acceptable to engineers, but how do you reconcile this concept with a public that wants a guaranteed degree of certainty before a project goes ahead when they perceive a danger with the project itself?

DR. COOK: I think there have been many





projects in the past which have been challenges part way through, and the idea when you run into a problem that you can't solve and there is no way of solving it that's the time to call it quits on that particular project.

Now it could be site specific. You may start into an operation and find out that as you get in underground fault structure such as you can't proceed any further there. It doesn't necessarily mean that you can't start into another structure elsewhere.

DR. LAPIERRE: But my question relates more to the public. How is the public going to perceive such a project because they require — they're asking for an absolute certainty before they accept such a project because they perceive that the waste itself is dangerous and because we all agree that it has to be dealt within some special conditions. But how do you address that factor in the general population?

DR. COOK: On a personal note, nothing is ever certain except death and taxes. But from the point of view of the public, in a situation like this I think the public has to have some faith in the people that are undertaking this project, but at the same time to have that faith they have to have people that they know are responsible, who are willing to take a responsible position and this is part of the education process. To





show that there are people who are taking responsibility for this project and are going to ensure that it is safe to the public and make the correct decisions at any point where they find that they're running into difficulties.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Van Vliet.

MR. VAN VLIET: Following along the lines of Dr. LaPierre's questions, you indicate that an education and interpretive program must be provided to communicate the complex technical concept to the general public.

That's a formidable task.

DR. COOK: I agree entirely.

MR. VAN VLIET: Who do you see as responsible for that?

DR. COOK: It could be anybody. I remember one public hearing in Saskatchewan for the Coronat (phonetic) where the presentation made on behalf of the power corporation was written twice. The first time it was written it was realized that the public wouldn't understand it and so the entire presentation was rewritten. It was rewritten in terms of not using words like boiler because the people don't necessarily understand what a boiler is unless you explain ahead of time. I think that's part of the process.

THE CHAIRMAN: Dr. Wilson.

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DR. WILSON: I would like to ask, do you see this in any way as more than a technical problem to explain to the public? Are we more into technical stuff here and if so what are we into?

DR. COOK: Yes, I do. As I mentioned just a little while ago, part of the education process goes beyond technical in the sense that we have to provide a demonstration or proof or an assurance of the faith in the people that are actually working on the project, and there are other factors that will come up.

The public is largely concerned about the technical side because they don't understand the technical side, but that's certainly not the only part of the problem.

THE CHAIRMAN: Any further questions? If not thank you very much indeed, Dr. Cook for coming and speaking on behalf of the Association today.

DR. COOK: Thank you.

---Dr. Cook withdraws

THE CHAIRMAN: The next participant I have on my list is Ms. Tannis Goldenstein. Please go ahead.

PRESENTATION BY MS. GOLDENSTEIN:

Good evening Chairman and Panel members. My name is Tannis Goldenstein and although I didn't receive any information with regards to this evening's meeting,





I am very concerned that Canada will become a radioactive garbage dump for other countries.

For 13 years Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. has made statements in every publication and to all news media that deep geological disposal vaults of high-level radioactive waste is safe.

In 1976 Robert Hart, vice-president of
Whiteshell Nuclear Research Establishment stated that
disposal of radioactive waste should be a simple matter.
We'll just bury the radioactive waste underground in an
area of one square mile.

I feel radioactive waste should be kept where it is produced and that Canada should not become a garbage dump for the world. There are 27 countries producing radioactive waste in nuclear power plants.

These radioactive wastes should not be transported on waterways and highways.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, any questions to put there?

I was going to ask, you, I think, said that the radioactive waste ought to be retained where it is produced. Is that the gist what of you --

MS. GOLDENSTEIN: Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: I see. Well some, of course, is produced in Canada, as you know, at nuclear stations





in parts of Canada. Is your thought that it should be retained close to those stations then, or that it should go somewhere else for later disposal? I wonder if you have any thoughts on that?

MS. GOLDENSTEIN: I feel that more research is needed. I haven't researched myself in regards to the nuclear waste issue, but research is definitely -- it's always needed and whichever is more suitable. I'm not certain whether it should be closer to where nuclear waste is produced or just one major area. But it should be retained in Canada.

THE CHAIRMAN: Dr. LaPierre.

DR. LAPIERRE: Well, that essentially was my question. So you have asked it.

THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry I cut out, member.

Dr. Wilson.

DR. WILSON: I would like to ask -- I mean it's quite clear from your documentation that you don't want to bury other countries' radioactive waste in Canada. Why not?

MS. GOLDENSTEIN: I feel that Canada should deal with its own radioactive waste and other countries should deal with their own. I don't want to see Canada becoming the world's garbage dump. That we take all -- everybody's garbage. I don't think -- I don't like the





picture of Canada becoming a garbage dump of the world, of us receiving all of the world's garbage. Canada will just eventually, after many, many centuries and years, just fill up, just as the vaults or as the plants are filled, they're going to have the build a new one and keep building right across — right in Canada. Like it'll just take over the province probably or the provinces.

THE CHAIRMAN: Dr. Reese.

DR. REESE: You know, you were concerned about Canada becoming the dumping ground for other countries. I would just like to follow that a little bit further.

Would you be willing in one province to accept the garbage of another province or one part of the province to accept the garbage of another part of the province? Do you follow me?

MS. GOLDENSTEIN: Yes.

DR. REESE: I can understand your nationalism, that you only want Canadian garbage in Canada.

I guess the next question though is, is this by province, by county, by city, by block?

MS. GOLDENSTEIN: By country.

DR. REESE: Thank you.





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THE CHAIRMAN: Any other questions?

Thank you. Thanks very much. It was good of you to come out.

---Ms. Goldenstein withdraws

THE CHAIRMAN: The next person I have on my list is Ms. Maisie Shiell speaking on behalf Grandma's Environmental Fund.

Ms. Shiell, please.

## PRESENTATION BY MS. SHIELL:

Good evening. I have addressed what I would like to see in the EIS for the concept of the high-level waste burial in Canada.

The burial of high-level radioactive waste 500 or 1,000 metres below the ground in a granitic pluton in Precambrian Shield in Ontario is an extremely risky concept.

EPA, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is quoted as having said in 1978 - now certainly this is 12 years ago - "Unlike ordinary engineering problems, there is no experience with long-term, sealed underground storage of such materials, and thus no foundation of empirical knowledge upon which to build." This is what makes it so different than the other engineering examples we've been hearing about.

The highly toxic long-lived radionuclide,





Plutonium-239, which has a half life of 24,000 years is what makes the concept of burying this high-level waste so dangerous and so risky for future generations.

As I see the problem in Canada, it can and indeed it should be, divided into two problems.

Firstly, Canada has already allowed 13 or 14,000 tons of this potentially dangerous waste, if it is ever allowed to escape, to build up prior to having the technology to deal with it in the long run. At present this is being safely stored on a temporary basis in swimming pools or in shielded containers. Since no way exists of disposing of it, our first problem must be how to deal with what we have already got.

Our second problem concerns whether or not we should be continuing to produce more, and I realize that you have said that this is not the concern this evening, but we have to divide these two problems is what I'm telling you.

I would like to see these two separate problems discussed in the EIS from both a practical and a philosophical point of view. I would also like to suggest that the EIS be written in language that a layperson can understand. It is very important that ordinary people are able to understand what is being said. The use of scientific terms that are not





understood by the general public not only makes the EIS very difficult to read, but also are suspect often as being used in order to try to fool us. If it is not possible to avoid such terms, perhaps they could be explained in the following sentence or paragraph. If this is not possible, a glossary should be provided. I consider it is absolutely essential that the author of the EIS, AECL, must, so to say, bend over backwards to be extremely honest and balanced in the information it gives in that EIS.

The nuclear industry has been guilty of telling a one sided story, hoping in this way to fool the people into accepting uranium mines, reactors and disposal sites. One of the results of this strategy of the nuclear industry has been a loss of confidence by many of us. So I'm suggesting that AECL should take off its rose coloured glasses and honestly tell the bad side as well as the good. The EIS should honestly deal with risks and with the possible long-term consequences.

I believe the EIS should include a discussion of radiation. The different types of radiation, the different half lives, and the products of radioactive disintegration, which may be radioactive or stable. The implications of gamma and alpha radiation and the long and short half lives, et cetera, should also be





discussed.

The EIS should list the actual radionuclides that will be stored in the proposed vault indicating their types of radiation emitted, their half life and the product resulting and whether it be radioactive or stable. Also the quantities of each at a certain date be given in bequerels per gram in each bundle, because of course, these quantities are changing as they disintegrate. Plutonium-239 should be dealt with on its own also.

The EIS must describe the actual containment and must explain the rationale for choosing the particular material such as titanium or copper or glass beds or lead. The same with the clay material that AECL intends to surround the containers with. References that have led to these choices should be given and should be publicly available.

Since it is vital that the highly toxic radioactive spent fuel be securely contained for at least a hundred thousand years, that is until the Plutonium-239 has disintegrated to 1/16 of its original amount, the methods and material being used in the containment must be able to be scrutinized by the public. The containment is the key. The public, who must take the ultimate responsibility, must be able to





understand if they are going to adequately scrutinize these conceptual plans.

In 1986 in Winnipeg, at a conference organized by the Concerned Citizens of Manitoba, many of use were able to learn a little about some of the real difficulties involved in attempting to secure these high-level radionuclides in granite rock.

Marvin Resnikoff explained some of the difficulties which involve the tiny 1/1000 of an inch hairline fractures in the granite rock. How the difference in the pressure - wait a minute, I think I've gone off a line - how drilling in fact may create or enlarge these fractures. How the difference in pressure between the rock and the mine would press ground water from the rock into the mine. How heat from the waste fuel would gradually travel to the rock thus enlarging the fractures.

In fact giving this -- Mr. Resnikoff -- giving the U.S. Department of Energy figures, his presentation gave the possible lengths of time that it might take for the contaminated water to reach the surface.

He quoted the U.S. Geological Service as saying, in 1978 again, "Given the current state of our knowledge, the uncertainties associated with hot wastes





that interact chemically and mechanically with the rock and fluid system appear high."

I have included an appendix with this brief which is this presentation, a copy of the presentation by Resnikoff have because maybe I haven't, you know, interpreted it correctly, but to me it seems — it is up to AECL in the EIS to tell us how such uncertainties are going to be overcome. And here I say that I have attended the...

In a section called "Learning From Nature" in a AECL brochure, we are told that studies of uranium mines in Northern Saskatchewan and Gabon in Africa, have given that corporation confidence that their plain will be safe and secure. Their arguments are based on the fact that mother nature has kept huge ore bodies safe and secure from the environment for two billion years. I personally find this extremely impressive, but I have yet to be convinced that AECL can so easily duplicate what nature has achieved, and this in actual fact from reading the paper I still — I most certainly wasn't convinced by it. I personally find this extremely — oh, I've done that.

I have also read a paper on this subject by Jan J. Cramer. Now, I brought a copy with me. I haven't given you this, but in this paper Cramer





explains how, by a number of studies on different mines in northern Saskatchewan, by various scientists, they have been able to put together a hypothesis of how this has been an achieved by nature.

Reducing conditions in the water have led to chemical reactions that in turn have led to a clay halo around the ore bodies. Apparently this paper is suggesting that we can copy the clay halo, but can we copy the reducing conditions? I would need very detailed explanations of method and material of how AECL intends to achieve this before I can possibly feel any confidence, and I have given the references there. I think it's on the back of page 2.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Thank you, Ms. Shiell.

I was going to ask you for the reference to Jan J.

Cramer but you have --

MS. SHIELL: I have given it. It's on the back of page 2 you'll find it.

THE CHAIRMAN: I see that. Perhaps we can just check with the Secretariat and see where that appeared so that we will be able to pin it down quite readily. It may have been in a scientific journal.

MS. SHIELL: I believe I picked it up at an AECL information meeting. So I think it should be readily available.





THE CHAIRMAN: Good.

MS. SHIELL: Would you like me to send it around at least.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. We will give that back to you.

MS. SHIELL: It's very badly marked up I'm afraid.

THE CHAIRMAN: It's your only copy but I'd just like to make sure that we have the correct reference for it. I will get the secretary to do that.

Now questions for Ms. Shiell, please, from any members of the Panel who would like to put them?

Mr. Van Vliet.

MR. VAN VLIET: Ms. Shiell, you indicate that you would like to see the Plutonium-239 kept until it has disintegrated to 1/16 of its original amount.

MS. SHIELL: I'm not hearing you very well. Would you mind speaking up?

MR. VAN VLIET: You indicate in your paper that the Plutonium-239 should be kept securely contained until the material has disintegrated to 1/16 of its original amount. Are you referring to a level of radiation and if so why did you chose 1/16?

MS. SHIELL: Okay. I'm referring to the amount of plutonium. The plutonium is -- the





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radioactivity is disintegrating and the atoms in the pluton are disintegrating and therefore you lose that atom. It goes into another material.

So it has a 24,000 year half life so in 24,000 years, half the atoms that you put down there will be disintegrated. Okay, so you've got half left. You've got half left, and half has already gone. Then with another 24,000 years you get another quarter. So it's half of what you've got, okay, and by a hundred thousand years you'll still have 1/16 left and this is very, very dangerous deadly stuff. Whether a hundred thousand years is even enough, you know, but that, at least, is what I'm saying.

MR. VAN VLIET: And 1/16, was that a reference to the level of the background natural radiation?

MS. SHIELL: Plutonium is not a natural radionuclide.

MR. VAN VLIET: No, but the radiation that comes from that remain --

MS. SHIELL: Well, yes, the radiation that comes from that is -- the really dangerous part of it is the alpha radiation in that, and if the water takes it and it gets dissolved, then this alpha will get into the food chain, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.





MR. VAN VLIET: Thank you very much.

MS. SHIELL: So talking of rems and things doesn't -- but I did ask in my paper that at least it be talked of in bequerels. How much plutonium in bequerels are they going to put in there. One bequerel is one disintegration per second so we know how much radiation we've got there then.

MR. VAN VLIET: Thank you very much.

THE CHAIRMAN: Dr. Reese.

DR. REESE: Just for a little clarification.

The problem with saying 1/16, that is true you have four half, fives.


MS. SHIELL: Yes.

DR. REESE: But the important thing is how much do you start with, how much do you have. In other words 1/16 of a large number is still a hell of a lot more than the whole amount of a small number. So that then itself doesn't mean anything.

MS. SHIELL: Well, we don't know how much we start with so what else -- how else can we describe it?

DR. REESE: Well, these numbers are available.

MS. SHIELL: Well, I have not received the number. That's why I've asked in there that the EIS state the number.





DR. REESE: Fair enough.

THE CHAIRMAN: Stating absolute amounts that they would predict would be necessary.

MS. SHIELL: I didn't hear.

THE CHAIRMAN: You've asked that the EIS contain an indication of the expected original amounts which be would placed in the disposal vault?

MS. SHIELL: If you have the original amount you can work out because you know the disintegrations how they're -- especially if you have that amount given to you in bequerels.

THE CHAIRMAN: Dr. Wilson.

DR. WILSON: You've have mentioned in your paper some of the areas that you think the public should know, not the certainties, but the risks. You've mentioned the actual container, the effective radiation, the fractures in granite rock, the ground water, the heat and some of those things.

Now we're charged with not only the safety of the concept which you've mentioned quite a number of the things, but also the acceptability. Do you have any thoughts on what would make this concept of the disposal site acceptable to a community? What would a community need to know before it would be acceptable?

MS. SHIELL: Well, I think in my brief that's





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what I say. To me, you know, I'm the public, I suppose too, and I have done quite a lot of reading and studying about this subject, but I certainly have still to be convinced. I'm fairly convinced by Mr. Resnikoff, you know, and by EPA and by, you know, but we are saying the tone of what AECL's brochure, that's all I've seen, the brochure from AECL, is saying oh, it's quite safe, you know. I suppose it does sort of put some risks, but it doesn't -- it really leads one to believe that if we follow things like this and we copy nature we can do it, you know, and they haven't convinced me because -- I mean here I'm going to do some more reading about this now, but just the little bit I've done, I went to this conference and I heard -- there's a number of other articles in here as well, and I tried to read them up before I made this presentation.

So I think we've dealt -- it is and unfortunately we've got -- I work mostly with the uranium industry and we get a lot of really foolish stories told to us.

On a TV show I've got a video of, I had to go on a debate with the Cameco company and it was the communications officer, but she said that -- she said for centuries this mine, the mine is right on the edge of Wallaston Lake, for centuries this mine has been





leaching into Wallaston Lake.

The study I've just sent around there, it does explain and I've known for a number of years how in fact the uranium is not leaching. It's because nature has found this way of safeguarding it, okay, but here, you know, she's going to tell the public that and in fact she has the gall to say and we are doing much better.

I think she does another thing with these radionuclides too, and it really sounds quite logical to the public. I'm not sure if I can -- I think I'll skip that one. I can't really remember it at the moment. My mind isn't right there.

THE CHAIRMAN: Dr. LaPierre.

DR. LAPIERRE: Thanks a lot, Mrs. Shiell for your presentation.

I have one question regarding a comment that you made in your --

MS. SHIELL: Would you mind speaking into your mike?

DR. LAPIERRE: I have one comment regarding a -- one question regarding a comment you made regarding the risk for future generations. Present generation is using the electricity and producing the waste. I wonder if you have any comments or further expansion on that,





your responsibilities to future generations with the present day waste?

MS. SHIELL: Well, I'm putting a tremendously -- I really spend my entire life worrying about the high grade uranium mining in Northern Saskatchewan. Not because of this generation but because of the next generations. Here the radium is -- and the thorium are just as long lived as the plutonium or longer lived the thorium is 80,000 years and so I just think it's totally unacceptable that we put the cost onto our children in the future. That's why I am doing what I am doing.

THE CHAIRMAN: Any further questions from Panel members?

Thank you, Ms. Shiell, and thank you for being quite explicit in the things which you think should be -- the questions which you think should be put to AECL in its environmental impact statement.

Thank you very much.

---Ms. Shiell withdraws

THE CHAIRMAN: I have next on my list for this evening, Mr. Al Taylor. He is here? Good.

PRESENTATION BY MR. TAYLOR:

You know now, Mr. Chairman, why I'm a happy financial contributor to Granny's Environmental Fund,





and I wish my brief was as well prepared as hers.

Thank you very much. Good evening, Mr.

Chairman and Panel members. Thank you very much for giving me this opportunity to -- I'll present a very short brief. I'm afraid its ill prepared and short mostly because the environmental movement is being consulted to death this summer in Saskatchewan and you happen to be the last folks on the list this month and we've just spent a great number of days preparing for other things.

Anyway, my name is Al Taylor as you obviously know. I guess I've been involved in the environmental movement, an activist, since about 1968, and I've been opposed to uranium mining and the production of electricity with nuclear power ever since I can sort of remember, but certainly since we started mining this stuff in Saskatchewan.

I guess a bit more brief history. I've worked in the -- I've been in the public health field for about 25 years and in the social service field for another 10 years and I'm now a retired federal civil servant.

I'm just going to actually make a few comments saying amen to nearly everything Maisie said and she certainly does much more research on it than I





do.

I guess I think wastes are inherently dangerous. I'm not so sure you're asking the right question. Maybe it should be what if the process is inherently unsafe what are we going to do? Should we continue with the way we are? I would argue that if wastes are inherently dangerous it's the height of arrogance to produce a high-level waste when we still don't have scientific agreement that there is safe disposal, and we can bring in the arguments about future generations, which is a very important one having children and grandchildren and hopefully being around for great grandchildren. I think it's an important question and it has to be asked.

My position is that we should have no new nuclear power plants and quit decommissioning of the present plants. I realize that there are present wastes that have to be stored, but I would argue that they should be stored at the nuclear power plants in Ontario and Quebec and New Brunswick and kept in their present swimming pools.

Simple justice dictates that those who have had the benefits can now have the environmental social health and economic costs in investing in a technology that again I would argue is inherently unsafe and can





never be sustainable. Never. The NIMBY Syndrome is quite legitimate where nuclear wastes are concerned.

Your mandate is to critically review and comment on the acceptability and applicability of AECL's high-level fuel waste disposal concept from a scientific and engineering point of view.

I ask that when you critically review and comment that you use the principles of sustainability and I've got a copy here and I'll leave it with you that came from -- pardon me, Principles of Sustainability as outlined in Alternatives Volume 17 No. 2, 1990.

I believe that by using these principles, you will find that nuclear power and all the wastes that are produced cannot meet standards of sustainability. If the technology cannot meet sustainable criteria then it should not be allowed to continue producing.

I do not want to read all of the recent article that appeared in the Harrowsmith written by F.P. Hughes, but I will leave a copy for the records. However, I do wish to read just some quotes that tend to put energy from nuclear power into perspective, and again leads me back to the question, if it is — well two questions. What are the alternatives to nuclear energy and are they much, much more — are they inherently safer than nuclear energy and can we get our





energy from them and if the process is inherently unsafe why are we dealing with it other than to contain it and not let it grow anymore.

Just a few of the quotes, "Many people are startled to learned that wood provides Canadians with more energy than nuclear reactors do," and we've known that for quite a few years. "Despite the billions of dollars that have been squandered, the lives put at hazard and the public relations whoppers told, nuclear power has not yet caught up with firewood as a source of energy in Canada."

It is perfectly possible to generate electricity from wood on a large scale without pollution, without adding to global warming or the greenhouse effect and without waste and without having to try and bury hot level waste for one hundred thousand years which, I would argue, ladies and gentlemen, are theological time scales, certainly not engineering time scales, and certainly not in the time scale of the human beings in this building here.

I'll leave it with you. I've got quite a few of them underlined in yellow, they're lovely quotes, it seems to me, to make for doing something with wood and we can certainly do it.

I guess that's the end of my presentation. I





will leave you -- I believe the Principles of
Sustainability are something more than worthwhile
looking at and reading, and as I say it seems to me you
have to have some basis on which to start making
decisions and if we use sustainability as an overriding
principle, I guess I feel that nuclear power is on its
way out.

Thank you very much.

THE CHAIRMAN: Perhaps you would be kind enough to lend both of those articles to the Secretariat then they can make sure they have the proper notation and return them to you, of course, before you leave this evening.

MR. TAYLOR: You can even have them.

THE CHAIRMAN: A contribution. Thank you very much indeed. That's great.

Are there questions which members of the Panel would like to put to Mr. Taylor?

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Van Vliet.

MR. VAN VLIET: Mr. Taylor, you indicate that you would like to keep the waste where it is in these water filled bays at the nuclear power plants. Do you consider those locations and those methods of storage safe for the long-term?

MR. TAYLOR: Well, I'm not a scientist. I





don't know. It seems to me we've accepted -- the scientific community as accepted them up till now as being a safe way of disposing of waste in a short term. They probably being -- I suppose there's the whole business of getting into the plutonium fuel cycle, which I would argue is even more dangerous than what we are trying to do now.

But I see it as at least staying in the swimming pools, the folks that tell us if we're to believe them and there's a fair amount of distrust of the nuclear community, that they're telling us that they are safe now. I would argue that they should be able to maintain their safety for the lifetime of the products that are in there.


MR. VAN VLIET: So essentially you are saying that current technology is safer than future technology?

MR. TAYLOR: I don't know. Do you know what future technology is going to be? I don't. It may be.

MR. VAN VLIET: You're make a value judgment in saying keep it where it is.

MR. TAYLOR: Until there's a safe method.

Until there's a safe method discovered that the scientific community agrees to stop producing it. It's unfair. It's just -- not only unfair, it seems to me





it's immoral to produce a product right now that we don't know that we can put away safely and yet we continue to produce it and you folks are trying to run around the country now trying to get a feeling from people of whether or not they want to accept that kind of disposal, and I would argue before you're finished that the scientific community is going to say it's not safe.

Maybe that's a bad prediction on my part, but it just seems to me that technology is not developed to the point where it's going to be -- where the high-level wastes are going to be able to be contained safely and so while we continue to produce it, my position is you guys that are producing it you keep it underneath your basements. When you decide to stop producing it then I'm willing to look at some sort of disposal because it's there. I agree we have to do something with it. It's absolutely preposterous that we have those high-level wastes. Its preposterous that we have them. It's immoral that we continue producing them until we can put them away safely. I don't think you're going to find that method. That's a value judgment to the future, you're right.

MR. VAN VLIET: Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: One question if I may and it's





a rather broad one, but you mentioned that you've been active in a broad range of environmental activity, not just exclusively this area of course.

The concepts of safety and risk are very, very difficult ones to come to grips with I would suggest, especially as there's some tendency to hope that they might be absolute terms. I guess I feel that they're is nothing in this world which is absolutely risk free nor absolutely safe. Yet questions along the lines of degree of safety, degree of risk have to be put and have to be answered somehow.

Within your experience, dealing with -- you know, looking at the dangers of this or other products, have you come to any helpful thoughts as to how one addresses those questions? How one gets the public and all of us as members of the public to come to grips with those difficult concepts?

MR. TAYLOR: I'm not quite sure I understood the question other than that I don't know. I guess if I had the answers I'd probably be rich.

I guess I think the things that are of most concern to me when you talk about -- well, I guess just talking about this. Like understanding the nuclear fuel cycle is a bit difficult to start with and when you start talking make Maisie about Plutonium-129 or 93 or





whatever it is, like you're just way over my head.

It seems to me that some of the things, though, when you get to talking about risks, if I have some control over it I'm willing to eye it. But if I don't have any control over it then it seems to me that I want to have somebody — either I want a very trustworthy person or trustworthy group of people eyeing it very carefully and saying that the risk is not — well, that there's a certain degree of risk, but we think it's manageable.

The problem with that, it seems to me, and particularly when we talk about this, you enter into a field where there's -- I guess it's morality. Like at what point do you decide that what you're producing today, this electricity that we can get from other sources -- as you get me talking about it, like it starts making me angrier and angrier and that we don't need to get the electricity from this source so why are we even talking about it.

If there was no other source of electricity I would still have some difficulty. But when there are multiple other sources of electricity and multiple ways of conserving energy and just different ways of running all kinds of systems that we have, that consume vast amounts of energy and electricity then why are we





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discussing this? Like if we don't need it, like...

THE CHAIRMAN: Let me just pick up, not to pursue it, but I think I've grasped the first point you're making on this, to my mind, the very difficult matter of risk. Certain activities of the earth you feel you understand them well enough that you can make some sort of a judgment as to whether you personally want to run that risk or not, and that may be from crossing the street or smoking a cigarette or what have you, but that in certain other areas it just isn't possible for many members of the public to have a sufficient understanding therefore you look to some trustworthy person to try and give you some advice as to what would be a reasonable explanation of the risk which is entailed in certain activities or processes. Is that the —

MR. TAYLOR: I guess I would agree, basically agree with that. Again using nuclear if --

THE CHAIRMAN: I got your main point. That you don't think this is a wise way to produce electricity.

MR. TAYLOR: That's number one, but number two, I don't think the studies that the nuclear folks have put out have been valid scientifically in many cases either.





Like when a person like me has no information about nuclear energy until you read and read and read and maybe I read all the wrong sources, but it seems to me there was enough questions raised and even I can raise some questions about it, that somewhere along the line there's been a snowjob about nuclear energy and that's what's got us.

Like, you know we heard first of all there was not supposed to be, what, one nuclear plant go out in I forget what study it was that said it's so far in the future that we'd never hear about and within, what, about three years we had two of them go. Well, if you take the study that was done to reassure us that it was safe and then look at the actual facts, you know, people are trying to predict the future — that kind of prediction it seems to me was — that was bad as soon as it was made and now I'm scared. Like who do I trust?

THE CHAIRMAN: Question of trust. Okay.

Thank you. I apologize for leading into that broader field but --

MR. TAYLOR: It's quite okay.

THE CHAIRMAN: -- the concept is important, I think, for all of us to try and grasp.

Thank very much, Mr. Taylor.

MR. TAYLOR: Thank you.





---Mr. Taylor withdraws

THE CHAIRMAN: The next and the final person

I have on the list so far, though there may be others

who have registered since this was made up for me, Mr.

Jim Harding who would like to speak on behalf of the

International Uranium Congress.

## PRESENTATION BY MR. HARDING:

Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman and Panelists and fellow friends and citizens of Regina, my name is Jim Harding and I'm presenting these questions and concerns for the scoping stage of the FEARO Panel on behalf of the International Uranium Congress.

This group is part of an international network of environmental, peace, development and energy organizations. Our broad objectives have been endorsed by over 160 organizations in 22 countries, including ones from eight Canadian provinces and territories and about 60 organizations in Saskatchewan.

The countries that we're involved in networking with are primarily the uranium producing and consuming countries, which means nuclear power countries because they are the ones consuming uranium. So we obviously have a great interest in this process.

As I proceed, I think you'll see that many of





our questions are about the question of acceptability and credibility as well as, I do want to perhaps pay a little more attention to the socio-economic questions that have been addressed to this point. But I should state that I think I could say that on behalf of this organization we would strongly endorse the kinds of questions that Maisie Shiell has raised and I won't go into those because Maisie has raised those so clearly.

At the start we have questions that I think are questions about acceptability and credibility arising from the hearings being held in Saskatchewan and I realize that the review is not site specific, but Saskatchewan is the only province where hearings are being held which does not directly contribute to nuclear reactor waste or have an active waste -- nuclear waste management project which is the case in Manitoba.

Now I'm going to raise a number of questions resulting from this because I think it has a bearing on the question of acceptability and public perception.

I've heard two answers to why the hearings are here. One is that we have the mines, which are nuclear mines because they wouldn't exist if there weren't nuclear power plants, and the other is that there's been a proposal to build a nuclear reactor plant in this province.





Well, I'm going to come back to both of those because if in any sense those are reasons, then it raises interesting questions about why the scope of the inquiry isn't larger.

Some of us have been calling for more than a decade for a federal public inquiry on the whole nuclear fuel system, and to be an optimist, which I am in regards to human beings, particularly when they're out of power, one would hope your review might be a step towards that full review. That, in fact, you might even consider recommending the need for the full review of the nuclear fuel system because we are all caught in these dilemmas of not being able to talk about the whole problem and public acceptability will only accrue from being able to think clearly about the whole question.

Now to reiterate what some others have said, it's certainly the position of this group that I'm speaking on behalf of, as a general position, that no technology, nuclear or otherwise, which does not have a proven waste management system should allowed to be developed in the first place, and I think to follow on principles of ecological sustainability, it's time we said that clearly, and later I will come back to how, in fact, we are beginning to see that that is the practice in some other industries.





In the case of nuclear power, which has been in the works for a full half century, and has continually failed to fulfill its guarantee that a waste storage system is just around the corner, it's our view that the only socially and ecologically responsible thing is to stop the technology so as to not build up even further nuclear wastes as a potential cost, and I think I would add, curse for future generations.

Moratorium on nuclear power in Canada, as suggested in 1988 by the Federal Standing Committee on Environment and Forestry, and I probably don't have to remind you that in 1980, the Ontario Royal Commission on Electric Power also said, I think by '85 there should be a moratorium if not just a concept wasn't in place, but a method wasn't in some process of being created, and clearly we're even further back in that thinking in 1990, which is somewhat ironic.

Now if in any way locating hearings here is because we have uranium mines and after the first brief tonight I began to wonder if maybe somebody's got some eyes on Uranium City - another boom for Uranium City folks - but if in any way someone, somewhere is thinking let's go to Saskatchewan because they have mines and maybe we can dump this stuff down the hole, we could ask





why the handling or mishandling of radioactive waste coming from these uranium mines is itself not included in your terms of reference. Now, I'm obviously not asking you that question, but it seems to me there is a relation.

Canada is now the major exporter of uranium in the world, largely because of the large mines in Saskatchewan, which means we are now one of the major reasons why there will be a build-up of nuclear reactor waste, and though the nationalism is satisfying, that was mentioned in the one brief, everyone keeps their own garbage, take the burdens with the benefits, the truth is it's a global system and the exporting of uranium on the scale that's coming out of this province is contributing to a global nuclear reactor waste problem, and we ought to confront that as a moral and an ecological dilemma for people in this province, especially if we don't believe there is an adequate safe way to deal with the waste.

Beyond this we already have nearly two hundred million tonnes of radioactive tailings in this country alone, and in the case of Saskatchewan where there's high uranium in the natural ore, and, as Maisie said, quite high levels of Thorium-230 and Radium-226 in the tailings, relative to tailings in Ontario, we might





even argue that they qualify as higher level wastes.

The Bayda Inquiry certainly viewed them as exceptional waste that should be isolated from the other tailings.

Now even though it's not in your mandate to deal with what I just talked about, obviously you don't have nuclear reactor wastes if you don't have uranium mines creating uranium tailings waste.

So even if you can't deal with it directly we would pose some questions for you to explore from the waste management experience with these tailings because you are doing a concept review.

For example, we'd ask you to ask the AECL how congruent the actual practices used with uranium tailings have been with the ones presented and supported in the public inquiries. Maisie has, of course, been following this quite closely.

We know that some of the higher level tailings which were not to have been put in with the others ended up being put in with the others because the method that was said to be available proved not to be workable.

Now that, in the engineering language, might be called correcting yourself as you go, but I'm afraid that it's a more serious question that can also be rationalized after the fact by ad hoc-ery (phonetic),





and I'm sometimes not sure that that's not what that means, ad hoc-ery with a lot of mystified language and a lot of kind of professional elitism too, I might add, which I think is a disturbing part of it.

Now it seems to me that even if you can't look at uranium tailings in the waste management practice directly as part of your mandate, you might look at the difficulties that industry, as part of the nuclear industry, has had with its own waste problem.

Certainly it is one significant test case of how the front end of the nuclear industry actually performs in contrast to what it says will be its state of the art, fail safe methods. It's a chance to evaluate the value of basing these reviews, public reviews, on idealized and I think public relations models devised by the industry.

Certainly the 150 reported spills at uranium mines since 1981 were of the kind that were vehemently denied as ever being possible during the public inquiries, and those of us who sat through those know that quite well.

Now the implications for this line of questioning for the AECL and the EIS, I think, are pretty clear. You should be asking the AECL to include in its EIS a complete record of all past attempts at





nuclear reactor waste disposal world wide with a full record of what's been the outcome.

Several countries have already tried and abandoned deep rock disposal largely because of movement of underground water waste which is already happening in Canada's underground nuclear reactor waste experiments at Lac du Bonnet. Many countries including the U.S. are looking to more arid locations for storage and I use the word storage intentionally because that's really what we're talking of.

I think the AECL should be asked to look at all plans to show us how fantastic have been some of the notions of dealing with nuclear waste.

For instance, until recently, there was still talk of disposing, in the U.S., of its hundreds of thousands of tons of reactor waste by torpedoing them into the seabed in the North Sea.

The assumption was again along the line of somehow we're going to do better than mother earth.

This is a real ego problem. I mean a planet is a planet, you know, and a human or a profession is a human or a profession but certainly we are not equivalent.

But certainly the logic in this, it was a crazy logic and thank God the plan has been abandoned, to my knowledge, and I think Norway and Sweden would be





thankful too, that somehow the seabed would encase the radioactive elements so as to slow down their diffusion as the encasement eroded.

Now what we know -- now this proves absolute ignorance about ocean ecology, and yet was seriously being considered until two or three years ago. In fact the biologist who was a member of this concept, he was interviewed very recently on CBC Radio.

Now there are many others and I'm not going to go into them, but I'd strongly suggest that the committee look at the world information services on energy newsletter from its very beginning simply to get the clippings, the history of clippings of every failed nuclear waste attempt, because they're a group based in Amsterdam that has monitored the world press on nuclear issues and kept track of reporting on what happens with nuclear waste concepts and it might be quite -- in fact I'd strongly recommend that the Panel subscribe to the Wise newsletter, World Information Services on Energy based in Amsterdam. I can pass on the address if necessary.

Now to return to the question of whether coming here has anything to do with there being a proposal for a nuclear reactor for this province, well obviously this is an example of having the cart before





the horse.

As was shown when the FEARO Panel came to Saskatchewan, I think probably for the last time in 1980, to review the proposed uranium refinery outside Saskatoon, I think it's fair to say there's even a deeper opposition in this province to expand the nuclear system and I won't give you examples, but the NDP itself, which oversaw the expansion of the uranium mines, it is now the official opposition, is on record as opposing the construction of any proposed nuclear reactor and supports the phase out of existing uranium mines in the province.

Even if the thought that there might be a reactor built in Saskatchewan crossed anyone's mind in deciding to have hearings about reactor wastes here, seems to me we have a right to raise questions about -- basically about energy policy.

I realize according to your own terms of reference your Panel is to exclude energy policies of Canada and its provinces and the role nuclear power should play in these policies. We are not saying this exclusion is a good thing because we think an inquiry on the whole nuclear system would be advantageous for the public, but certainly if the feasibility of a reactor being built here is a factor in sitting here, then you





are, in a sense, entering into the whole question of energy policy.

The separation or the attempt to separate nuclear wastes from what produces nuclear wastes, we find to be - and I don't think we can say it any clearer - to be silly.

You can't deal with any waste problem without dealing with the source of production. This has been the preferred approach taken to other waste problems such as PCBs, dioxins, metholmercury and asbestos, to name a few. In some cases safe alternatives have been found to particular industrial toxins and that industry has not been forced to close down.

In some cases such as nuclear power, the toxic wastes are inherent to the industry, hence an alternative technology is required. It seems a simple matter of logic. If that is the case then you have every right to ask AECL the implications of moving to energy alternatives such as energy efficiency, conservation and renewables and how the development of these could reduce the use of nuclear power and the buildup of nuclear waste.

It seems to me that is a reasonable question, because if we're dealing with 14,000 tonnes as at present or 40,000 tonnes at the turn of the century and





you can keep drawing your curve, it has a different implication in terms of costing and acceptability. I realize we can debate this down to a small amount or a very big amount, but it is a difference in the acceptability and the credibility. Were there to be a stop at 14,000, your task of finding an acceptable way even if it was not a certain way would be fundamentally different.

So it seems to me fair to ask what are the implications of moving to energy alternatives, et cetera, et cetera, for reducing dependence on nuclear power and stopping the buildup of nuclear waste.

Now nuclear officials have attempted to market their toxic product as the sustainable alternative to fossil fuels and you're bound, of course, to be dealing with this question, even though it might be outside your mandate, and the issue of sustainability has already been raised so I want to expand on that.

Even a brisk reading of the Brundtland Report makes it quite clear that nuclear energy was not seen as the way to go. After noting the rising risks of nuclear power - I've given you the pages - the difficulties controlling nuclear weapons, proliferation, the higher than alleged chances of nuclear reactor accidents, the Brundtland Report targets the issue of nuclear reactor





waste. It clearly acknowledged the need to isolate
"These from the biosphere from many hundreds of
thousands of years that they will remain hazardously
radioactive," and it makes no bones about it that, "The
problem of nuclear disposal remains unsolved."

It says, "The generation of nuclear power is only justified if there are solid solutions to the presently unsolved problems to which it gives rise," which is a polite way of saying this is not justified. And it states quite clearly that the priority, in terms of sustainability is, "That vigorous promotion of energy efficient practices in all energy sectors and large scale programs of research, development and demonstration for the safe and environmentally benign use of all promising energy sources, especially renewables, be given the higher priority."

It seems to me --

THE CHAIRMAN: Excuse me, Mr. Harding, I don't know whether you had asked for an additional 10 minutes.

MR. HARDING: I did.

THE CHAIRMAN: Did you? I'm sorry. I wasn't informed of that. Please, you're all right.

MR. HARDING: And I'm more than half done.

You might wish to explore and ask the AECL to





explore what the implication of following this approach in Canada, the Brundtland approach, would be for reducing the future cost, both ecological and economic of nuclear waste -- nuclear reactor waste.

You might also want to ask the Federal EMR which subsidizes the AECL, why they are not pursuing the priorities emphasized by the Brundtland Report on sustainable development. It seems like a legitimate question.

There is growing worldwide support for the ecological ethic that wastes for which a safe disposal system is not in place or is not likely to be developed should not be created.

Because of the hundreds of thousands of years which nuclear waste will remain hazardous to the biosphere, one cannot really talk of disposal as a viable waste management strategy. One is really talking about permanent storage, and in an ecologically and geologically dynamic world for time periods beyond human historical contemplation.

When you really think about it and imagine what's being considered by the AECL, the absurdity and the cynicism is overwhelming. This is why we think there's another agenda which supersedes that of nuclear waste management.





Now, I'm going to jump. Basically we're calling for some common sense, looking at the source of the waste as part of the solution to the waste problem.

It's artificial and highly questionable to separate the review of nuclear waste from the nuclear reactors which create them, as though nuclear power is a sacred cow with a privileged status beyond the environmental review process. As though the federal government is so tied to its offspring, nuclear power, that it cannot take a second look at it even in its own environmental review process, and because of this we want to turn to a question that I think relates to the part of your mandate about acceptability, and that's to raise a few questions in conclusion about bias.

Your scientific review group seems
particularly narrow. Not only are six of the total of
13 appointees from an engineering background, but the
others are all from the natural sciences. Though two
are biologists there are no ecologists in the group.
There are no social scientists at all. There are no
economists capable of assessing cost benefit analyses,
no public policy analysts, no sociologists to address
issues of social structure and social change which might
be what this is really about. You need a person, we
would argue, trained in philosophy and semantics in that





so much of the language used in this controversial area amounts to public relations double talk, and we're serious. A lot of this is about language and discourse. It is not about nuclear waste, and I think if you're going to deal with acceptability and credibility that dimension will have to be looked at.

Clearly the issue of nuclear waste does raise many societal and ideological problems in addition to the difficult geological ecological and engineering ones. Yet they seem to have been given little significance.

Other kinds of bias have been operating, which I think have a bearing on the credibility, and I won't go into this, but I should point out that a number of people in Regina were concerned that when you came through on the open house, that part of the travelling display was the AECL and Ontario Hydro, and if you were to separate the review process from energy policy, people found it rather strange, there was Ontario Hydro with demonstrations of how nuclear power plants worked. I suppose to balance that people could have requested a renewable energy, non nuclear waste producing design or display in the same room to give, if you like, a more balanced picture.

On the whole question of socio-economic






impacts, there is also the question of bias that enters, and credibility, and, I suppose, acceptability ultimately, and I will just briefly deal with this.

Even in some of the publications of the Panel, we sense there is a socio-economic predisposition. For example, the questions that were listed in the second issue of -- or Volume 1, Issue 2 of dialogue on the socio-economic issues to be considered by the FEARO Panel, the first two questions posed deal with the possibility of increased employment from AECL's nuclear waste facility. They both use the more deterministic word "would."

The third question posed deals with the possibility of negative economic impacts. In this case the less deterministic more probabilistic term "might" is used.

The next two questions - I'm only giving you a couple of examples. The whole thing is spelled out in the brief - the next two questions posed deal with a possibility of increased demand for local products, services and housing. The more deterministic term "would" is used again.

The next two questions posed deal with a possibility of an increase in population specifying professional and scientific staff.





What we're saying is the bias is already taking shape in the kinds of questions that are posed. Four of the first five questions posed, you're already painting a picture of benefits from economic growth. This picture would obviously be quite attractive to depressed communities facing serious unemployment, out migration, and a weakening local economy.

Though the AECL proposal and FEARO Panel are theoretically not to be site specific, we all know there are many such communities in the Cambrian Shield where local elites and politicians would look upon the picture presented by these questions in mostly positive terms. The very asking of these questions in this manner carries a clear message.

Now I will move -- you have other examples of that, but I want to pose some additional socio-economic questions. Why are there no questions posed about the capital cost of such job creation? About the loss of economic benefits to other communities due to this capital intensiveness, or about the effects of the worry about nuclear waste over many generations on the morale and quality of life of the people in this region, hypothetical region, or about whether communities facing a depressed economy would even consider such a facility if alternative economic and social development paths





were emphasized, more sustainable ones, or whether the creation of such a facility will make it more likely that other countries, perhaps even those importing Canadian uranium, will send their nuclear reactor wastes here for disposal. Global cost effectiveness. We hope you won't rule these sort of questions out of order since that would simply assure that the overwhelming bias towards the AECL persists.

On the basis of earlier reports, about 2,500 person years of employment which might result from the 50 years needed to begin and end deep rock storage, even taking what would likely prove to be a great underestimation of the cost, being \$7 billion - this was the figure given by the AECL in an interview - we end up with a figure of 2.8 million dollars per job. This is obviously not a cost effective way to create employment except, perhaps, for those in the AECL already facing unemployment due to the lack of demand for their toxic products. Doesn't it make more sense to put this kind of investment into alternative technologies which don't produce waste?

Now the point is, something will have to be put into the 14,000 tonnes, but if the waste buildup isn't stopped a heck of a lot more capital will have to be put into the problem and not be available maybe to





move in more sustainable ways.

I think to conclude, we're concerned that already the narrowing of the mandate and some of the predispositions around benefits and assumption of continuation of the industry will make the process lack credibility to a large part of the public.

The underlying conflict of interest which perpetuates this industry will continue to shine through the kind of promotions that it's involved in. The fact that the AECL, a proponent in this FEARO review, and the FEARO review itself both report to the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, the minister is known to be pro nuclear and who, interestingly, represents the Manitoba riding which includes AECL's Whiteshell Research Station, makes the process somewhat circular to us and the credibility somewhat questionable.

I recognize that the FEARO panel also reports to the Federal Environment Department, and I do not rule out some contradiction in the federal state over how to respond to the mounting ecological crisis. God knows there should be some. However, we know which minister has carried the clout in matters of energy policy, which really what this is about.

The fact that the nuclear regulatory system also reports to the Minister of EMR shows just how






incestuous the nuclear industry has become.

If the AECB was reporting to the Federal Environment Minister and this FEARO Panel was only reporting to that Ministry, those of us in the International Uranium Congress might have more confidence in the process.

Under present circumstances, not only FEARO but the AECB, the nuclear regulator is complicit in the nuclear industry's attempt to expand and leak documents from the AECB to the Treasury Board, reported in the Globe and Mail on May 28th of last year, indicate that the AECB knows itself to play a major part in the promotion of the industry. It will probably come as a surprise to the people of this province that the AECB requested and received 14 new person years of staff and over one million additional dollars to licence "the Candu-3 and new uranium mines in Saskatchewan" which hasn't even been approved.

The AECB knows something we don't know perhaps. Perhaps the decision has already been made. The most interesting thing in the AECB document to the Treasury Board was, and I quote, this is the regulatory agency, and I quote, "The marketability of the Candu-3 may be prejudiced as it relies on up front licencing to reduce its capital costs to make it competitive." What





this is saying, is that the regulators understand their role to be to help expand the marketability and competitiveness of the nuclear industry. A strange role for regulators indeed.

If nuclear regulators can be that complicit with the industry, how can Canadians believe that a FEARO review process, hamstrung by a limited mandate, will provide them with the kind of independence required to finally address the root cause of nuclear waste.

Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Harding. I appreciate that you --

MR. HARDING: Jumped.

THE CHAIRMAN: -- had to skim and jump through your presentation. The result may be a somewhat more staccato impression left than you would have wished. I think I certainly wouldn't want to comment on it and it would be improper to do it in any event in this stage but I can assure you that we will want to read it very carefully and take into account the full report and that it will be given the same weight as your presentation, so we'll all be reading that more carefully.

It maybe, however, even from a rapid skimming of the material and listening to you at the same time





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that some of the members of Panel will some questions they would like to put to you while you're here. Are there such?

Dr. LaPierre.

DR. LAPIERRE: I have a question regarding your comment on the globality of the problem. Since you indicated in your brief that the waste was being produced globally, do you think that the scope of the problem in controlling it should be on the edges of a global authority?

MR. HARDING: Well, we already know nuclear wastes have been dumped in the ocean, and that that method of out of sight - out of mind was used, and I suspect you would need some kind of international convention to enforce retrieving of that, which, it seems to me, should be done quickly.

It seems to me that every industry in the world is competing with each other for markets, which puts a bit of a slant on an attempt at some objective reconstruction of what is the magnitude of the problem. People tend, when they're in a highly competitive market, to put their best face forward and to not talk about wastes which we are finally doing 50 years after this industry started up. It seems to me it might take an international body, not like the IAEA that I think





itself has some of the same credibility problems that AECB has, but something that's seen more to the implementing of the sustainable development idea to assess what is the global risk. What has been done, been documented, what's been done and perhaps not well

At that level, yes, it's not that different than global warming. I mean it's different in its impact, but certainly we don't want to pretend that we're just talking about risks that might accrue from deep burial and then fissures and water movements bringing alpha emitters to the surface much faster than anyone realized. We also want to talk about oceans, and we want to talk about the whole interdependence of ocean ecosystems.

Now the oceans are under a lot of assault from other things as well, but I guess the answer is, yes, because I suspect that we don't know most of what we should know on a global basis about this problem.

DR. LAPIERRE: Thank you.


THE CHAIRMAN: Other questions?

Mr. Van Vliet.

MR. VAN VLIET: Mr. Harding, you indicate in your paper that it's noteworthy that several countries have tried and abandoned deep rock disposal for a

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documented.





variety of reasons. Could you give us which ones?

MR. HARDING: Well, my understanding is that even the Germans were looking at this and they had some difficulties with stability of the structure and that's based on actually talking with a West German at the university. So it's something to explore. But my understanding is that the U.S. has also shifted its focus -- well, it's put some money into the Lac du Bonnet, but its domestic focus, I believe, is shifted to areas with less rainfall.

They did look at some sites, I believe, in northern Maine, if I'm right, that may not be being explored at this point, but I think if you look at the Wise Newsletter I mentioned there's reference to a number of the West German plans to deal with both salt and deep rock burials in some of their sort of annotations of their news stories. I wouldn't know what other lead to take than the Wise Newsletter.

MR. VAN VLIET: Are these being abandoned for technical or social political reasons?

MR. HARDING: I'm not sure, but I do think it is probably both, given that the water issues have been raised in a number of reports that just the amount of water that was moving in these systems was far greater than people had expected they'd be dealing with





I have read a report about rubber boots in Lac du Bonnet. I don't know if you've been there. You probably did a tour of it. I think it was Patterson's book, the Manitoba physicist who's done a couple of books on ethropower (phonetic). I think I read in one of his, that is one of the people who raised that there were technical problems, not just local community opposition. I think that's in Maisie's — it's in the book Maisie actually referred to the reports of that.

THE CHAIRMAN: Dr. Wilson.

DR. WILSON: I'm interested in your comments around the scientific review group that we've appointed, and a number of people who have made interventions have mentioned the -- you know, the importance of the cost benefit analysis which will certainly be included, and as you know or you may not know, we have perfect freedom to consult widely.

What I'd like to ask you, you mentioned here issues of social structure and social change. I mean the very important societal questions which may come, and since this exercise is about identifying questions that we put to AECL, are you able to articulate for the Panel what some of those social structure questions might be?

MR. HARDING: Well, as a Euro-Canadian, who





has just, I suppose, in my mid-life discovered the cultural bias that came with the immigrants of which I am an offspring, I find it rather strange that we can even sit here and talk about this time span with any semblance of security that there would be any -- that we could predict societal continuity.

The cultures that have had ways of attempting to keep tabs on themselves as ecological creatures have been largely decimated on this planted and are only attempting a comeback at this time, with, I think, the support of the environmental movement worldwide.

Aboriginal people and the emerging kind of ecology movement is quite strong because the people who are in the environmental movement that is beginning to realize it has to be more than an anti pollution movement. It has to be something that talks about creating sustainable societies, has an immense amount to learn in terms of how do we even keep track of what's happening to us over time periods.

I've worked with the Inuit in the East Arctic who have inhabited that quite difficult terrain in terms of surviving for an estimated 5,000 years with some quite incredible cultural skills in terms of keeping track of their dependence on caribou herds and such, and






I don't believe in the dominant culture we have anything like that sense of culture, kinship continuity, and I'm just talking 5,000 years.

It seems to me that the toughest questions are questions of history, not questions of engineering. Because the presentation around engineering raised all kinds of societal questions, I was taking notes, and we'd be quite happy to transpose those into societal terms.

Are you going to have professional engineers signing the Saskatchewan Code of Ethics as of 1980 there for a hundred thousand years overseeing this? I mean we know very well that that kind of continuity is unlikely. There may not even be engineers in a sustainable society. There may be something else. We're dealing with such a short time span in our sense of going into the future that I think that perhaps we should ask questions of cultural bias and maybe ask how questions of cultural bias. Even our notion of science and technology, which is very short term, probably biases us to think things are easy or more manageable technically than they really are.

I suppose to sum up, I know geology is not a predicted science. I'm not dumb. We know ecology is not yet a predictive science, and we certainly know





history isn't a predictive field. Well, there it is folks. If those three are not predictive, we've got to ask some really tough questions about sort of entering into a hundred thousand year contract with unborn generations about monitoring nuclear waste in a particular way.

Again, I would say the best way to deal with that uncertainty is to stop creating them and then try to deal with it. Give us the moratorium. Give us the break. Give us the time to think as clearly as we can.

THE CHAIRMAN: Other questions?

Dr. LaPierre.

DR. LAPIERRE: Mr. Harding, I just have one concern and it is your concern I guess about hitting biases by an association of the Panel and really that concerns me because I can assure you that as far as I'm concerned those comments do disturb me, and I guess you have brought forth some interesting observations from the dialogue newsletter. But I just wanted to indicate to you that as far as I'm concerned I'm doing an honest job.

MR. HARDING: We're not here to -- this was not said to alienate you or to alienate us from you. It was said because I think you're looking for some insight into the question of acceptability, and I believe that






many people do not distinguish between the AECB, the AECL and your inquiry. Because the nuclear industry has been a closed shop for so long, and that the processes — the processes that we have in terms of reporting in this province are even more credible — I hate to say that. I hope Devine hears me. He can quote that in the election — but we separated the mine's waste from the Department of Mineral Resources here. It used to be similar as the MR so it reports to environment, so that at least there's the chance to build up some sense of credible autonomous reporting and expertise in a department that has a clear mandate, or ought to have a clear mandate and hopefully some day we'll even have as much influence as Energy Mines and Resources.

The trouble is in the federal system it's a mixed-up reporting system and it confuses people. I even had an AECB person agree with me privately at the end of a meeting about two weeks ago that they should report to environment report because he knows he has a credibility problem.

So I think you need to know that to be able to ask the questions about when will the public believe that some people are actually trying to look at this stuff to sort it out, and when will they think there's another agenda.





For example, the agenda of the industry trying to convince the public that something is being done to deal with the waste, therefore it's all right to go on expanding nuclear power. Because we know and they know from their own testing that that's their biggest credibility problem.

So you're pulled into that environment which is highly loaded and people need to have a sense, and I suppose we will ultimately judge you by your report, of whether you can ask questions that are clearly outside of that incestuous nuclear circle which is a bit circular. I mean it is — if you take a look at it structurally it isn't a particularly credible system of reporting.

DR. LAPIERRE: Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: No further questions for -- one more from Mr. Van Vliet or two if you wish.

MR. VAN VLIET: Is there, in your opinion, a safe method of storage at this present time?

MR. HARDING: No, but I do want to read what one of our supporters would have said if she had come herself, so that it's clear what our position is. We don't believe there's a safe method and we don't believe that moving to deep, you know, Cambrian storage, certainly with what's presently known, carries enough --





has reduced the uncertainty sufficiently that we'd think that that was the route to go.

This is what one of our supporters wanted to say. Store all the waste in visible places beside or near the facility. Check on containers, et cetera, at least twice yearly and make repairs and replacement as needed, report on at least an annual basis to all householders in a 200 mile radius plus all communities downstream or at least as far as the sea. Nuclear waste should not be hidden and should not be transported.

There should be no central facility.

And I think -- I guess I would encourage you to think of that as a way to go because it's the out of sight - out mind question and the sense that the public thinks somebody is actually dealing with something that could in fact not be dealt with because you're taking -- I mean you're making too many assumptions when you move to a so-called permanent storage system.

I can't ever imagine geology being a predictive science myself, to be frank, in which case better to keep the stuff visible and monitored. It reduces as quickly as possible how much is created, and do the serious long-term studies, and I mean long-term. It may not be our generation that can deal with this stuff. I don't see it as an ethical dilemma. I think





there's probably more of an ethical dilemma to pretend do to something that really passes the buck, which we might be doing to future generations by saying well, we'll go into it sort of incrementally and ad hoc and we'll build something and we'll put it there and we'll have people keep track of it with the sense in the public that the problem is being addressed and then perhaps stimulate late a growth of more wastes for future generations to deal with.

MR. VAN VLIET: So you clearly see the -- it is less of an ethical problem to pass on the waste in a visible place rather than in a place where it --

MR. HARDING: Yeah, and I think that's the whole dilemma of a creating a sustainable society, is that we have to recognize that for every product there's — at present we are a waste producing species and if we don't get the feedback in the process of the benefits we can become, you know — I suppose our ethical standards can go to the very lowest level, which they have. I mean — I think that's largely what this is a question of, is raising our social ethics so that we take responsibility for the waste we produce and perhaps stop doing things the way we're doing them, and if we don't have them visible and within our own realm of social benefits it seems to me you can't ever





generate that public responsibility.

Plus, I think it's probably better to have it monitored on that basis. Having everything in one area and a major calamity, I suppose you could always say it's something like Chernobyl instead of something else, but there's no guarantees that geological changes don't have implications for multiple ecosystems and we don't know very much about underwater water systems. The more I talk to hydrologists the more I realize it's even — we're better at public opinion polling — can I state it that way — with our sampling then we are at understanding hydrology because of the sampling dilemmas.


MR. VAN VLIET: Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr.

Harding, and I can assure you --

MR. HARDING: I have one thing that I would like to leave with you. It's the proceedings of the Congress that we organized in 1988 and it's a publication put out by environmental groups when the last FEARO Panel sat in Saskatchewan in 1980, and you might be interested in having it for your library.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, and we'll make sure that we make a note of that also in the record of the proceedings, that has been referred to.





MR. HARDING: Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for appearing. We will be re-reading what you've written and also what you've said in your presentation today. Thank you for that.

---Mr. Harding withdraws

Mr. Harding's name was the last one I had on the list, but I would like to ask now if there is anyone else who would like to address us while we're here. We have a little time available for that. If not, I would like to thank all of you for — first for being present and particularly those who have taken the trouble to prepare material and to participate in our discussions today.

I hope that there is a little bit of tea and coffee left and that you will feel that it's worthwhile to stay and have a little bit of informal chat amongst yourselves and possibly the members of the panel, as informal discussions are frequently of equal benefit to the more formal presentations which we have. So please, if you'd like to stay around a little bit longer do so. You'd be very welcome.

Thank you very much indeed.

---Whereupon the scoping meeting adjourned at 9:30 p.m. to resume Tuesday, November 20, 1990, at 7:00 p.m.





I hereby certify the foregoing to be a true and accurate computerized transcription of the proceedings, to the best of my skill and ability.

Carla Helman, C.S.R.

